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ABSTRACT 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the majority of Latin American states have 
attempted to incorporate in some way or another human rights concern into their 
respective foreign policies, highlighting a history of human rights abuses and the return 
of democratic political rule as a trigger for galvanizing a commitment to assist in 
preventing such violations in other countries. Yet, while human rights have come to play 
a non-trivial role in the contemporary foreign policy of many Latin American states, there 
is great diversity in the ways and the extent to which they go about incorporating human 
rights concerns into their foreign policies. Explaining the diversity of human rights 
foreign policies of new Latin American democracies is at the heat of this project. The 
main research questions are the following: Why do new democracies incorporate human 
rights into their foreign policies? And what explains the different international human 
rights policies of new democracies? To answer these questions, this research compares 
the human rights foreign policies of Chile and Brazil for over two decades starting from 
their respective transitions to democracy. 
The study argues that states commitment to international human rights is the 
result of the intersection of domestic and international influences. At the international 
level, the search for international legitimacy and the desire for recognition and credibility 
affected the adoption of international human rights in both cases but with different 
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degrees of impact. International values and pressures by themselves, while necessary, are 
an insufficient condition for human rights initiatives perceived to have not insubstantial 
political, economic or strategic costs. New democracies will be more or less likely to 
actively include human rights in their international policies depending on the following 
four domestic conditions: political leadership legitimizing the inclusion of human rights 
into a state’s policies, civil society groups connected to international human rights 
advocacy networks with a capacity to influencing the foreign policy decisions of their 
government, and the Foreign Ministry’s attitudes towards international human rights and 
the degree of influence it exercises over the outcome of the foreign policy process. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The International Human Rights Policies of Latin American Democracies 
Since the beginning of the 1990s Latin American states have increased their 
participation in international and regional human rights regimes and reinforced their 
capacities to respond and aid states when they face human rights catastrophes. Most 
countries in the region have attempted to incorporate in some way or another human 
rights concerns into their respective foreign policies, highlighting a history of abuse 
within their own countries as a trigger for galvanizing a commitment to assist in 
preventing such abuse in other countries. These cases come from all the Latin American 
Sub-regions (North- Central- South America) regardless of geography or relative power 
in the international system. The majority of them are, however, states that ended up years 
and in some cases decades of authoritarian regimes to undergo important transition to 
democracy processes that led to consolidation years later. 
In South America, Argentina represents a middle power that dramatically changed 
its international policies to more adequately incorporate human rights concerns after the 
end of the military rule. The trajectory of Argentina has been characterized as a transit 
from being a “Pariah state to a global protagonist in international human rights” (Sikkink 
2008). Among the many actions that Argentina took to protect human rights beyond its 
borders, the country stands out for helping to define the very term of forced 
disappearance and developed regional and international instruments to end the practice. 
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Mexico, another middle power state and a country internationally known for its 
traditionally absolute sovereignty focus, also started to open up to the international 
human rights regime since the defeat of almost a century of one single party rule under 
the PRI—Institutional Revolutionary Party in 2000. During President Fox’s years, 
Mexico ratified all the major regional and international human rights treaties accepting 
the oversight procedures of these Conventions and opening its door to external scrutiny 
receiving multiple visits of human rights special rapporteurs from the United Nations 
Special Mechanisms and the Organization of American States (OAS). 
Smaller states such as Uruguay, Costa Rica, Guatemala and Chile have also 
played a significant role shaping international human rights. Uruguay, for example, has 
focused on increasing its peacekeeping capacity worldwide. UN Secretary General, Ban 
Ki-moon in a recent visit to the country said that “Uruguay’s commitment to global 
peacekeeping is without rival”, highlighting that “when adjusted for population, no 
country contributes more troops than Uruguay ” (UN News Center, 2014).  Costa Rica, 
without undergoing major democratic breakdowns since 1950s, has a historical record as 
a human rights champion. The country lobbied aggressively for the establishment of the 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and became the first nation to recognize the 
jurisdiction of the Inter-American Human Rights Court, based in San Jose. Costa Rica’s 
influence in multilateral institutions has helped to frame and ratify treaties, create and 
staff institutions, monitor and sanctions offenders, and introduce new understandings of 
rights to the global agenda (Brysk 2009). Guatemala after 36 years of internal conflict 
and the only genocidal situation in the region and despite continuous domestic 
vulnerabilities also decided to include human rights as a central part of its new 
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democratic foreign policy. This Central American country brings to the table its own 
knowledge as a peace-builder based on the positive experience of the United Nations 
Verification Mission (MINUGUA) which performed a role as a third actor in the peace 
negotiations and was subsequently overseer of the consolidation of the process. The 
presence of the International Commission Against Impunity (CICIG) in the country is 
also pioneering experience on an international scale, through which the United Nations 
were involved in the strengthening of justice (Aguilera 2012). Guatemala as a non-
permanent member of the UNSC in 2012 had a leading role in the debates regarding the 
protection of civilians in armed conflicts and was strong supporter of the concept of 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P). 
Chile is probably the best example of a small state actively promoting 
international human rights. The country is among the few Latin American states that have 
gone as far as to identify the international promotion and protection of human rights as 
one of the fundamental goals of its foreign policy. After the end of the military regime, 
the first democratic government quickly ratified all major international and regional 
human rights treaties and reactivated its participation in international human rights 
institutions. Since then, the country has engaged in strengthening international 
institutions protecting human rights, being active, for instance, in negotiations for the 
newly created UN Human Rights Council and the UN Peace Building Commission, 
augmenting the presence of Latin American representatives in human rights institutions, 
and sponsoring or co-sponsoring important UN resolutions on issues such as the right to 
truth, the protection for all persons against enforced disappearance, the optional protocol 
to the convention against torture, among many others. Chile has actively participated in 
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UN peacekeeping operations since the 1990s and clearly endorsed the concept of the 
Responsibility to Protect internationally (Vargas, 2012; Aranda & Morande, 2012). 
Yet, while human rights have come to play a non-trivial role in the contemporary 
foreign policy of many Latin American states, there is a great diversity in the ways in 
which they go about incorporating human rights concerns into their foreign policies and 
in the priority assigned to these principles as part o their international policies. There is a 
group of Latin American states that are more passive when comes to defending human 
rights internationally and a few are still skeptic of the value and legitimacy of human 
rights in world politics. Brazil has traditionally preferred to define its national interests 
differently emphasizing the importance of absolute sovereignty, non-intervention, and 
autonomy in international politics. In recent years there has been increasing criticism 
against Brazil’s foreign policy in this area. A recent study comparing the six most 
influential rising democracies
1
 in relation to their support to human rights at the 
multilateral level, characterized Brazil as “ambivalent and often unpredictable” when 
comes to voting behavior in key UN bodies (Piccone 2011:139). Yet, these studies also 
have tended to downplay the fact that Brazil has been increasingly a more active actor, 
for example, in the process of reform creating the new UN Human Rights Council and 
has been at the forefront of important international initiatives at the United Nations on the 
right to health, development and non-discrimination. 
Nicaragua, Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador are arguable more reluctant 
participants of the international human rights regimes and in several occasions they have 
                                                          
1
 The study includes Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey. 
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denounced human rights principles as an unjustifiable intrusion into the sovereignty of 
states. Venezuela, for example, withdrew its membership at the Inter-American Human 
Rights Commission and Bolivia and Ecuador recently announced that they would follow 
suit. At the international level, these countries’ tendency has been to abstain from 
condemning human rights violations abroad. Recently, these states refused to condemn at 
the UN General Assembly and at the Human Rights Council the atrocities committed by 
Bashar al-Assad in Syria. 
Research Questions 
The precise etiologies of these diverse policies among states that at least 
ostensibly have similar political values due to their experience with authoritarianism that 
led to democratic openings and consolidation, are members of the same regional 
institutions, and in some cases are at similar stages of economic development should be 
susceptible to clarification. This research addresses the following questions:  
1) Why do new democracies incorporate human rights into their foreign policies?  
2) What explains the different international human rights policies of new 
democracies? 
Why this Research Matters 
The current literature on human rights and foreign policy focuses heavily on 
countries from the North—specially the United States and some Western European 
countries—and pays too little attention to what and through which mechanisms countries 
from different geographical areas and with different political and economic capacities are 
doing to protect human rights internationally. Scholars have paid even less attention to 
explaining why there is a great diversity in the way in which new democracies adopt 
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human rights as part of their foreign policies. This dissertation is the first one to 
concentrate on explaining the extent to which newly democratized states in Latin 
American support human rights beyond their borders and how and why their policies 
differ.
2
  
Of particular importance is the inclusion of Chile and Brazil as case studies in this 
research. There is an emergent consensus that Brazil’s status as a rising power has made 
the country an increasingly pivotal player in international relations. Yet, thus far there has 
been relatively little debate with regards to the values guiding Brazil’ international 
policies and the particular place of human rights in its foreign policy. Chile’s 
international trajectory, on the other hand, illustrates how a small state emerging from 
military rule can reconstruct its perception of national interests in order to incorporate 
humanitarian concerns into foreign policy decisions. 
The experience of Chile and Brazil also contributes to contemporary debates 
about the means and circumstances in which states are likely to intervene in one way or 
another to prevent or to terminate violations of human rights or to strengthen the 
normative and institutional framework for defending human rights. Important policy 
lessons can be extracted from the foreign policy experience of these two countries that 
can serve as guidelines for government officials, local and international norms 
                                                          
2
 To be sure, among the very limited literature on the subject it is important to highlight David 
Forsythe’s volume (2000) on “Human Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy” and Alison 
Brysk’s “Global Good Samaritans” (2009) both of them including some case studies from the 
Global South. Also at a regional level, Natalia Saltalamacchia and Ana Covarrubias recently 
published a book titled “Derechos Humanos y Politica Exterior: Seis Casos Latinoamericanos” 
(2012) describing how six Latin American states have incorporated human rights into their 
international policies. Yet, none of these publications focus on comparatively explaining the 
different human rights performance of their cases and some of their chapters are largely 
descriptive. 
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entrepreneurs, NGOS and epistemic communities interested in the promotion of human 
rights internationally.  
What is a Human Rights Foreign Policy? 
Democratic states have committed and also implemented international human 
rights policies for almost half a century.
3
 Countries adopting such policies aim to improve 
the human rights practices of a targeted government and or to prevent further human 
rights violations in the future.
4
 The broader aim of human rights foreign policies is, 
therefore, improving and securing the fundamental rights outlined in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the two International Covenants (Civil and Political 
Rights, as well as Economic, Cultural and Social Rights). In principle, this means that 
states are “concerned about human rights violations, wherever they occur, and that 
borders are not barriers for the protection of rights” (Sikkink 2004:5). In practice, the 
weight that each country assigns to international human rights varies considerably 
according to their foreign policy priorities, political and economist interests as well as 
with the intensity of the violations. The policy instruments and means that states select to 
achieve this goal are also diverse. 
A human rights foreign policy has two related but analytically separate parts: a 
bilateral and a multilateral policy. States have a multilateral human rights policy when 
they decide to participate in global multilateral mechanisms that are part of the 
international human rights regime. The latter is generally understood as a set of 
                                                          
3
 In Europe and the United States human rights foreign policies were implemented in 1970s. In 
Latin America human rights promotion started only after the wave of repressive regimes ended in 
the mid-1980s and early 1990s. 
4
 In some cases the aim is simply deterring similar future violations.  
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principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures that states and other 
international actors accept as authoritative on the field of human rights (Donnelly 
2013:14). A major aspect of participating in international human rights regime refers to 
the ratification of international human rights treaties and a state’s acceptance of specific 
mechanisms for multilateral supervision of domestic human rights practices. Of the 
hundred or more treaties that address human rights issues, broadly understood, six are 
usually taken to provide the core of international human rights law: the two1966 
International Human Rights Covenants plus the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women; the 1984 Convention Against Torture and 
Other, Cruel, Inhuman, or Degradating Treatment or Punishment; and the 1989 
Convention of the Rights of the Child (Donnelly 2013:14). In addition, there are 
particular types of international human rights treaties that are especially powerful in the 
sense that they have enforcement powers that permit a supranational institution like a 
regional human rights court to oversee human rights practices. Examples of such treaties 
include the European Convention on Human Rights, the American Convention on Human 
Rights, and the Rome Statue of the international Criminal (Sikkink 2004: 10).  
Apart from the ratification of international human rights treaties, a multilateral 
human rights policy includes the participation in international organizations in particular 
UN institutions with a human rights mandate. At the core of these organizations are the 
UN Human Rights Council and the High Commissioner of Human Rights but it also 
encompasses organizations with a mandate that centrally includes but is not limited to 
human rights such as UNESCO, the International Labor Organization (ILO), the 
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International Criminal Court (ICC), and the UN Security Council and the UN Peace-
Building Commission and UN Peacekeeping missions. Regional organizations are also 
included in this list, in particular when they have a system of human rights enforcement 
such as such as the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American 
Commission of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court. Participation in these 
organizations involves activities such as founding and or joining these diverse 
international bodies; drafting, sponsoring and supporting human rights resolutions and 
initiatives; financing these institutions or any relevant initiative that they sponsor; and 
providing personnel such as troops in the case of UN Peacekeeping missions. 
Bilateral human rights diplomacy consists of state to state diplomacy. In other 
words, “states have a bilateral human rights policies when their foreign policies 
systematically takes human rights in other states into account” (Sikkink 2004:10). The 
implementation of bilateral foreign policy can take many forms and can be legitimately 
pursued using all the means of foreign policy—short of the use of force, which 
contemporary international law reserves for self-defense (Donnelly 2013:140). These 
means include a wide array of policies that can be arranged as a continuum from mild to 
severe including: private diplomatic discussions, public diplomatic statements, 
information generation and dissemination, reprioritizing aid decisions to decide on 
human rights goals, human rights training programs, sanctions trade sanctions and arms 
embargoes, among other initiatives.  
States with both bilateral and multilateral policies can be considered as having a 
comprehensive human rights foreign policy. In practice, only some states have both. The 
United States has a strong bilateral policy and a very poor multilateral policy. Most of 
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Latin American countries have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights and others human rights treaties but only a few of them 
have explicit bilateral policies. On the other end, Canada and some European Union 
countries are the best examples of states having both bilateral and multilateral human 
rights policies. Despite these differences, the historical trend shows a “gradual but clear 
movement toward the adoption of human rights policies. Before World War II no country 
in the world has a human rights policy”(Sikkink 2004:10). Today, the majority of 
democratic states in all the regions of the world have more or less ambitious international 
human rights objectives either in their bilateral or multilateral policies or in both. Even 
non-democratic regimes support or at least tolerate some of the multilateral mechanism 
discussed before. There is, however, a significant difference among states with respect to 
the priority given to human rights into their foreign policies, the targets of human rights 
pressures, the type of human rights that gain predominance in their respective 
international agendas, and the means and instruments they use to implement policy. 
Research Design 
Selected Cases 
This study is a comparative historical analysis based on case-oriented research. 
The selected countries (Chile and Brazil) are suited to a comparative study based on the 
logic of most similar system design (George and Bennett 2005; Della Porta and Keating 
2008). These two countries share similar general characteristics including a common 
historical experience of human rights abuses during their respective military regimes and 
a transition to democracy that led to a process of consolidation in the mid-1990s. Both 
countries have similar level of development and initiated processes of economic openness 
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either in the late 1980s (Chile) or in the 1990s (Brazil). Yet, they show important 
differences when comes to their human rights diplomacy. 
Chile since the beginning of its transition to democracy has actively incorporated 
human rights policies into its foreign policy, ratifying major international treaties and 
supporting international human rights institutions. On the other hand, Brazilian decision-
makers took more than ten years after the transition in 1985 to accept the legitimacy of 
human rights in international affairs through the acceptance the external international 
scrutiny of international human rights treaties and it is country that still remains a 
reluctant promoter in many areas of the global human rights regime specially when 
comes to denounce country abuses and the discussion on humanitarian intervention. This 
study wants to explain this difference. Why Chile has been an active human rights 
promoter while Brazil has a more ambivalent policy towards international human rights? 
To explain the different foreign policy outcomes, this research focuses on four 
independent variables that present an important degree of variation between the selected 
cases. Chile ranks high on these variables while Brazil is significantly lower. The 
variables are the following: a) Impact of international influences in accepting human 
rights as standard of international behavior; b) Commitment to human rights of political 
elites involved in foreign policy-making; c) Ministry of Foreign Affairs strength and 
openness to international human rights; d) Civil society involvement on foreign policy 
and human rights (more on this in the hypothesis section). 
This case comparison is supplemented with within-country qualitative analysis 
using process tracing to evaluate casual processes within cases. Process tracing—a 
procedure designed to identify processes linking a set of initial conditions to a particular 
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outcome—has been acknowledge as an indispensable element of case empirical research 
and especially useful for comparative historical analysis (George & Bennett 2005, 
Vennesson 2008, Mahoney & Rueschemeyer 2003). Process tracing is particularly 
suitable for this type of study because it provides way to learn and to evaluate empirically 
the preferences and perceptions of actors, their purposes, their goals, their values, and 
their specification of the situations that face them. This method requires document 
analysis (official speeches, reports, journals) but also and very importantly in depth and 
carefully structured interviews with key actors that help us to understand and to uncover 
previously unknown relations between factors.  
Fieldwork 
The research entailed extensive fieldwork in the Brazilian cities of Brasilia, Sao 
Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro and Chile’s capital, Santiago. In Brasilia, the librarians at the 
Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Rio Branco Diplomatic Academy provided 
invaluable help to find official documents and relevant articles and other publications to 
complete this study. In Santiago, representatives from the “Andres Bello” Diplomatic 
Academy and its library provided invaluable logistic support and relevant documentation 
to complete this work. The data collected during fieldwork was invaluable to systematize 
the human rights diplomacy and the instruments used by these two countries to 
implement these policies in the past twenty years. 
On the other hand, almost thirty interviews were performed for this research with 
government officials, diplomats, scholars, and civil society members. The majority of the 
interviews were held personally while the rest were performed by telephone or through 
written questionnaires that were previously sent by e-mail. Interviews were crucial to 
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understand actor’s motives, the context in which foreign policy decisions took place, and 
to test the possible casual mechanisms operating in these two cases. 
Timeframe 
As for the time frame, this research covers more than two decades of Brazilian 
and Chilean foreign policy. This provides a longer perspective on the domestic and 
international changes conditioning the international human rights policies of these two 
countries. The study starts with the respective transitions to democracy and continues 
examining several presidencies until 2010. For the case of Brazil, the research covers the 
following Presidential terms: Jose Sarney
5
 (1985-1990), Fernando Collor de Mello 
(1990-1992) and Itamar Franco (1992-1994). Brazilian consolidation started with 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso who was President of Brazil for two terms (1995-2002), 
followed by other two terms of President Luis Inacio “Lula” da Silva (2003-2010). 
Chile’s time-frame covers the whole period in which the Coalition of Parties for 
Democracy was in government. This includes four administrations: Patricio Aylwin 
(1990-1994)
6
, Eduardo Frei (1994-2000), Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006)
7
 and Michelle 
Bachelet (2006-2010). 
                                                          
5
 Jose Sarney was the first civilian President in Brazil since 1964. 
6
 First democratically elected President, after 17 years of military regime led by General Augusto 
Pinochet. 
7
 There has been an intensive debate regarding when to mark the end of the Chilean transition to 
democracy. Yet, in 1998 the detention of General Pinochet in London opened the space for a 
further dialogue on pending human rights issues and civil-military relations. It also played and 
important part in generating a consensus for constitutional reform in 2005, eliminating important 
non-democratic areas of the text such as the existence of non-democratically elected senators.  
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Assessing Human Rights Foreign Policies  
This section identifies a state’s degree of commitment to the promotion of 
international human rights—the dependent variable in this study. The aim is to 
operationalize into measurable factors the variables included in this research. The 
adoption of human rights foreign policies is often inconsistent; lack continuity over time, 
and in many cases consist more of grandiloquent statements than the serious investment 
of diplomatic capital.  
Evaluating the actual performance of countries regarding their international 
human rights agenda remains a critical component in the analysis of the foreign policy of 
states. Systematic assessments are, in fact, very rare and this is even more so for countries 
coming from the global south. The first objective of this study, therefore, is to elaborate 
metrics for assessing the record and international performance of different states in the 
promotion and protection of human rights. This systematization helps to identify critical 
moments in which the foreign policies of these two countries differ, to trace the evolution 
of the policies over time, and to identify the means used by each state in the pursue of 
human rights diplomacy.  
This assessment considers only the multilateral human rights policies of Chile and 
Brazil. Bilateral foreign policies are not part of this study due to fact that much of 
diplomacy takes place behind the scene and because Ministries of Foreign Affairs in 
Latin America keep poor public records of bilateral initiatives on this subject. At the 
same time, the majority of Latin American countries have explicitly indicated some sort 
of commitment with multilateral human rights policies. Chile and Brazil, despite the 
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different degrees of activism, have contributed in some way or another to the global 
human rights regime. 
The study considers four dimensions that altogether cover the core activities of 
states participating in global multilateral mechanisms on human rights. These dimensions 
are legal, human rights institutions, humanitarian protection and peace promotion, 
financial assistance. (Table 1 illustrates the relevant dimensions included in the 
assessment with specific variables per dimension and observations identifying the kind of 
information on relevant data.) 
(1) Legal. The legal dimension traces states ratification of international and 
regional human rights treaties. It looks specifically at the numbers of ratified treaties, the 
timing and process of ratification. 
(2) Human rights institutions. This dimension evaluates states participation at 
relevant human rights institutions. These institutions include the UN human rights system 
especially at the Human Rights Commission and the Human Rights Council (established 
in 2006) and when necessary it also highlights important landmarks at the United Nations 
Security Council. At a regional level, the participation and responses to the Inter-
American human rights system are also included.  
The participation at UN human rights institutions is evaluated by a number of 
observations: number and type initiatives sponsored. These includes a wide array of 
initiatives encompassing the whole spectrum of human rights: civil and political rights 
along with economic, cultural and social rights; voting behavior when assessing country-
specific human rights situations; voting behavior in cases of massive human rights abuses 
and humanitarian crisis; other high-profile human rights initiatives within the UN such as 
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Brazil’s “Hunger Zero” initiative at the UN. At the Inter-American Human Rights system 
the observations concentrate on the Commission and include the following: number of 
petitions submitted by countries to the Commission; responses to the recommendations 
emanating from the Commission; number of commissioners that are Chilean or Brazilian 
in origin. 
(3) Humanitarian protection and peace promotion. This dimension evaluates 
states participation in UN peacekeeping initiatives and responses to massive human rights 
violations. The relevant observations include number of peacekeepers and type of 
missions; responses to major humanitarian interventions such as Rwanda (1994); Kosovo 
(1999), and Libya (2011); reaction to the idea of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and 
initiatives in this subject. 
(4) Financial assistance. Effective financial contribution to international human 
rights institutions. This includes, for example, the contributions to the Office of the High 
Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) and the United Nations Democratic FUND 
(UNDEF). At a regional level, the financial assistance to the Inter-American Commission 
for Human Rights. 
A country that ranks significantly high across these dimensions qualifies as 
having a high degree of commitment to international human rights and, therefore, can be 
regarded as an “international humanitarianist.” Ideally a country’s performance can be 
examined each year examining each one of the relevant dimensions. Yet, this study 
covers more than twenty years of human rights diplomacy and therefore will assess the 
general performance of Chile and Brazil highlighting the significant differences and 
continuities across time.  
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Note that this this research focuses exclusively on the factors that shape states to 
commit to international human rights and in explaining the divergence in states’ 
performances, leaving outside of its domain of inquiry any questions regarding the 
impact or effectiveness of these policies in the domestic human rights conditions of the 
recipient countries (Landman, 2006; Landman & Carvahlo 2010; Cardenas 2007).  
Table 1 
Assessing Human Rights Foreign Policies: Chile and Brazil 
Dimensions Variables Observations 
Legal - International and Regional 
Human Rights treaties ratified  
a) Number of treaties ratified, year of 
ratification-timing, process of ratification. 
Human 
Rights 
Institutions 
 
-Participation at the Human 
Rights Commission and the 
Human Rights Council (since 
2006). 
-Voting patterns in other key 
UN bodies (UNSC) 
-Other relevant multilateral 
initiates at the UN.  
- Participation at the Inter-
American Human Rights 
System.  
-Acceptance of international 
scrutiny on domestic human 
rights issues. 
a) Number and type initiatives sponsored. b) 
Voting behavior when assessing country-
specific human rights situations.  
a) Support for UN resolutions against 
‘pariah states” or states committing human 
rights abuses. b) Relevant votes in cases of 
massive human rights abuses and R2P 
situations. 
a) For example, Brazil sponsored the “Zero 
Hungry challenge”.  
a) Number of petitions submitted by 
countries to the Commission; b) Responses 
to the recommendations emanating from the 
Commission. c) Number of commissioners 
that are Chilean or Brazilian origin.  
a) External monitoring on local human 
rights issues such as: acceptance of 
UN/OAS experts (timing, topic, etc). 
Peace 
Promotion 
and 
humanitarian 
protection 
-UN peacekeeping missions. 
- Responses to humanitarian 
crisis- mass atrocity. 
a) Number of peacekeepers, type of 
missions.  
a) Responses to major humanitarian 
interventions: Rwanda (1994), East Timor 
Kosovo (1999), Libya (2011). (political 
statements and position of the country, 
sending troops, humanitarian assistance, 
etc.) b) Tracing each country’s response to 
R2P. 
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Table 1 (continued) 
*Human Rights Council 
**Inter-American Commission for Human Rights.  
*** Office of the High commissioner for Human Rights 
Sources of International Human Rights Policies 
There is an extensive literature on foreign policy analysis (FPA) dating from 
1950s that seeks to explain why governments make the foreign policy decisions that they 
do (Hudson 2007; Smith, Dunne, Hadfiled 2008; Beasley et all 2012). Researchers have 
investigated how regime type, bureaucratic politics, interest groups, social and individual 
psychology and a significant number of other variables influence government decisions. 
However, current studies on human rights diplomacy do not originate from FPA but from 
the intersection of IR theory with the specific domain of human rights. The IR literature 
on the subject is basically divided in three main approaches— realism, constructivism 
and liberal institutionalism—three of them emphasizing different ways of understanding 
the role of human rights in foreign policy. This subsection reviews each of these three 
approaches situating them within the broader discussion of human rights diplomacy, 
analyses the current research gaps, and then draws hypotheses for this study. 
Realism 
Size, distribution of power, and the position in the international system are seen 
by realists as the determinants of a state’s national interests. Jan Egeland (1988) in his 
Dimensions Variables Observations 
Financial 
Assistance 
 
-Contribution to the HRC*/ 
OHCHR*** or other relevant 
UN institution for human 
rights promotion. 
-International Cooperation 
Monetary contribution by GDP percentage 
of the GDP. 
-Relevant initiatives that are cataloged as 
cooperation for human rights.  
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book comparing Norwegian and U.S. international human rights policies, for example, 
offers an explanation that focus on the international structure to explain differences 
between these two countries: “small and big nations are differently disposed to 
undertaking coherent rights-oriented foreign policies.” In the case of the United States, its 
relatively modest international human rights policies are “because of, rather than in spite 
off, her superpower status.” Furthermore, “the frequency and intensity of the conflict 
between self-interests and (international human rights) norms seems, in short, 
proportional to a nation’s economic and military power, as well as its foreign policy 
ambitions.” Small states, with fewer constrains and international responsibilities, rarely 
have to choose between human rights and other foreign policy goals and therefore they 
based their strategies on multilateral institutions in order to exert international influence. 
In sum, small democratic states are likely to be strong human rights promoters while big 
and powerful states are skeptics or moderate human rights promoters. 
Realists also emphasize that in the very unlikely circumstances that powerful 
states decide to pursue human rights at some perceived political, economic or strategic 
cost this is due exclusively to self-interest: human rights enhance the relative power of 
the state or if human rights are used to justify certain acts in foreign policy. Human rights 
promotion, therefore, becomes the product of “dominant nations or group of nations” 
espousing moral principles that serves their own interest (Carr 1939:211; Morgenthau 
1960). Most notably, when powerful states deem it necessary, they will employ coercion 
or inducement to unilaterally spread human rights internationally. 
Realist structural explanations, however, seem to be insufficient to explain the 
many foreign policy differences regarding human rights. If it were only for “small” size, 
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most of Latin American countries would be international human rights promoters. The 
reality shows a region with diverse policies regarding its engagement with human rights 
and the most “big and powerful” countries in the region (Mexico, Brazil. Colombia and 
Argentina) are comparatively more inclined to participate in international human rights 
regimes than middle size countries such as Peru or Venezuela, for example. No common 
patterns regarding international human rights policies can de deduced from size, 
geography and power alone. Realist predictions regarding the spread of human rights 
internationally do not account for why less powerful states would accept international or 
regional human rights regimes when they are not coerced to do so. In sum, realist 
explanations do not seem to account for the differences in the human rights foreign policy 
of the cases considered in this research. 
Liberalism 
Liberal approaches hypothesize that states pursue international human rights 
because it is in the self-interest of states to comply with international norms and 
institutions. Moravcsik’s work deals specifically with the human rights foreign policies of 
new democracies. He attempts to empirically demonstrate that the participation in an 
international human rights regime constitutes an act of political delegation that could be 
used by governments to ‘lock-in’ and consolidate domestic policies, thereby enhancing 
their credibility and stability vis-à-vis domestic political opponents. The pursuit of human 
rights abroad in other words would be a result of political calculations at home. The type 
of regime (democratic, authoritarian, newly democratic) becomes a crucial factor for 
liberals in explaining and predicting the adoption of international human rights. For 
Moravcsik, newly established democracies are likely to ratify binding international 
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human rights commitments to protect their still unstable regimes against overthrows or to 
reduce political uncertainty at home (Moravcsik 2000).  
Liberal predictions when comes to the foreign policies of new democracies are at 
the crux of this study. Thus, one of the purposes of this research will be to test this 
assumption by addressing the specific question of whether the newly elected 
governments of Chile and Brazil felt pressure to consolidate the credibility of the new 
democratic regime vis-à-vis non-democratic forces in the society and commit to 
international treaties and institutions as a means to reach their goals.  
Constructivism 
While liberalism focuses on how human rights norms alter incentives thereby 
making it rational for new democracies to support international human rights (logic of 
rational consequentialism), constructivism stresses the power of strongly held principles, 
ideas about what is right or wrong.  
A critical characteristic of political action in this area [constructivism] is that it is 
‘‘principled’’—that is, the altruistic and moral motives of actors have persuasive 
power in themselves. Accordingly, the most fundamental motivating force behind 
human rights regimes is not rational adaptation, let alone coercion, but 
transnational socialization—the logic of appropriateness. (Moravcsik 2000: 223) 
In explaining state’s support for international human rights, some constructivist 
scholars have looked to salient historical events or dramatic policy failures, yet recurrent 
explanations comes either from the identity of states (who they are) or from the notion 
that international norms and ideas have a powerful effect in shaping states’ policies. 
Identity-based explanations focus on the democratic character of a state and or its role as 
middle power. According to what Thomas Risse terms ‘‘liberal constructivism”, 
established democratic governments seek to extend their domestic values abroad and 
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recognize others who do so (Risse-Kappen 1996). The more democratic they are, the more 
likely their espousal of human rights values. Democratic human rights foreign policy, 
therefore, may be more direct expression of liberal democratic identity as a community of 
values (Risse-Kappen 1996). 
Other authors add state identities as “middle powers” as an additional explanatory 
variable for the adoption of human rights in foreign policy (Cooper, Higgott, & Nossal 
1993; Cooper 1997; Brysk 2007). Middle powers, from this approach are countries 
defined by “[...] the tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, 
the tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and the tendency 
to embrace notions of ‘good international citizenship’ to guide diplomacy” (Cooper, 
Higgott, and Nossal 1993: 19). Alison Brysk specifically uses the criteria of middle 
powers to explain why certain countries decided to act as “Global Good Samaritans.” She 
highlights that “candidate states [humanitarians] are usually globalized, democratic, 
moderately developed, and secured middle powers” (Brysk 2007:5). The problem with 
this definition is that it is so broad that it encompasses a wide spectrum of countries. In 
the specific case of Latin America, the majority of the countries in the region would 
actually classify within this category of Middle Powers. Yet, only some states in Latin 
America are active human rights promoters while others have remained more reluctant.  
In sum, identity-based approaches lack a substantive explanation of what a middle 
power or a democratic identity means and how this identities project into the international 
community and its specific effects on human rights diplomacy. This perspective have led 
scholars to exclusively concentrate their work on demonstrating the link between the 
social democratic values of a state (democratic identity) and/or its role as middle powers 
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with the international promotion of human rights. The unintended result has been an 
extensive focus on the human rights foreign policies of very few countries that possibly 
fit the former explanation: Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway, Canada and to a lesser 
extend Australia. The processes by which newly democratic states adopt human rights 
foreign policies have been largely overlooked by identity-based explanations and 
therefore the motives of a more extensive list of countries that decide to adopt 
international human rights remains understudy. 
Constructivist’s scholarship, however, have built an important research agenda on 
norm diffusion and the persuasive power of principle ideas in bringing about political 
change (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Rice, Roop, & Sikkink, 1999; Finnemore & Sikkink, 
1998; Nadelmann, 1990; Klotz, 1995). This literature can offer further insights for this 
research due to its focus on how international norms such as human rights have impacted 
state policies. In what has been called the first wave of scholarly research on norm 
diffusion, the main concern has been with international or regional norms that set 
standards for the appropriate behavior of states. 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) introduced the concept of “norm cascade”, a 
mechanism in which countries adopt new norms through a process of international 
socialization that is driven by a need to enhance international legitimation, pressure for 
conformity, and the desire of state leaders to enhance their self-esteem. In the past 
decade, scholars have generated important accounts of international legitimacy and on the 
sources of legitimization in shaping state behavior (Barnett and Finnemore 1997; Clark, 
2007). States also care about international legitimacy because it has become an essential 
contributor to perceptions of domestic legitimacy held by a state’s own citizens. 
24 
“International legitimation is important insofar as it reflects back on a government’s 
domestic basis of legitimization and consent and thus ultimately on its ability to stay in 
power” (Finnemore, M. & Sikkink, K. 1998:903).8 Conformity can be seen as analogous 
to “peer pressure” among countries. Conformity involves a “social proof” demonstrating 
that states have adapted to the social environment that they belong—they are part of a 
group (Axelrod in Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:903) Sikkink and Finnemore suggests that 
leaders of states sometimes follow norms because they want others to think well of them 
and the want to think well themselves (903). In this sense, “states care about following 
norms associated with liberalism because being ‘liberal states’ is part of their identity in 
the sense of something that they take pride in or from which they gain self-esteem” (904).  
There is also an incipient second wave of norm scholarship that contributes to 
previous literature by adding a new focus on the effects of international norms on state 
behavior via domestic political processes. These perspectives emphasize the role local 
leaders—political elites and societal groups— as “norm entrepreneurs” promoting the 
legitimacy of international norms through a process of “accommodation or localization” 
that bridge international with local understandings and experiences (Acharya, 2004; 
Checkel 1998).  
Checkel use the concept of “cultural match” to describe a set of preexisting 
domestic understandings that condition the impact of transnational norms. According to 
this scholar, diffusion is faster when ‘a cultural match exists between a systemic norm 
                                                          
8
 The international legitimacy of military or authoritarian governments, for example, has been 
signaled as an important driving force for regime transition in Latin American regions. 
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and a target country, in other words, where it resonates with historically constructed 
domestic norms.” Checkel further defines a cultural match as  
a situation where the prescriptions embodied in an international norm are 
convergent with domestic norms, as reflected in discourse, the legal system 
(constitutions, judicial codes, laws), and bureaucratic agencies (organizational 
ethos and administrative procedures). (Checkel, 1998) 
More recently, Amitav Acharya, proposes a dynamic explanation of norm diffusion that 
describes how local agents reconstruct foreign norms to ensure that the norms fit with the 
agents’ cognitive priors and identities. Acharya calls this process “localization” and it is 
said to occur where there is contestation between emerging transnational norms and 
preexisting regional and normative and social orders” (Acharya, 2004: 241). Specifically 
he argues that successful norm diffusion depend on the extent to which they provide 
opportunities for localization. 
In parallel to the previous debate, constructivist highlights the process by which 
these new norms are institutionalized. This perspective emphasize that ideas an norms 
have a strong and continuous influence on state policy as they become embodied in 
institutions and that institutions themselves can become autonomous and powerful 
political actors (Barnett & Finnemore 2004). Cortell and Davis stress the role of institution 
“as providers of the rules of the game for citizens and state officials, establishing rights 
and obligation, identify what is legitimate or not, and, in the process, help national actors 
define their interests domestically and internationally” (Cortell & Davis, 2000: 79).9 
                                                          
9
 Another interesting example of the role of institutions is Legro’s  (1997) perspective which 
mixes a cultural and organizational theory that “focuses on the way that the pattern of 
assumption, ideas and beliefs that prescribes how a group should adapt to its external 
environment and manage its internal affairs, interests, and calculations”. Legro applied his 
“organizational cultural approach” to explain the varying use of force in World War II.  
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Sikkink specifically emphasize that human rights principles acquire strong and 
continuous influence when they become embedded in institutions (Sikkink 2004). 
As explained before, constructivists have done very little research on the human 
rights diplomacy of the Global South. This study adds to current constructivist research 
by looking at both the role of domestic and international factors described in the two 
waves of constructivist research described previously. These include assessing the 
following variables: a) International dimensions: Human rights as international standards 
of behavior as the possible product of socialization among states; b) Domestic 
dimensions: the role of “norm entrepreneurs” (defined here as political elites and civil 
society in this research) and political institutions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) in the 
prospects for adopting international human rights. Looking at both domestic and 
international dimensions simultaneously is an innovation of this study since the majority 
of constructivist work focuses only in one dimension or primarily in one. 
Gaps in the Literature and Hypothesis 
The previous review of the current scholarly work on human rights foreign policy 
reveals important gaps in understanding the process by which state adopt these policies. 
This research seeks to fill these gaps. 
First, when explaining why states adopt human rights the three predominant IR 
approaches tend to focus on one level of analysis either domestic or international. This is 
an important shortcoming considering that current foreign policy analysis is increasingly 
incorporating perspective that see any state’s foreign policy as a reflection of the subtle 
interplay of domestic and international conditions and pressures (Evans, Jacobson, 
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Putnam 1993; Milner 1997). This study will look at the intersection of both domestic and 
international factors to explain foreign policy outcomes. 
Second, research on the domestic factors that drive new democracies to adopt 
international human rights is very limited. Moravcsik’s work from the liberal front is a 
potential good starting point to explain why new democracies adopt human rights in the 
first place and this research will test this proposition. Still, an obvious shortcoming of this 
perspective is its incapability of explaining why states’ commitment to international 
human rights persists once democratic consolidation takes place. On the other hand, 
constructivist research on the domestic processes shaping the adoption of international 
norms into the foreign policy process is scant and the majority of it is still very much at 
the theoretical level with little empirical work. This approach highlights the importance 
of looking at “norms entrepreneurs” and institutions but without specifying which 
specific factors to look at. This study focuses on political elites and civil society as the 
“norms entrepreneurs” and identifies the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the most relevant 
institution when comes to foreign policy decision-making and implementation. 
Domestic considerations are especially critical for the selected cases. The political 
leaders of Chile and Brazil put forward a series of political, economic and social reforms 
in order to move beyond the authoritarian practices of the past with the goal of securing 
and strengthening the democratic regimes at home. In both cases— but with different 
degrees—these domestic reforms conditioned foreign policy decisions. Simultaneously, 
other domestic conditions such as institutional and bureaucratic practices, the 
predominant ideology of decision-makers significantly affect the ways in which 
international norms such as human rights are perceived locally. 
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Third, when comes to the effects of international dimensions, structural realist 
accounts provide very little value-added to understand the incorporation of human rights 
into foreign policy due to its almost exclusive focus on material power in the 
international system. Constructivist approaches are more appropriate to understand why 
and how international human rights ideas affect the behavior of states. Yet, one of the 
shortcomings of this approach is that it assumes that the process of socialization by which 
states adopt human rights as standards of appropriate behavior affect all countries equally 
or at least similarly. So far, states responses to international human rights are so diverse 
that there seems to be no good reason to hold this assumption especially when comes to 
new democracies from the global south. Understanding the different ways in which 
international and domestic factors influence the foreign policy of states can provide a 
better clue as to which are the causal mechanism affecting the adoption of human rights 
foreign policies. This will allow scholars to better understand the possible ways in which 
states especially those from the global south will engage with the international human 
rights regime and to better account for their critiques and potential contributions. 
This study builds upon the relevant literature on human rights foreign policy and 
fills some of its gap. In light of the above theoretical and empirical discussion, this study 
assess the following international and domestic variables as possible drivers for the 
inclusion of human rights into foreign policy, testing the following hypotheses. 
International Dimension: Human Rights as International Standards of Behavior 
The role of international human rights ideas and norms in changing the perception 
of a country’s national interest and in setting international standards for the behavior of 
states has been documented by constructivist research on the subject. From this 
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perspective, states adopt human rights foreign policy as a result of a process of 
international socialization that is driven by the search for international legitimacy and 
“peer pressures” for conformity (to be part of a group), and the desire of leaders to 
enhance its credibility. Yet, international pressures and the normative force of 
international human rights do not seem to affect all countries in the same degrees and 
there is a need to understand the different ways in which states respond and adapt to these 
influences. 
Hypothesis: International influences affect the adoption of human rights foreign 
policies differently depending on a state’s perception of what constitutes international 
legitimacy and its international role. 
Domestic Dimension 
The democratic “lock in.” Liberal theories predict the adoption of international 
human rights instruments in order to protect unstable new democracies or as a formula to 
consolidate the credibility of the new authorities vis-à-vis domestic political opponents 
(See next chapter). Thus, the question to be asked is whether governments of newly 
democratic states feel pressure to consolidate the credibility of the new democratic 
regime vis-à-vis non-democratic forces in the society and commit to international treaties 
and institutions as a means to reach their goals.  
Hypothesis: Political elites during the transition to democracy use international 
human rights foreign policy instrumentally for domestic gains. 
Elite leadership’s role. The personality, values and beliefs of a leader, or group 
leaders, can shape the policies of a state. Characteristics of leaders are generally more 
influential when they have significant latitude in shaping policy and in ambiguous, 
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uncertain, or complex situations as is normally the case in process of transition to 
democracy. In these cases, the leaders have a larger opportunity to act as “norms 
entrepreneurs”, providing legitimization to foreign norms or ideas. In this particular case 
it is important to assess if political leaders and decision-makers’ have an unusual personal 
commitment to promoting and legitimizing human rights initiatives. 
Hypothesis: Political leaders and decision-makers’ commitment to human rights 
are important drivers for promoting and legitimizing human rights values into a state’s 
international policies. 
Foreign Ministry and its impact on the foreign policy process. The role of 
domestic institutions has been often overlooked in the literature dealing with human 
rights in international politics.
10
 The institutional dynamics and the prevalent ideas within 
the bureaucracies that decide over foreign policy can critically influence the potential 
inclusion of human rights policies. The identification of particular foreign policy 
ideologies inside the foreign ministry will allow a better understanding of the potential fit 
of human rights into the shared ideas and values that have historically motivated states 
foreign policies. In other words, the attitude of Ministry of Foreign Affairs is 
fundamental. Is it sympathetic or at least not hostile to a strong human rights foreign 
policy? How do its history, structure, ethos and recruiting patterns affect the policy views 
it communicates to political leaders? And what is the degree of influence it exercises over 
the outcome of the foreign policy process?  
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 Depending on the selected countries some state institutions are more critical than others to 
understand foreign policy outcomes. This research focuses specifically on the role of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs due to the low impact of congress or other state institutions for these cases.  
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Hypothesis: A high degree of fit between universal human rights and the 
prevalent ideas motivating decisions inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs positively 
impacts the commitment of a state to international human rights policies.  
Civil society. Foreign policy scholarship is increasingly moving away from an 
exclusive governmental focus towards looking at the role of societal groups in explaining 
policy choices. The impact of domestic civil society when advocating for human rights 
increases with the support of international actors. This has been sufficiently documented 
by the work on “transnational advocacy networks” (TANS) (Keck and Sikkink 1998). 
TANS—groups motivated by principled ideas and values rather than material concerns—
are critical drivers for policy change towards international human rights policies.  
Hypothesis: Strong domestic civil society groups connected to international 
human rights advocacy networks effectively pressure governments to commit to 
international human rights policies. 
Overview of the Argument 
Existing International Relations approaches explaining state’s support of 
international human rights fail to explain adequately why some new democracies commit 
to human rights more than others. The empirical work on human rights diplomacy from 
countries in the Global South is also very limited. To fill this theoretical and empirical 
gap in the literature, I examine the domestic and international factors that determine the 
commitment to international human rights of new democracies from the global south. 
I find that the search for international legitimacy and the desire for recognition 
and credibility affected the adoption of international human rights in both cases but with 
different degrees of impact. International values and pressures by themselves, while 
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necessary, are an insufficient condition for human rights initiatives perceived to have not 
insubstantial political, economic or strategic costs. New democracies will be more or less 
likely to actively include human rights in their international policies depending on the 
following four domestic conditions: political leadership legitimizing the inclusion of 
human rights into a state’s policies, civil society groups connected to international human 
rights advocacy networks with a capacity to influencing the foreign policy decisions of 
their government, and the Foreign Ministry’s attitudes towards international human rights 
and the degree of influence it exercises over the outcome of the foreign policy process. 
In the case of Chile, the higher degree of commitment to international human 
rights was significantly shaped by the timing of its transition to democracy in the early 
1990s, which coincide with the end of the Cold War and a new wave of democratization 
across the region. The favorable external environment was combined with a pressing 
need to recover Chile’s international credibility after years of being isolated from the 
international community of states due to human rights abuses during the military regime. 
At the same time, important domestic factors significantly pushed Chile to 
commit to international human rights policies. The uncertain conditions in which the 
transition to democracy took place and the lack of maneuver of the new authorities 
prompted the government to use foreign policies for domestic purposes. But human rights 
values were not use only for instrumental purposes. This new group of leaders also had 
an unusual level of commitment to promoting and legitimizing human rights initiatives 
due to their personal history of struggle during the Pinochet regime. This led to 
development of new foreign policy ideas that were convergent with human rights values. 
The limited bureaucracy of the Chilean foreign ministry and a civil society with extensive 
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ties with international human rights organizations and the government further 
strengthened this process. Finally, the same political elites were in power for more than 
twenty years, further institutionalizing Chile’s commitment to international human rights. 
Unlike Chile, Brazil’s international status and prestige did not diminish 
significantly during the military regime and there were no significant foreign policy 
changes during the transitional period. Brazil’s diplomacy maintained its traditional 
suspicious attitude towards international human rights. However, starting in the 1990s 
Brazil’s foreign policy experienced a strategic change as a result of the consolidation of 
the democratic system especially during Cardoso’s Presidency along with the country’s 
economic opening. The search for international credibility and legitimacy became only 
during this period an important objective of Brazil’s diplomacy and the adherence to 
international human rights and international human rights institutions played a role in 
attaining those goals. Indeed, this study documents how Brazil’s foreign policy 
experienced a shifted from a defensive posture to broadly accepting the role of human 
rights in international politics. Yet, despite Brazil’s increasing acceptance of 
humanitarian ideas, the country was still pretty much anchored on international strategies 
privileging importance of absolute sovereignty and non-intervention in international 
affairs. Domestic factors played a critical role explaining this variance. The Brazilian 
case demonstrates that democratic transitions not always generate local incentives for 
accepting international human rights norms. Most importantly, it highlights how history, 
institutional and bureaucratic practices, and the kind of ideology of decision-makers and 
political elites affect the ways in which international human rights norms are perceived 
locally. Brazilian foreign policy has traditionally been dominated by a powerful and 
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fairly autonomous Foreign Ministry that has been somewhat suspicious of international 
human rights and that had tended to disregard humanitarian interventions as a cover for 
great power involvement in the domestic affairs of other states. The lack of local NGOS
11
 
working on monitoring and influencing foreign policy decisions further constrained the 
prospects of a more active inclusion of human rights into Brazil’s international policies. 
 
                                                          
11
 Brazilian NGOS started monitoring Brazil’s foreign policy on human rights only during the 
mid-2000s.  
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CHAPTER 2: CHILE’S HUMAN RIGHTS DIPLOMACY 
Following General Augusto Pinochet’s departure from power in 1990, one of the 
first objectives of the center-left coalition in power (“Coalition of Parties for Democracy” 
or CPD) was to actively promote the reinsertion of Chile into the community of 
democratic states as a way of recovering the country’s international credibility that was 
lost due to the multiple condemnations made by international institutions, states, and 
transnational NGOs aiming to stop the human rights abuses perpetrated by the military 
regime. Because the CPD continued to win presidential elections, holding office for four 
consecutive terms
12
, policymakers were able to develop a consistent and coherent agenda 
on foreign relations for over twenty years. They promoted the notion that a relatively 
small country like Chile without geostrategic or economic prominence needs to search for 
alternative sources of power actively participating in the creation and strengthening of 
international norms and institutions and reinforcing Chile’s traditional emphasis on 
international law and multilateralism as a way of leveling the playing field among 
nations. 
Chile’s historical preference for building multilateral institutions, however, is not 
a sufficient condition for becoming an international human rights promoter. In fact many 
small countries have active multilateral foreign policies in different issue-areas but are
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 President Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994), Eduardo Frei (1994-2000), Ricardo Lagos (2000-
2006), and Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010). 
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 less active than Chile on the realm of human rights. Among the conditions that were key 
for Chile to commit to international human rights is the presence of domestic actors 
willing to mobilize, promote, and legitimize human rights ideas into the foreign policy 
process. A key element in this analysis is the unique role played by a group of highly 
qualified experts in international relations with extensive ties with human rights advocacy 
networks that entered as part of the new democratic government in key positions at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The similar political backgrounds of these individuals 
enabled them to transform their personal ideals into more than two decades of effective 
foreign policy. These actors shared common values, had similar beliefs about what 
constitutes Chile’s national interest and, most importantly, developed concrete foreign 
policy initiatives with an emphasis on international human rights and the promotion of 
democracy. 
Chapter two explains Chile’s support for international human rights and places it 
within the context of Chilean foreign policy since the transition to democracy. The first 
chapter provides a detailed assessment of Chile’s diplomatic actions from 1990 to 2010 
in three arenas that are crucial for the promotion and protection of human rights: a) Legal 
(ratification of International human rights treaties); b) Institution-Building/ international 
human rights regimes (Participation in multilateral human rights institutions at the UN 
and OAS); c) Peace promotion and humanitarian protection (UN peace keeping 
initiatives and responses to humanitarian crisis especially massive human rights 
violations) Chapter three discusses the international and domestic determinants that 
explain why, and under which conditions, human rights principles came to be an 
important part of Chile’s foreign policy.  
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Chile’s Assessment13 
Chile’s involvement with the promotion of universal human rights dates back to 
the creation of what is today the international human rights regime after the Second 
World War. Chilean diplomats along with a reduce number of leaders from other 
developing countries particularly from Asia and Latin America were able to play a 
significant role during the drafting of the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR). Chile’s Permanent Representative at the UN, Hernán Santa Cruz, was one 
among the group of ten international figures who drafted the UDHR in 1948 (Sikkink 
1993(b)/2004; Reus-Smit 2011). Chile was also active in the ensuing debate. Speaking in 
the Third Committee of the General Assembly on the draft Declaration, the Chilean 
Representative stated almost prophetically “no one could infringe upon the rights 
proclaimed in it [the Universal Declaration] without becoming an outcast from the 
community of states” (Reus-Smit 2011: 532). 
The coup d'état in 1973 and subsequent military regime broke Chile’s traditional 
engagement with the international human rights system. During this period, Chile’s 
participation in the United Nations and other international and regional fora was 
drastically reduced. Those very same international institutions that Chile had helped to 
create were at the forefront of the fight against the massive human rights violations 
                                                          
13
 There is very little written on Chile’s Human Rights Foreign Policy. It is also important to note 
that the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not regularly publish or keeps a public record of 
the country’s voting record at UN human rights forums. Unlike other countries, including Brazil, 
there is no NGO or any other institution monitoring Chile’s foreign policy decisions on this 
subject.  
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perpetrated by the military regime. The United Nations condemned the Chilean 
government several times, at critical moments of state repression. Following the coup 
against President Salvador Allende, the United Nations established an ad hoc working 
group (1975) to inquire into the situation of human rights in the country. This ad hoc 
working group is generally perceived to be the first “Special Procedure” of the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights.In 1979, this working group was replaced by a 
special rapporteur and two experts to study the fate of the disappeared. This led to the 
establishment of the first thematic Special Procedure in 1980: The Working Group on 
Disappearances to deal with the question of enforced disappearances throughout the 
world. The Inter-American Commission on Human rights also presented several reports 
on the human rights situation of the country (Vargas, 2012). 
By late 1970s and early-1980s, Chile was increasingly seen as a pariah state 
within the international community and the country’s international image was at its 
lowest levels. Chile’s relations with Latin American countries dramatically deteriorated 
after the country decided to withdraw from the Andean Pact; some European countries 
issued complaints against the country due to the killing of their nationals in Chile’s 
territory—most notably Spain, and the lessening of United States’ support after the 
killing in 1976 of the former Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs, Orlando Letelier and 
his American assistant, Ronni Moffit, in Washington DC significantly affected the 
country’s standing within the international community. Agents of the Chilean secret 
police planned and perpetrated this assassination, the first one of this kind committed not 
only beyond Latin American borders but in US soil and with one local casualty. The 
international repercussions of the killings were considerable and accentuated 
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international criticism of the military regime. In the words of the Chilean diplomat and 
scholar, Heraldo Muñoz: “…each time the government increases its authoritarian 
measures domestically there will be a revitalization of the negative image of the regimen 
externally and political isolationism will continue characterizing the foreign relations of 
the military regime” (Muñoz 1982: 597).  
The reestablishment of democracy opened an enormous window of opportunity 
for the restoration of Chile’s diplomatic prestige. Consistent with its historical tradition, 
and in light of the new democratic government’s redefined objectives, Chile’s most 
immediate foreign policy objective was to re-insert itself into the international 
community. Promotion of human rights became an integral part of the country’s 
international strategy. The newly elected President Patricio Aylwin defined this objective 
clearly in his 1992 State of the Union—a speech that traditionally has an almost exclusive 
domestic focus— in which he explains the importance of human rights for Chile’s 
foreign policy: 
We consider that the defense of human rights is an ineluctable duty of any 
government that is committed to peace, one in which there is no room for 
invoking the principle of non- intervention. As a designated member of the United 
Nations Human Rights Commission, Chile will act according to this conception. 
(Aylwin in Morande and Aranda 2010: 95) 
 
The first step toward the effective inclusion of human rights into Chile’s foreign policy 
was the creation in 1990 of a Human Rights Unit within the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs—that later became the Human Rights Department (DIDEHU)— and the 
appointment of a very well-known Chilean human rights lawyer, Roberto Garreton, as 
Ambassador and chief of the new unit. The prompt institutionalization of human rights 
issues within the Ministry of foreign Affairs signaled Chile’s commitment to human 
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rights protection abroad. This decision also paved the way for the next three 
administrations (Eduardo Frei 1994-2000, Ricardo Lagos 2000-2006 and, Michelle 
Bachelet 2006-2010) to embrace human rights as a salient national interest. 
Yet as comparative experience indicates, strong rhetoric and the creation of 
governmental departments do not necessarily lead to diplomatic action (Farer & Fuentes, 
2013). A State’s rhetorical and formal commitment to the promotion of human rights 
does not lead invariably to consistent performance in this area. The following section 
provides a detailed assessment of Chile’s international human rights policies and 
diplomatic actions from 1990 to 2010 in three arenas that were explained in the 
introductory chapter: a) Legal (ratification of International human rights treaties); b) 
International human rights Institutions; c) Peace promotion and humanitarian protection; 
d) Financial assistance. 
Legal: Human Rights Treaties 
In 1972, a year before the military coup against the elected government led by 
Doctor Salvador Allende, Chile ratified the the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
While not withdrawing the nation’s signature from the two treaties, the Pinochet 
dictatorship avoided ratifying them. So they remained dead letters until 1989 when 
according to Chilean custom, ratification was effected through publication in the Official 
Newspaper (Vargas 2012). Ratification of other important human rights treaties followed 
rapidly (See Table 1). Thereafter, through successive administrations additional human 
rights treaties were ratified as they became available. The present list includes the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal 
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Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO No. 169); the Second Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aimed at the abolition of the death 
penalty; the Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death 
Penalty; the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; and the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities. As today, Chile has ratified all of the most important human 
rights agreements. 
Among that now considerable list of treaties one occasioned significant political 
debate. The Statute of the International Criminal Court stirred controversy. Despite being 
one of the first nations to sign the Rome Statute, the country’s ratification process was 
delayed by a number of legal and constitutional difficulties and could only be ratified 
after the Chilean Chamber of Deputies approved a constitutional amendment recognizing 
the Court's jurisdiction.  
At the Inter-American Level (Table 2), Chile ratified the American Convention 
only a few months after its transition to democracy (August 1990). At the same time the 
country recognized the contentious jurisdiction of the Inte-American Court of Human 
Rights, that is to say, it accepted that the Commission or any other state party could refer 
cases against the Chilean state to the Court. Chile followed the majority of the Latin 
American states that also ratified regional human rights instruments in the early 1990s. 
Brazil, however, was one of the last countries among Latin American States accepting the 
jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court only in 1998. 
42 
Table 2 
Chile: Selected International Treaties 
Treaty Year of Ratification 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1972 (It came into force in 1989* 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights 
1972 (It came into force in 1989* 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women 
1989 
Convention on the Rights of the Child 1990 
Ottawa Convention 2001 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.  2008 
ILO C169 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 2008 
International Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance 
2009 
International Criminal Court/ Rome Statue 2009 
Sources: Coalition for the International Criminal Court, 
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=country&iduct=35; Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en. 
Table 3 
Chile: Selected Regional Human Rights Treaties 
Treaty Year of Ratification 
American Convention of Human Rights  1990 
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture 1988 
Convention on the Prevention, punishment and 
Eradication of Violence against Women. 
"CONVENTION OF BELEM DO PARA”.  
1996 
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights 
to Abolish Death Penalty 
2008 
Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons 2010 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities  
2001 
Source: IACHR, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/basic_documents.asp 
 
International Human Rights Regimes  
Chile’s involvement with international human rights is set within its broader 
strategy of strengthening multilateralism. Table 3 summarizes the country’ involvement 
with major UN institutions since 1990, in particular the ones with a human rights focus. 
Chile has been elected twice to a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council in spite 
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of an intense domestic debate on the possible political costs associated with such a post. 
The country was recently re-elected to occupy a seat in the Security Council in 2014-
2015. Chile actively participates in the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 
even holding the presidency on several occasions. In addition, Chilean diplomats working 
at the United Nations mission in New York under the leadership of Ambassador Heraldo 
Muñoz, strongly supported the creation of the UN Peace-Building Commission in 2005, 
holding the presidency of that organization for two years. It is important to note that 
securing the election to the Security Council and to have a diplomat elected to a position 
like the Presidency of ECOSOC or the Peace-Building Commission is an intensive 
diplomatic task. Chile invested considerable political capital and significant diplomatic 
efforts to be part of these organizations and to obtain the Presidency of some of these 
international institutions.  
Additionally, Chile incorporated the concept of human security into its foreign 
policy, and correspondingly created a special unit within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
dedicated to bringing a human-security perspective to bear on diplomatic issues. Since 
1999 Chile has been part of the Human Security Network
14
, a group of likeminded 
countries that have made human protection an integral part of their foreign policy 
concerns (Brauch & Fuentes 2009). Finally, Chile was one of the founding members of 
the Community of Democracies
15
, a global, intergovernmental coalition of democratic 
                                                          
14 
This network involves thirteen countries: Austria, Canada, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, South Africa, Switzerland, and Thailand. 
15 
The Community of Democracies was initiated by seven countries: Poland, Chile, the Czech 
Republic, India, the Republic of Korea, Mali, and the United States. Today, this organization 
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countries, whose goal is the promotion of democratic rules and the strengthening of 
democratic norms and institutions around the world. 
Table 4 
Chile’s Participation in Multilateral Initiatives Related to Human Rights 
UN Institution Years of Participation (since the 1990s) 
Security Council 1996-1997 
2003-2004 
2014  
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Presidency 1993, 1998 (Somavia) 
UN Human Rights Commission  1998-2000 
2002-2004 
UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) 2008 (3 years) 
2011(3 years) 
Peace-building Commission (PBC)  Presidency 2009-2010  
Other Initiatives: 
Human Security Network 
Community of Democracies 
1999-Present Presidency 2001-2002 
2000-Present, Presidency 2003-2005 
Sources: United Nations, http://www.un.org/; Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile, 
www.minrel.gov.cl. 
  
UN Human Rights Commission 
The democratization process brought Chile back to its diplomatic work with the 
UN human rights institutions and in particular to the United Nations Human Rights 
Commission in Geneva. Chile’s participation at the UNHRC was significant during this 
period. An assessment of Chile’s work at the UN Human Rights Commission from 1990 
to 2005 (until the Commission changed to Human Rights Council in 2006) shows three 
distinctive trends: voting behavior, resolutions and thematic motions, and creating and 
improving human rights regimes. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
consists of seventeen member countries. In 2000, in Warsaw, ministerial delegations from 106 
countries signed the final declaration calling for the establishment of the Community of 
Democracies. 
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Voting behavior. Chile consistently voted at the Commission in favor of 
addressing country-specific human rights situations as violations escalated in many 
nations and regions. This is the case of resolutions regarding Cuba (with the exception of 
one year), Iran, Iraq, Rwanda, Sudan, Myanmar, Belarus, Zaire (currently named the 
Democratic Republic of Congo—DRC), and North Korea (Piccone, 2004).16 Chile has 
systematically voted in favor of resolutions addressing abuses in the Israeli occupied 
territories. One of the exceptions to the rule was the case of East Timor. Chile voted in 
favor of the resolution in 1993 condemning the grave human rights abuses committed by 
Indonesian authorities and encouraging Indonesia to invite a Special Rapporteur, but it 
abstained the following year.
17
 
Two cases particularly stand out, the resolutions on Cuba and on Belarus. In the 
case of Cuba, the different resolutions generated political debate over the years within 
and among the political parties that were part of the governmental coalition in Chile. Yet, 
the country’s vote has consistently remained in favor of examining the violations 
occurring in the Caribbean country. Cuba’s case has been very contentious among Latin 
American states. Brazil always abstained on Cuba’s resolution at the Commission while 
other Latin American states had a more erratic voting behavior. Argentina, for example, 
voted in favor of a resolution on Cuba in 2001/2002/2003 but abstained in 2004 and 
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 Note that the Ministry does not keep a systematized record of Chile’s votes with the 
Commission or the Human Rights Council (at least up to 2010). 
17
 According to an interview with Roberto Garreton, the lobby from Indonesia was extensive and 
reached important Chilean officials. After Chile voted in favor of the resolution in 1993, 
Indonesia managed to propose a project at the Non-alignment Movement over Bolivia’s access to 
the sea—one of the most sensitive topics for Chilean diplomacy. Under these circumstances, 
Chile abstains the following year at the Commission.  
46 
2005. Central American countries have consistently voted in favor, while Paraguay, 
Ecuador and Venezuela have abstained in several occasions. Mexico has voted in favor 
only since 2002. Internationally, the case of Cuba also generates controversy. A study 
from the Democracy Coalition Project indicates that only 58% of Democratic states in 
2005 voted in favor of the Cuba’s resolution at the UN Commission on Human Rights in 
2005 while 21% voted against and 21% abstained (Piccone, 2004).   
The different resolutions on Belarus also generated controversy at the Human 
Rights Commission. Chile, once again voted in favor in all the instances in which this 
case came into vote. Other Latin American countries such as Argentina (2004), Ecuador 
(2005), Honduras (2005, 2005) and Brazil (2005) voted abstention in some of years in 
which member states decided to take this situation into a vote. At the international level, 
several countries decided to abstain or vote against resolutions on Belarus. In 2004, for 
example, India, South Africa, and Russia voted against the resolution. The Democracy 
Coalition Project indicates that in 2005, 33% of democratic states voted against or 
abstained on the Belarus vote at the UN Human Rights Commission. 
Resolutions and thematic motions. Chile co-sponsored several resolutions 
addressing severe human rights situations in countries such as Burundi, Myanmar, and 
Sudan as well as thematic resolutions. Due to Chile’s very limited staff working on 
international human rights and lack of resources, the country joined forces with like-
minded countries (particularly European countries) and co-sponsored some of their 
proposals. It is also important to highlight that Chile was an active promoter of new 
international human rights instruments, most notably it sponsored UN Resolution 60/127 
on “the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
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Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations 
of International Humanitarian Law” and the then United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights endorsed the Updated Set of principles for the protection and promotion of human 
rights through action to combat impunity (impunity principles). 
Creating and improving human rights regimes. Chile actively worked on the 
creation and the improvement of international human rights regimes. At the 1993 World 
Conference on Human Rights (Vienna Declaration) Chile acted as one of the Vice-
presidents and played a role in promoting the universality of human rights.
18
 Chile´s 
delegation was also active on the attempted reform of the UN Human Rights Commission 
in the course of its transformation into the Human Rights Council-HRC (Vargas, 2011). 
During the discussion to create the HRC (and the review process that took place after its 
initial four years of functioning), Chilean diplomats favored proposals to improve 
controversial issues related to selectivity and membership. They also favored the 
inclusion of procedural aspects such as quicker response to emergencies and ways to 
strengthen of Special Procedures with the Council. For example, Chile along Argentina, 
Mexico, and Peru, proposed a mechanism through which the Council would examine 
situations formally brought to its attention by the High Commissioner (HRW 2011). 
UN Human Rights Council  
After the 2006 morphing of the Commission into the Human Rights Council, 
Chile continued with its strategy of supporting institutions for the protection and 
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In an interview with Roberto Garretón in July 2013, Chief of the Chilean delegation, he recalls 
that Chile was very active and that its contribution was internationally recognized as indicated in 
the Journal “Liberation de Paris”, 26 June 1993. 
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promotion of human rights within the UN. Indeed, Chile has been praised by Human 
Rights Watch as one of the most influential countries from the Global South in the 
promotion and protection of universal human rights internationally (Kenneth, 2009; 
HRW 2010, 2011). Human Rights Watch latest report (2011) on the Council’s work 
states that “Chile has a strong and coherent voting record at the Council. Its positions are 
based on a principled approach to human rights, which is consistent and non-selective”. 
Table 4 summarizes Chile´s participation within the UNHRC. The country has been 
elected member of the Council twice (2008 and 2011) for three years terms and in 2009 it 
was selected as Vice-president of the Council for one year to represent its regional group. 
In terms of resolutions addressing country or special sessions considering urgent 
situation’s, Chile systematically voted in favor of examining situations or resolutions o 
Sudan, North Korea, Iran, Belarus, Sri Lanka, Congo and Syria (HRW 2011). 
The Eleventh Special Session (2009) at the UNHRC on the human rights situation 
in Sri Lanka was particularly interesting when comes to assessing the voting the behavior 
at the Human Rights Council of different countries and Latin American states in 
particular. Germany sponsored a session on behalf on behalf of 17 member states and 20 
member states. Among these countries were Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Canada, Ukraine, 
Uruguay and European Union member states. The majority of the states in the African 
group, and NAM withheld support for the session. While consultations were held on an 
outcome text, an alternative and largely self-congratulatory resolution was introduced by 
Sri Lanka, the concerned country. This resolution included for example an explicit 
reference to “the principle of non-interference in matters which are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of states,” a statement that directly undermined the central mandate 
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of the Council to monitor human rights violations internationally especially under 
situations of armed conflicts as it was the case in Sri Lanka (Piccone, 2004). 
In response to this draft, Germany once again offered a set of amendments to 
strengthening it. States were split between those who have called for the special session 
and favored a strong role of the international community with regard to humanitarian 
assistance and accountability, and those which did not support the convening of a special 
session and supported the government of Sri Lanka’s prerogative to deal with the crisis. 
Arguing that the amendments were an attempt to redraft the document, Cuba presented a 
no-action motion. Cuba’s non-action motion on the amendments was approved by a vote 
of 22 in favor, 17 against and seven abstentions. As it was the case on the vote in the call 
for the session Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay all voted against the no-action 
motion. A number of states including Brazil and Nigeria abstained. 
Another example of Chile’s voting behavior vis-à-vis other UNHRC members 
was the resolution in the Tenth session of the Council on the resolution on the 
Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (2009). The resolution strongly called the 
government of the DPRK to stop the human rights violations occurring in the country and 
to cooperate with special procedures. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 26 in 
favor, six against and 15 abstentions. The Group of Latin American and Caribbean States, 
the GRULAC group as it is known in the Council, were noticeable divided between those 
who supported the resolutions and those which abstain or voted against. Chile, Argentina, 
Mexico, Uruguay voted for the resolution while Brazil, Nicaragua, and Bolivia abstained. 
It is important to note that in this particular vote, Brazil changed its position from support 
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from the mandate from previous years to abstaining. China, Cuba, Egypt, Indonesia, 
Nigeria, and Russia all voted against the resolution. 
Table 5 
Chile and the UNHRC 2006-2011 
Years of Membership 2008-2011  
2011-2014 
Voting on relevant country-
situations/ resolutions 
In favor: 
Sudan  
North Korea 
Iran 
Belarus 
Syria 
Other relevant thematic 
initiatives: 
-Sponsor resolution to mainstream gender throughout 
the UN, especially within the Human Rights Council 
and treaty bodies. Several initiatives to promote 
women’s rights. 
- Active member of the bureau of the Preparatory 
Committee for the 2001 Durban World Conference. 
Also on its review process in 2009. 
-Supports the implementation of the Council’s 
mandate to respond promptly to emergencies. 
Cosponsor of the special session on Libya and also 
sponsor the resolution on Iran, which led to the 
creation of the special rapporteur mandate. 
Universal Periodic Review 2009 (submitted) and also extended a standing 
invitation to the Human Rights Council mechanism. 
Source: HRW (2011), Office of the High Commissioner of Human rights, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/countries/LACRegion/Pages/CLIndex.aspx. 
 
In terms of initiatives on the HRC, Chile has been an important actor when it 
comes to supporting the effective implementation of the Council’s mandate to respond 
promptly to human rights emergencies. It was a cosponsor of the special session on Libya 
and the only council member of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean countries to 
sponsor the resolution on Iran, which led to the creation of the special rapporteur mandate 
(HRW 2011). In a note to the UN General Assembly presenting its candidacy for 
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reelection to the Human Rights Council, this point was made fairly clear by the Chilean 
delegation:  
We believe that, as part of the Council’s action, there can and must be a 
strengthening of the procedures for the early warning of and response to situations 
of mass violations of human rights in a particular State, including special sessions, 
on-site visits and stronger resolutions on such countries. (Permanent Mission of 
Chile at the General Assembly, 2011) 
Chile is also among the states that regularly advocate for the strengthening the 
Council’s mechanisms and in particular the independence of the special procedures, as 
well as promoting NGO participation (HRW 2011). In the same concept, Chile’s 
delegation indicated:  
We stressed the importance of improving the Council’s working methods. We 
also stressed the need for it to be a principal organ of the United Nations system 
and for the review process to be conducted using transparent, inclusive and open 
procedures, with the participation of non-governmental organizations, the 
Council’s special procedures and the organizations and agencies of the United 
Nations system. (Permanent Mission of Chile at the General Assembly, 2011) 
Thematically, Chile promoted at the Commission and later in the Council initiatives 
mainly on civil and political rights. Several interviewers indicated that there was not a 
deliberate policy to focus on these rights but that the recent transition to democracy 
combined with the depth of the human rights violations perpetrated by the military 
regime marked the country’s international commitment with the promotion of political 
and civil rights. Chile has sponsored or cosponsored relevant initiatives in the Council 
and other UN mechanisms to offer reparations to victims human rights violations, the 
right to truth, the protection against forced disappearances, among others. 
For the past decade, in particular, Chile has been a strong advocate of women’s 
rights. The country sponsored the Commission on Human Rights resolution on 
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integrating the human rights of women throughout the United Nations system and 
cosponsored the resolutions on maternal mortality and the elimination of discrimination 
against women. Chile´s human rights agenda also included efforts to combat racism, 
racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance. It participated actively as a 
member of the bureau of the Preparatory Committee for the 2001 Durban World 
Conference on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, at 
which it was one of the Vice-Presidents. Before that, in December 2000, Chile had hosted 
the Regional Conference of the Americas in preparation for the 2001 Durban World 
Conference. 
Finally, despite of the relatively small size of the country, a considerable number 
of Chileans have occupied relevant positions within the UN human rights machinery as 
special rapporteurs or in special procedures of the Human Rights Commission and 
Council (Vargas, 2012).
19
 
The Inter-American Human Rights System 
Only a few months after the democratic government of Patricio Aylwin took over, 
the American Convention of Human Rights was ratified, also recognizing the jurisdiction 
of the Inter-American Court over contentions cases. According to Felipe Gonzales,
20
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 Just to mention some Chilean experts at the UN human rights system since 1990: Cecilia 
Medina, member of the Committee for Civil and Political Rights; Alejandro Gonzalez y Claudio 
Grossman, Committee against Torture; Marta Mauras, Committee for the Rights of the Child; 
Maria Soledad Cisternas, Committee for Persons with Disabilities; Maria Magdalena Sepulveda, 
expert on the issue of human rights and extreme poverty; Roberto Garreton, Special Rapporteur 
for the CDR and member of the Committee for Arbitrary Detention; and Jose Bengoa, member of 
the UN working group on minorities.  
20
 Felipe Gonzalez is today a member of the Inter-American Comission of Human Rights. 
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Chile reposition itself within the Inter-American system very quickly, assuming 
during the first years of the transition to democracy a protagonist role in the 
strengthening of the system, calling in the different OAS forums for states to 
implement the mandates of the Commission and the Court. It also played and 
active role in the preparation of the Inter-American Convention on Forced 
Disappearance that was finally adopted in 1994. (Gonzalez, Felipe 1997: 11)  
Yet, “Chile’s attitude towards the Inter-American system started to change as soon as the 
Commission questioned the country against certain cases” (Gonzalez, 1997: 11). 
In the 1990s and the early years of 2000s the Commission issued several 
decisions on specific cases against Chile, which the state either did not obey or took 
several years to do so. There were two group of cases in which the Commission declared 
the Chilean Amnesty law to be contrary to the American Convention. No action was 
taken by the state at the time, and it was only years later that Chilean jurisprudence would 
change in this regard (Gonzalez 2010). The latter does not come entirely as a surprise 
considering that when Chile ratified the American Convention of Human Rights in March 
1990—probably foreseen future controversies with the Commission due the Amnesty 
Law in place in the country since 1978 by the military regime—it was signed with a 
special reservation. The Chilean Delegation explicitly declared  
the Government of Chile places on record that this recognition of the competence 
and jurisdiction of the Commission applies to events subsequent to the date of 
deposit of this instrument of ratification or, in any case, to events which began 
subsequent to March 11, 1990. 
In the end of the 1990s there was also the case in which the commission decided that 
appointed senators adversely affected the political rights of Chilean citizens. It took six 
years to respond to this decision (Gonzalez, 2010: 11).
21
 
                                                          
21 
Chile, however, was more active in implementing the Court’s decision in the case of The Last 
Temptation of Christ.  
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Experts have criticized Chile’s involvement with the Inter-American human rights 
system particularly during the 1990s because “the Chilean state did not engage in 
amicable settlements during proceedings at the Commission, in contrast to the trend 
among other states that were interested in supporting the Inter-American system.
22” 
(Gonzalez, Felipe 2010:167). Yet, since the turn of the century, Chile’s attitude towards 
the Commission has been more positive. The government has engaged in more 
negotiations that have led to some amicable settlements and “generally playing a role 
more consistent with that of a state that allegedly supports the enhancement of the Inter-
American system” (Gonzalez, 2010: 168). 
Finally, it is important to note that a significant number of Chilean lawyers have 
been selected to part of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and the Court. 
Chile is one of the countries with the highest number of Commissioners in the past 
twenty years. Since 1990 the Chilean selected member of the Inter-American 
Commission of Human Rights includes: Claudio Grossman, Jose Zalaquet y Felipe 
Gonzalez. Three Chilean judges have been members of the Inter-American Court: 
Maximo Pacheco, Cecilia Medina y Eduardo Vio. 
UN Peace Operations and Humanitarian Protection 
Chile’s response to the international intervention in Kosovo in 1999 was cautious. 
The government did condemn the atrocities perpetrated in Kosovo but at the same time 
explicitly manifested their concern about NATO’S decision to intervene without UNSC 
approval. This position is probably due to the coincidental arrest of General Pinochet in 
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 Moreover, during the 1990s Chile repeatedly argued before the commission that it had not 
responsibility for actions of the judiciary (invoking the separation of branches in power). 
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London and the need to be consistent with the notion advanced by the government that 
prosecuting Pinochet outside Chilean jurisdiction was not in the interest of Chile, a 
sovereign state capable of judging him at home. Domestically, the low Chamber of the 
Congress issued a declaration on April 19, 1999 addressed to the Chilean Minister of 
Foreign Affairs declaring their opposition to an illegitimate intervention lacking the 
support from the UNSC (Serrano 2000). 
Yet, despite Pinochet’s arrest and unlike other Latin American countries such as 
Mexico that were up front defenders of an strict notion sovereignty, the Chilean Mission 
at the UN explicitly manifested that respecting sovereign integrity does not precludes that 
under exceptional circumstances and under the right authority the international 
community should contemplate the possibility of intervening for humanitarian reasons 
(Serrano 2000). Chile ultimately decided to participate in peacekeeping and policing in 
the area when solicited by the United Nations Peacekeeping Unit in 2000. 
Chile also contributed to peacekeeping operations in Iraq, Cambodia, and El 
Salvador, among other missions (see Table 5). However, it was not until 2010 that Chile 
drastically increased its participation in peacekeeping, sending troops to the Multinational 
Force for Haiti and later to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti 
(MINUSTAH). With more than 500 troops on the ground since the beginning of the 
mission in 2004, Chilean officials see participating in MINUSTAH as one of its greatest 
contribution to the protection of human rights, human security and regional peace. The 
latter point is continuously emphasized by Chilean delegates, which indicate that this 
operation is at the core a regional one. Two Chilean diplomats have been selected as 
Special Representatives of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission since the 
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beginning of the mission in 2004. Additionally, since 2010 Chile’s International 
Cooperation Agency (AGCI) has been implementing programs on education and 
development in the Caribbean nation. 
Table 6 
Chile’s Participation in UN Peace Operations since 1990 
 
 UNIKOM (Iraq – Kuwait), 1991-1993 
 UNTAC (Cambodia), 1992-1993  
 ONUSAL (El Salvador), 1992-1995 
 MOMEP (Ecuador- Peru), 1995, 1999 
 UNSCOM (Iraq), 1996-1998 
 UNMIBH (Bosnia Herzegovina),1997-2002 
 UNTAET (Timor Oriental), 2000-2002 
 UNMOVIC (Iraq), 2000-2003 
 UNMIK (Kosovo), 2000-Present 
 UNFICYP(Chipre), 2001-Present 
 UNMISET (Timor Leste), 2002-2003 
 MONUC (DRC), 2003 
 UNAMA (Afghanistan), 2003-2004 
 MINUSTAH(Haiti)2004-Present 
 
Source: CECOPAC-Chile, http://www.cecopac.cl/chile_en_opaz/contribucion.html. 
 
Chile has also been one of the leading countries in the region to support the 
concept of “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) as conceptualized by the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s (ICISS) in 2001 (Fuentes & 
Fuentes, 2013). Unlike a substantial minority of Latin American governments that claim 
that R2P is a threat to their sovereignty or represents a new form of interventionism, 
Chilean leaders have insisted that no country is less sovereign because of its willingness 
to accept an international responsibility to respond to mass atrocities. Chilean policy 
makers explicitly state that R2P is a legitimate alternative for responding to humanitarian 
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crises (Fuentes & Fuentes 2013). In fact, this is one of the reasons why Chilean 
delegations have been supportive of the UN Human Rights Council’s mandate to respond 
promptly to human rights emergencies. 
Chile clearly stated its position in relation to R2P during the 2005 UN World 
Summit, when the country supported the inclusion of specific international commitments 
endorsing R2P in the Outcome Document. As expressed by the former Chilean Minister 
of Foreign Relations, Ignacio Walker, at the Sixtieth Session of the UN General 
Assembly,  
When States are unable or unwilling to act, this organization cannot remain 
indifferent in the face of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. We have an international responsibility to protect that which we 
cannot ethically shrink. (Walker, 2005: 2)  
During the Summit, the Chilean delegation insisted on its interpretation of the 
Responsibility to Protect as a “continuum,” which included the international 
responsibility to prevent and assist (Labbe, 2005). It argued that efforts to prevent 
genocide and other crimes against humanity needed to address root causes, such as hatred 
among ethnic groups and inequality among various groups within a country.
23
 Finally, in 
accordance with the UN Charter, the Chilean delegation concurred with the idea of a 
collective international obligation to take timely and decisive action when needed. The 
concept of decisive action included the provisional use of coercive tactics only under 
certain extreme conditions and only with the collective consent of the Security Council. 
                                                          
23 
Yet, there is no evidence of Chile, or of any other Latin American country, taking a global lead 
in generating international or regional initiatives specifically aimed at preventing mass atrocities. 
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Financial Assistance 
The financial contribution to international human rights organizations is also 
another indicator of a state commitment in this area. Since 2000 the contribution of Chile 
to the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) is limited but 
constant across the years. According to the annual OHCHR reports, in 2011 Chile 
contributed US$ 25,000 leaving the country according to OHCHR´s donor ranking per 
capita in the place 52 out of 71 states (OHCHR, 2011). The United Nations Democratic 
FUND (UNDEF) that was created in 2005 is another UN institution providing grants to 
civil society groups for democracy promotion. Chile is among the 39 countries 
contributing financially to UNDEF with a total amount of US$320,000 from 2005 to 
2013. Mexico, Peru and Argentina have also contributed to the UN Democratic Funds 
while the rest of Latin American countries have never been donors. 
Regarding Chile’s assistance to the Inter-American Human Rights System, the 
country has been a longstanding contributor to the Commission’s special budget. In terms 
of numbers Chile’s contribution is not that significant24 (IACHR, 2012) (US is the main 
contributor to the Human Rights Commission, financing more than 75% of the budget). 
Yet, Chile along with Costa Rica and Mexico have consistently contributed to the 
Commission’s budget every year and they have recently indicated that they will increase 
these funds. In contrast, Brazil, has not contributed any funds in several years 
(2007/2010/2011/2012). 
                                                          
24 Chile’s contribution is not more than 3% of the budget total that comes from the IACHR 
member states. Information available only from 2006.  
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Conclusions 
The transition to democracy that began in March 1990 prompted Chilean foreign 
policy officials to start a process of international re-insertion with the objective of 
recovering the country’s lost prestige within the international community of states due to 
the massive human rights abuses committed by the military regime for seventeen years. 
This process included coming back as an active participant at the very same international 
and regional human rights institutions that were at the forefront of the struggle against 
General Pinochet during the dictatorship. The fast signature and ratification of many 
international human rights treaties in which the country was not part due to the military 
regime’s policy of not accepting international scrutiny over domestic issues were part of 
this process. The ratification of the American Convention and the jurisdiction of the 
Inter-American Court, for example, were made only three months after the newly 
democratic government took over. 
The politics of re-insertion also included the participation in multilateral human 
rights institutions such as the UN Human Rights Commission. What is more striking is 
that these policies continued after the government of Patricio Aylwin ended in 1994 and 
long after Chile had left behind its stigma as an international pariah. Moreover, human 
rights were integrated into the foreign policy of the three following governments of the 
Coalition of Parties for Democracy up to 2010. The assessment of Chile’s human rights 
diplomacy from 1990-2010 can be summarized as follows: 
Chile was an active player at the multilateral level, especially within UN human 
rights institutions. At the Human Rights Commission and later on in the Council the 
country evidences a consistent voting behavior when comes to country-specific 
60 
situations. In other words, it voted on the basis of the facts rather than calculations of 
political advantage. It has been a significant promoter of international human rights 
instruments and thematic initiatives and is permanently searching for mechanisms for 
strengthening these institutions. At the Inter-American, it has supported the system 
politically and also economically, but it has been weaker when comes to implement 
recommendations from the Commission. When it comes to humanitarian protection, 
Chile has increased its participation in UN Peace operations with a special emphasis on 
of Haiti (MINUSTAH). At the same time, it’s supportive of the concept of the 
Responsibility to Protect emphasizing the need for displaying a continuum of 
mechanisms and instruments to prevent and effectively respond to human rights 
emergencies.  
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CHAPTER 3: UNDERSTANDING HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHILE’S  
FOREIGN POLICY 
Contextualizing Foreign Policy 
In explaining why Chile became an international human rights promoter, we first 
need to situate it within the larger international and regional context of post-Cold War in 
which this nation’s transition to democracy took place. Second, to understand the 
domestic drivers of foreign policy with a focus on the shared national experience of the 
military regime’s rule and the way that the transition to democracy took place in Chile—
what is called the mode of the transition. Finally, locate the discussion as part of the 
general objectives and priorities driving the newer, democratically elected government’s 
foreign policy. 
International and Regional Context 
Only a few months after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of several 
communist regimes across Eastern Europe, Patricio Aylwin took over as the first Chilean 
President after 17 years of military rule. The new government arrived at the outset of a 
new international order, a world with a power dynamic and a normative structure far 
different from the one which faced the last democratically elected President, Salvador 
Allende in 1970. As a Chilean historian aptly puts it: 
Between 1989 and 1990, it seemed that Chile was confirming international 
tendencies…Chile was a protagonist within itself of the end of the Cold War, 
even before it (the Cold war) disappeared from the international scene. 
(Fermandois 2004: 494)
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International changes came hand in hand with regional ones. The democratic transition 
initiated in the Southern Cone (Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile) was coupled with the 
pacification and democratization process developed in Central America during the 1990s. 
Between 1978 and 1991, “no fewer than fifteen of the twenty countries returned to or 
established elected civilian governments after experiencing one form or another of 
authoritarian rule” (Scott Palmer, 1996). The depth of the democratic wave in each one of 
the Latin American countries, at least in terms of establishing electoral democracies, 
paved the way for the creation of a regional system for the promotion of democracy at the 
regional level. 
Domestic changes together with the vastly decreased salience of ideological 
rhetoric in US-Latin American relations, due to the end of the Cold War, opened the 
political space for better Inter-American relations and for strengthening democratic 
governance in the Americas. As Tom Farer has written, the end of the Cold War “sharply 
reduced the risk that resolutions endorsing hemispheric action on behalf of democracy 
would be treated as licenses for the pursuit of political ends related only loosely (if at all) 
to the consolidation and preservation of representative democracy” (Farer, 1996:15). In 
June 1991, the OAS adopted the Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal 
of the Inter-American System and an accompanying resolution on representative 
democracy. It provided that the interruption of a democratic or constitutional form of 
government would trigger a process of consultation to consider measures for restoring 
democratic legitimacy. Moreover, through the Protocol of Washington of 1993, the OAS 
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Charter was modified allowing for the suspension of non-democratic states (Acevedo & 
Grossman, 1996). 
Liberalism became the reigning orthodoxy in the economic as well as the political 
sphere. During this period the so-called “Washington Consensus” drove economic 
reforms in Latin America. Leading orthodox economists from the United States and 
within the region pushed for an agenda of deregulation of capital markets, free exchange 
rates, privatization of national companies. Almost all of the countries in the Americas, 
and numerous others outside the hemisphere, followed important parts of the policies of 
the Consensus during the 1990s and many continued to do so afterwards. Chile was at the 
forefront of these economic reforms and initiated an aggressive policy for market 
liberation as described in the next section. 
By the beginning of the next decade, many of these economic policies and even 
democratic principles have been significantly challenged fundamentally due to the 
incapacity of many Latin American governments to overcome increasing levels of 
economic and political inequality that are so pervasive throughout the region (UNDP, 
2010). The beginning of the new century also brought important international changes as 
the rise of other powers—most importantly China— and the advent of a multipolar world 
became more evident. Yet, Chile´s international policies up to 2010 present no significant 
shifts as a result of these new international developments.
25
 As the Chilean case goes, the 
fundamental tenets of its foreign policy were developed at the beginning of the 1990s and 
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  Several Interviewers with different policy makers (including some that are part of the electoral 
campaign of Michelle Bachelet who is running to be in office by 2014) said that there is lack of 
thinking on Chile´s foreign policy agenda and future goals in light of the current international and 
regional agenda. 
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since then its international policies have remained very much shaped by the national and 
international context in which the transition to democracy took place. 
The Mode of the Transition 
One of the key characteristics of the transition to democracy in Chile was the 
highly constrained condition under which new democratic authorities took office on 
March 11
th 
1990. The military regime imposed an institutional framework (accepted by 
the opposition as a condition of the armed forces’ toleration of a democratic transition 
that allowed for very few reforms without the approval of the right-wing forces, which 
still by and large supported General Pinochet. For instance, the Constitution (1980) 
established that the head of the armed forces and the chief of police had fixed 
appointments of four years, and that the president could not remove them without the 
approval of the National Security Council (NSC). However, the military controlled the 
majority of votes in that Council (4 out of 7 votes). Two members of the NSC could call 
a meeting if they considered the state to be under threat. Moreover, through the NSC, the 
head of military institutions appointed four senators and two members of the 
Constitutional Tribunal. Military institutions also held seats in regional and municipal 
development councils, the Council of Cinematography (responsible for revising and 
censuring movies and TV programs), and the National Mining Company (CODELCO) 
(Fuentes S. 2006). Due to the aforementioned system of appointed senators, conservative 
sectors controlled the majority of the Senate between 1990 and 2005. Thus, any 
substantive reform promoted by the new government necessarily demanded the 
agreement of the right wing parties in congress. 
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These constraints led the first democratically elected president of the transition, 
President Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994), to adopt a very cautiously incremental approach 
toward the policy agenda. After March 1990, incumbents decided to strategically define 
what would comprise the most essential reforms for the new government, postponing 
conflictive issues such as the reform of the Constitution, the reform of the electoral 
system, and several other deep institutional challenges to unconstrained electoral 
democracy. Between 1990 and 1994 the government launched a special effort to pass a 
relatively moderate bill on tax reform, municipal elections, and the reestablishment of 
certain basic civil and political rights, which had been suspended under Pinochet’s 1980 
Constitution. Rather than promote grand institutional reforms, new authorities opted 
instead to establish cooperative agreements with the opposition, thereby advancing some 
smaller reforms. 
It is in this context of moderation that the new government formulated an 
international relations agenda. The international arena provided democratic authorities 
with an excellent vehicle for the advancement of specific policies, while also allowing 
them to diplomatically circumnavigate political opposition from right-wing parties at 
home. Foreign policy could significantly contribute to two major domestic goals: to 
generate governability and a peaceful transition to democracy through the 
reestablishment of civil and political rights; and to promote economic growth and social 
development. For instance, on the economic front the government initiated an aggressive 
strategy of opening international markets in order to move forward with specific social 
and economic policies. At the political level, as we will see in the next pages of this 
chapter, international organizations and governing bodies were used strategically by local 
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actors as source of internal legitimacy and as a way of controlling the authoritarian 
sectors of Chilean society. 
Objectives and Priorities in Chilean Foreign Policy 
As Chilean policymakers developed foreign policy objectives they simultaneously 
assessed the opportunities and challenges of a new post Cold World War international 
context and the domestic priorities of democratic consolidation and economic 
development (Van Klaveren, 1998; Insulza, 1998). In this context, the government set 
three core foreign policy goals, goals that remained very much unchanged until the 
Coalition’s defeat in the 2010 election. First, the new authorities put a special emphasis in 
the internationalization of the economy, which in Insulza’s words implied “strengthening 
and widening our international presence in terms of commerce and investment abroad. A 
country like Chile, which is open to the world, needs to link its economic and foreign 
policy objectives” (Insulza 1998: 18). The international economic strategy was labeled 
‘open regionalism’ and was meant to promote trade agreements between Chile and 
countries both within and outside of Latin America. Consecutive administrations signed 
economic as well as free-trade agreements with various countries in Asia, Europe and the 
Americas. Among the most prominent arrangements were the complementary agreements 
with Bolivia (1993), Venezuela (1993), Colombia (1993), MERCOSUR (1996), and 
Cuba and Peru (1998). Free trade agreements were signed with Canada (1996), Central 
America (1998), the European Union (2002), the United States (2003), South Korea 
(2003), and China (2006). Moreover, this strategy also entailed the promotion of Chilean 
private investment abroad. Between 1990 and 2004, Chile invested more than US $15 
billion in Argentina, US $5 billion in Brazil, US $4 billion in Peru and US $2 billion in 
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Colombia (Fuentes S. & Fuentes J. 2006). This strategy proved to be one of the most 
successful foreign policy decisions that was made at that time. Today, Chile has a 
network of signed free trade agreements with 56 countries, representing over 60 percent 
of the world’s population. Seven out of every ten pesos of Chilean wealth come from 
foreign trade. (Fuentes & Rojas 2010: 145). 
A second objective established early on in the transition was a great strengthening 
of Chile’s participation in international institutions (and international politics more 
generally) with the aim of giving Chile the profile of a resolute contributor to the building 
of a more “stable and more secure international order” (Insulza 1998: 35). According to 
Insulza, 
we have pointed out that Chile is an intermediate country within the international 
system, and in a highly complex world it is essential to cooperate and to respond 
to international responsibilities in order to promote peace and the well-being of 
the people. This is a country that needs to not only take advantage of the 
opportunities of the international system, but also to assume some responsibilities. 
(Insulza 1998: 61) 
This strategy represented Chile’s position as a small country, which wanted to promote 
global rules within an international framework. As we will see, human rights promotion 
became an integral part of this strategy. 
The third foreign policy objective was proactive involvement within the Latin 
American region. This implied the promotion of economic agreements with individual 
countries (almost all the countries within the Pacific rim), economic agreements with 
groups of countries (MERCOSUR, Central America, the Andean Community), and 
political initiatives such as the resolution of all border conflicts with Argentina, the 
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promotion of political initiatives within multilateral regional fora and the development of 
other confidence-building measures with bordering countries.  
Explaining Chile’s Foreign Policy Choices 
As described in the previous section, Chile´s transition to democracy occurred in 
a particular international and regional context that combined with the domestic constrains 
of the time prompted the creation of a new foreign policy agenda that prolonged itself for 
almost two decades. The remaining question is why human rights ideals have occupied 
such a privileged position in the foreign-policy-making process during this period? The 
following section explores a series of international and domestic forces driving Chile’s 
commitment to the defense and promotion of international human rights. 
International Dimension 
As a relatively small country without geostrategic or economic prominence at the 
international level, Chile’s foreign policy historically emphasized the promotion of 
international law and multilateralism as a way of leveling the playing field among 
nations. As the Chilean Foreign Policy Blue Book
26
 indicates, the goal is to  
strengthen our involvement in international institutions and to participate within 
the multilateral system with our own vision and capacities, making the principles 
that inspire Chilean foreign policy a true reality through the effective promotion 
of standards, norms, rules and international regimes, which facilitate the task of 
‘global governance’ in order to confront new international challenges. (Ministerio 
de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile, 2010)  
Chile’s historical preference for building multilateral institutions, however, is not a 
necessary or a sufficient condition for becoming an international human rights promoter. 
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 The Chilean Foreign Policy Blue Book is a government initiative to provide a public report 
stating core principles and objectives of the state on Chile’s international policy.  
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In fact many small countries have active multilateral foreign policies in different issue-
areas but are less active than Chile on the realm of human rights. 
The search for legitimacy and the need to recuperate what local policymakers 
called “Chile’s lost international prestige” was at the forefront of the nation’s 
international strategy in the early 1990s. All the policymakers interviewed for this project 
concurred that the best way to recover full membership in the international society of 
states was to portray an international image in tune with the democratic values and 
human rights principles that were the prevalent pattern among democratic states in the 
context of the Post Cold War. “Democracy and human rights promotion was central to 
the country’s international insertion” (A. Van Klaveren, personal communication, July 
2013), “human rights were at the time of the transition an international reality. Chile had 
to be able to meet these new international challenges” (R. Garreton, personal 
communication, July 2013), “Chile had to recover its traditional multilateral stand as a 
defender of universal human rights” (E. Vargas, personal communication, July 2013) are 
some of examples of the quotes used by government officials explaining human rights 
promotion beyond its borders. In other words, the judgment of Chilean elites was that 
their international policies were best served by following a liberal international order that 
among other features set human rights promotion as an increasing international standard 
of appropriate behaviour for states. 
International human rights promotion was, therefore, used as a means for rapid 
international insertion after years of isolation due to the notorious human rights violations 
perpetrated by the military regime, notorious in part because Chile had previously 
exemplified democratic governance in a Global South nation. Yet, it would be misleading 
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to assume that the promotion of international human rights was purely instrumental. It 
also responded to a moral commitment based on the historical experience of a nation and 
in particular with new elected leaders that had experienced first-hand the horrors and 
abuses of the Pinochet’s years. In fact, the new coalition of governing parties as we will 
see later in the chapter, brought into the bureaucracy human rights ideas acquired in exile 
and learned during the intensive struggle against the military regime. The Chilean 
historian, Joaquin Fermandois, nicely illustrates this point:  
The importance of being a ‘morally correct’ country was a first priority for the 
Coalition of Democratic Parties when introducing themselves to the international 
public. This was based upon a significant dose of passion due to sometime terrible 
past experiences. (Fermandois 2004: 506) 
At the time of Chile’s transition to democracy there was also significant evidence 
of “peer pressures” from other states—especially European Union members— pushing 
Chilean diplomats to be active human rights promoters. Roberto Garreton, who was in 
charge of Chile’s newly created human rights unit at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 
1990 to 1994, recalls that there was an enormous interest in Chile’s transition to 
democracy and an expectation that “Chile would become part of the international group 
of countries that are well known human rights promoters” (R. Garreton, personal 
communication, July 2013). He indicates that at the beginning of the 1990s Chilean 
diplomats quickly learned that it was smart to team up with like-minded states that were 
eager to form coalitions to promote human rights resolutions within the United Nations. 
As an example of the international interest in getting Chile involved in the 
promotion of human rights, Garreton remembers how the country became the sponsor of 
the Resolution on “the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
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Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law”. All the work to present this 
project was performed almost exclusively by the Netherlands including a leading study 
by Theo van Boven concerning the right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation 
for victims of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms that is at the 
core of the basic principles and guidelines that were agreed at the United Nations. Yet, 
the Dutch government “offered us (Chilean delegation) the opportunity to sponsor this 
initiative. Something that came as a gift since we did not have the capacity to 
systematically work on presenting such projects” (R. Garreton, personal communication, 
July 2013). 
Unlike the “peer pressures” from European states, the influence of regional actors 
on Chile’s decision to include human rights as parts of its foreign policy are difficult to 
gauge at this point. Latin American states played a more significant role pressuring 
counterparts with respect to democracy promotion rather than human rights protection. 
Indeed, in 1991 Santiago was the site chosen for the OAS General Assembly at which 
Hemispheric political leaders met to sign the democratic commitment to promote and 
defend democracy throughout the hemisphere. This event symbolized a pledge from the 
rest of the Inter-American countries to promote democracy throughout the region and in 
Chile in particular. Domestically it also gave new political actors additional leverage in a 
period when the recently elected government was still struggling to exert control over the 
military, and simultaneously attempting to establish political mechanisms to seek truth
27
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 The Report of The National Truth and Reconciliation Commission was released in 1991.  
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apply justice and provide reparations to the victims of human rights violations committed 
by the military regime. Yet, regional effects towards international human rights 
promotion—except for participation in the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti in 2004—
were not mentioned by policymakers as an important driving force. 
After the first democratic government of Patricio Aylwin came to and end in 
1994, Chilean policymakers concluded that the main objectives of international 
reinsertion were accomplished. Yet, the search for international legitimacy and prestige 
through multilateralism and as member of the team of states that are recognized as human 
rights and democracy activists remained at the forefront of Chile’s foreign policy aims. 
General Augusto Pinochet’s detention in London in 1998 at the end of Eduardo 
Frei’s administration illustrates this trend. The international arrest warrant issued by 
judge Baltasar Garzón of Spain on charges of genocide and murder negatively affected 
Chile’s international standing as it was evident that the country still suffered from 
important institutional constraints precluding further democratic strengthen. It also made 
evident the new political leaders were unable for two consecutive governments to 
prosecute the perpetrators of past human rights violations. Under those circumstances, 
Chilean diplomats promptly used the country’s newly recovered international credentials 
in the human rights field as a way of deflecting international criticism about the 
incapacity of the government to effectively pursue justice and as a platform to push for 
the return of the General to Chilean soil (Rojas & Stefoni, 2001). As part of the 
government’s strategy to block Pinochet’s extradition to Spain, the Minister of Foreign 
Relations of the time, Jose Miguel Insulza, wrote a letter to UN Secretary General Kofi 
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Annan highlighting Chile’s diplomatic action in favor of human rights protection and the 
universalization of justice: 
As the member states of the United Nations are aware of, since the re-
establishment of the democracy in 1990, Chile has been advocating for the 
international protection of human rights, and our diplomatic actions are very 
consistent in this realm. My government had placed special interest in 
contributing to the universalization of justice when comes to crimes against 
humanity and the development of international norms when comes to individual 
criminal responsibility when comes to human rights abuses. Chile was from the 
beginning an active participant in the negotiations for the International Criminal 
Court Statue that was signed in Rome on June 1998 and it was one of the first 
states to subscribe to it on the past September 11. (Insulza in Aranda & Morande 
2009: 102). 
 
Chile’s international credentials continued to concern the government in the wake 
of Pinochet’s return to Santiago. During his first year as President in 2000, Ricardo 
Lagos, presenting the results of the Roundtable for Dialogue on Human Rights
28
 
reiterated, as he had during his election campaign and earlier in his political career that 
seeking truth and justice was an inescapable goal primarily for the people but also as a 
way for the government to demonstrate to the international community that Chile is a 
responsible nation. In his words:  
We cannot fail, we owe this to the victims and the Chilean people and also to 
international community that is looking at us… Today, after this agreement, we 
are a better country. We have grown and learned from our own adversity, by 
reaching this consensus we have been able to say to Chile and the rest of the 
world that the country is capable of facing the challenges that our own history 
asked us to face. (Ricardo Lagos in Aranda & Morande 2009: 106)  
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 The Round Table for Dialogue on Human Rights was formed on the 21st of August 1999 
during the government of President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle. It was made up of a group of 
people who included, among others, representatives from the Government, the Armed Forces and 
the Police and religious and moral institutions. Its principal objective was to propose measures 
that would contribute towards determining the fate or whereabouts of detainees that had 
disappeared. 
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The international recognition of Chile as responsible stakeholder was a key concern 
throughout this period and indeed an important driver to include human rights as part of 
the country’s foreign policy. 
The final government of the Coalition of Democratic Parties headed by Michelle 
Bachelet (2006-2010) was especially active in the human rights field. Chilean diplomats 
participated on the discussion to reform the UN Human rights Commission and to make 
the newly formed Human Rights Council a better vehicle than its predecessor for 
carrying out its stated mission. They occupied the vice-presidency from 2008-2010. The 
government was also finally able to ratify the Rome Statue establishing the International 
Criminal Court. The normative ethical commitments as a motive for promoting 
international human rights became more evident during Bachelet’s Presidency. During 
her time in office, Bachelet was particularly sensitive to the topic, as she herself was a 
victim of the Pinochet regime’s ruthless methods of torture and imprisonment. Explaining 
the Chilean commitment to the UN Security Council, Bachelet stated: 
You will be aware of my own personal experience with the abuse of human 
rights. Those were painful times for me, for my family, and for my country. They 
were certainly the darkest chapter in Chile’s history (...). But we are striving to 
create a world in which such abuses are no longer possible. Nunca Más, never 
again, as we said in Chile after our experience in the 1970s and 1980s. And that is 
what we must also say in the United Nations, and act accordingly. Chile 
subscribes fully to a broad concept of freedom and emancipation under which 
respect for human rights—along with economic and social development, peace 
and security—is one of the pillars of the mission of the United Nations in this new 
century. As we would like to contribute our experience and commitment to the 
new Human Security Council. (Bachelet, 2011). 
 
In sum, the search to improve Chile’s international credentials in the context of 
recovering the country’s international prestige was a triggering factor for the inclusion of 
human rights into its foreign policy. Chile, however, continue pursuing a human rights 
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foreign policy long after fully recovering its membership within the international 
community at the beginning of the 1990s. The persistent inclusion of human rights into 
Chile’s foreign policy can be interpreted, in part, as a search for legitimacy and prestige 
through the projection of an international image of a “good international citizen”.  
Domestic Factors 
International factors generated the appropriate conditions for Chile to include 
human rights into its foreign policy. Yet, Chile’s diplomatic commitment to human rights 
is also a function of specific domestic conditions. In what follows, several possible 
domestic drivers for foreign policy decision are assessed to establish the relative weight 
of each one of them when it comes to human rights promotion. The main argument of 
this section is that a key aspect for explaining Chile’s commitment to international human 
rights can be found in the personal commitments and political influence of a small group 
of experts on international politics. Together, these individuals formed a leadership 
alliance that would have a profound impact on the nation’s foreign policy decisions for 
more than twenty years (1990-2010). This group of experts understood how to use the 
international community to their advantage in order to gain political influence 
internationally and at home. The emergence of Chile’s foreign policy on human rights 
during the 1990s can be understood as result of these actors’ choices and values, as well 
as domestic political conditions during the democratization process and thereafter.  
Transition to Democracy and the “Lock in” Effect 
Democratic liberal theories predict that states commit to international human 
rights instruments to protect unstable new democracies and to consolidate the credibility 
of the new democratic authorities vis-a vis domestic political opponents (Moravcsik 
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2000). In the case of Chile, there is evidence indicating that this assumption holds. 
Chilean political leaders persistently emphasized that engaging with international human 
rights was an effective way of exerting pressures on the non-democratic sectors of the 
society and particularly the armed forces to preserve the democratic rules of the game. In 
fact, during the first five years following the transition to democracy, any military 
uprising—such as “Ejercicio de Enlace (1990) and “Boinazo” (1993)—was closely 
scrutinized by the entire international community, putting additional informal pressures 
on the armed forces to respect democratic rules (Fuentes 2006). From this point of view, 
participation in international regimes in general and human rights in particular allowed 
further scrutiny from the international community in times in which the main objective of 
the political elites was to secure a peaceful transition to democracy. 
After the transition to democracy and especially since the early 2000s, the country 
started to contribute more significantly to the military dimension of UN peace operations. 
This represents a significant foreign policy shift for a country that had limited 
participation in these activities. Here the motives were to strengthening Chile´s 
democratic process and institution building through the strengthening of civil-military 
relations. Juan Emilio Cheyre, Commander in Chief of the Chilean Army from 2002 to 
2006, indicated that the government was very effective in using foreign policy tools as a 
way of reaching domestic objectives: 
The orientation by President Lagos was to consolidate the transformation of the 
military in order to ensure that its organization, equipment and doctrine were in 
full harmony with Chilean foreign policy, its focus on peace and regional 
integration, and on its desire to assume a role wherever international organizations 
might require support from Chile and where Chile would agree to participate. 
(Cheyre, 2008: 88)  
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Thus, military participation in international peacekeeping missions sponsored by the 
United Nations was an additional tool used by civilian authorities to open new spaces for 
dialogue with the armed forces. 
The armed forces, which had consistently defended the prerogatives and 
privileges they had acquired during the military regime, were surprisingly willing to 
discuss their functions in the context of international peacekeeping missions. For the 
military, participating in peacekeeping operations offered a window of opportunity for 
the creation of a new military mission. After all, on the national stage the armed forces’ 
role was already being scrutinized and limited. Simultaneously, being part of the United 
Nations in situations of humanitarian emergency gave the armed forces a unique chance 
to atone for previous human rights abuses by supporting peace, security and human rights 
abroad, and to cleanse themselves of the negative national and international image they 
had acquired. Their participation in peacekeeping operations also helped the military to 
obtain economic benefits in the form of payment for international missions, and provided 
opportunities for international training and joint exercises with armed forces from around 
the world (Aguero Felipe & Fuentes Claudio 2009). 
It is important to note that this case illustrates that the reasons for new 
democracies to pursue “lock in” strategies can vary. Chile’s high levels of uncertainty 
and the constrained conditions in which the transition took place pushed the newly 
elected political leaders to pursue this strategy as a way of preventing drawbacks and 
ensuring the continuity of the democratic process as well as an alternative to 
strengthening civil-military relations through peace-keeping. Unlike other new 
democratic states, in the Chilean case there is little evidence indicating that they use the 
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logic of subscribing international human rights treaties as a way of fulfilling domestic 
goals in the realm of transitional justice that is characteristic of other states experiencing 
transitions. Argentina is the case that comes most immediately to mind. In Argentina the 
main human rights treaties have constitutional standing, making the country 
exceptionally open to international human rights law (Engstrom 2011). Under President 
Raul Alfonsin, the government instrumentally used international human rights treaties to 
move forward his domestic agenda in particular the Trial of the Juntas (Sikkink 2008). 
Chile under Aylwin’s policy of “justice under the limits of what is possible” was very 
cautions not to open such possibility. In fact, the administration paid special attention to 
the domestic effects of international human rights treaties especially when dealing with 
the amnesty law in place since the military regime. The best example is the already 
mentioned reservation that the Chilean delegation made when signing the American 
Convention, namely that it would be inapplicable to previous events. Even when the 
Inter-American Commission declared the Chilean Amnesty Law contrary to the 
Convention, no action or responses were taken on the government side. 
To summarize, the newly elected government of Patricio Aylwin deliberately 
invoked international human rights treaties and employed international human rights 
monitoring as a formula to exert additional pressure to the non-democratic sectors of the 
Chilean society and to secure a peaceful transition to democracy. Later in the early 1990s, 
participation in peacekeeping operations opened a new window of opportunity for both 
the government and the armed forces to cooperate on an issue that was mutually 
advantageous. While the military saw UN peacekeeping operations as a way of gaining 
public recognition, increase resources and further access to training; the government 
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detected an opportunity to further exert further civilian control over the military and 
strengthening civil-military relations. Indeed, when dealing with peacekeeping missions 
domestic actors (government officials and the military) astutely took strategic advantage 
of international mechanisms to promote domestic objectives.  
Political Leadership and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
A key variable for explaining Chile’s commitment to international human rights 
can be found in a small group of experts on international politics. Together, these 
individuals formed a leadership alliance that would have a profound impact on the 
nation’s foreign policy decisions for more than twenty years (1990-2010). This group of 
experts understood how to use the international community to their advantage in order to 
further pursue domestic goals. Simultaneously, they shared a set of common values 
emphasizing democracy and human rights, due largely to their personal histories of 
struggle against Pinochet’s regime. They took key positions within the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs soon after the transition to democracy and remained in power for almost 
two decades. This next section is dedicated to understanding this group’s ideals, values, 
objectives, and impact on foreign policy decisions. 
While the military regime was in power, several non-governmental organizations, 
universities, and think tanks, both in Chile and abroad, worked extensively on issues 
related to democracy and human rights in Latin America and global politics. Institutions 
like FLACSO-Chile, PROSPEL, CERC, ILE, and academic networks like the Latin 
American Network of International Relations (RIAL), developed a myriad of seminars, 
workshops, publications, and policy initiatives facilitating the formation of what can be 
understood as an international epistemic community (Hass, 1992). During the 1980s, a 
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vibrant community of internationalists gathered in different parts of Latin America to 
discuss ideas about democratic peace, confidence-building measures, Latin American 
integration, U.S.-Latin American relations, and the prospects for democratization.
29
 This 
group not only concentrated on academic work. They also worked extensively with 
transnational human rights networks either when they were in exile and upon their return 
in Chile as part of struggle against Pinochet’s dictatorship. Almost a decade later, the 
Chileans that were part of this regional and international community of scholars and 
human rights networks became government officials and used their international 
connections to advance and coordinate action as well as to disseminate their ideas both 
locally and throughout Latin America. 
What stands out in the case of Chile is that, following the initial election, the same 
center-left coalition maintained power for four consecutive terms. This unique situation 
not only gave these new political leaders an opportunity to advance their careers within 
the government but also allowed them to implement policies over a relatively long period 
of time. In order to illustrate the main characteristics of this group and how its members’ 
common backgrounds affected the policymaking process, this section provides brief 
profiles of five key political appointees within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 
1990 and 2010: José Miguel Insulza, Heraldo Muñoz, Carlos Portales, Juan Gabriel 
Valdés, and Alberto van Klaveren. 
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 A good snapshot of this network is presented in the collection “Anuario de Política Exterior de 
América Latina” produced by RIAL-Prospel as well as in the publications produced by the Area 
of International Relations of FLACSO-Chile during the 1980s. 
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These five political figures share important commonalities. All of them were 
recognized professionals who developed their academic careers either in non-
governmental organizations or in universities in Chile and abroad. They all hold post-
graduate degrees from prestigious U.S. universities. All of them were active members of 
political parties in Chile and they each played an important role in the struggle to recover 
democracy, and two of them (Valdés and Insulza) lived in exile. Finally, they each 
occupied at least three key positions within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in different 
periods, allowing for long-term continuity of the policies they promoted. Each of these 
leaders had a striking political career in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Four of them 
occupied at least one of the top five positions at the Ministry, and one of them (Muñoz) 
was Minister of Communication and later the Chilean Representative to the United 
Nations. 
Jose Miguel Insulza began his career as an advisor in international affairs for the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1990, becoming Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs in 
1994. During President Frei’s administration he was appointed Minister of Foreign 
Affairs (1994-1999) and during the Ricardo Lagos’ presidency he became the Chief of 
Cabinet as Minister of the Interior (2000-2004). In 2004, Insulza was supported by the 
Chilean government in his successful campaign to head up the Organization of American 
States (OAS). 
Muñoz’ also fits our description of an expert in international relations because he 
built extensive academic networks throughout the Americas during the 1980s, and, after 
obtaining his PhD in the United States, he decided to return to Chile to confront the 
military regime and reestablish democracy. Soon after the transition, he was appointed 
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ambassador to the Organization of American States (1990-1994) and during the second 
administration of the center-left coalition he became ambassador to Brazil (1994-1998). 
Then the government appointed him Minister of Communication, offering him access to 
top-level decision-making processes in the Presidential Palace. In 2003, President Lagos 
appointed Muñoz the Chilean representative to the UN. During his time at the UN he was 
a key actor in advancing R2P and establishing the Peacebuilding Commission. He 
occupied key positions within the UN system, including chairing a special UN committee 
on Al-Qaeda sanctions, President of the Security Council, and the head of the special 
panel to investigate the death of Benazir Bhutto. Currently, Muñoz is the United Nations 
Development Program’s Regional Director for Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Table 7 
Political Leadership and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Chile (1990-2010) 
 Insulza Muñoz Portales Valdés Van 
Klaveren 
Institution CIDE Prospel FLACSO CIDE U. Chile 
Studies M.A. 
University of 
Michigan 
Ph.D. 
University of 
Denver 
M.A. 
Stanford 
Ph.D. 
Princeton 
M.A. 
University of 
Denver 
Abroad during 
military 
regime 
Italy and 
Mexico 
(Exiled) 
USA USA USA and 
Mexico 
(Exiled) 
USA 
Political party PS PPD PS PS PPD 
Main 
Positions in 
Chile 
-FA Minister 
(1) 
-FA Under 
Sec (2) 
-FA 
Multilateral 
Office 
Director (5) 
-Int’l. 
Agency 
Ministry 
-Vice-Pres 
AGC 
-Comm 
Minister 
-FM 
Foreign 
Policy 
Director (3) 
-FA 
Planning 
Director (6) 
-FA 
Diplomatic 
Academy 
Dir. 
-FA Minister 
(1) 
-FA 
Economic 
Director (4) 
-Int’l 
Division at 
Finance 
Ministry 
-FA Under 
Sec (2) 
-FA Planning 
Director (6) 
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Table 7 (continued) 
 Insulza Muñoz Portales Valdés Van 
Klaveren 
Main 
Positions 
Outside Chile 
-Amb. for 
Int’l 
Cooperation 
-Secretary 
General of 
the OAS 
-Amb. UN 
-Amb. OAS 
-Amb. Brazil 
-Amb. 
Mexico -
Amb. 
Geneva -
Amb, OAS 
-Amb. UN 
-UN special 
repres. in 
Haiti 
-Amb. Spain 
-Amb. 
Belgium 
-Amb. 
Luxem. 
-Amb. To the 
EU 
Note: FA = Foreign Affairs Ministry; Under Sec = Undersecretary; AGCI = Chilean International 
Agency for Cooperation; Amb. = Ambassador; Comm = Communication Minister; PS = 
Socialist Party; PPD = Party for Democracy; UN = United Nations; EU = European Union. 
For appointment information, see: http://www.minrel.cl. 
 
A third case study is Juan Gabriel Valdés. After the transition he was appointed 
Ambassador to Spain (1990-1994), during the second administration of the Concertación 
of Political Parties, he was appointed Economic Director at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (1996-1999), and in 1999 he became Minister of Foreign Affairs. From 2000 to 
2003 he served as the Chilean Ambassador to the UN, and in June 2004 he was appointed 
as Special Representative and Head of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti 
(MINUSTAH). More recently, he was appointed the head of the governmental agency 
“Chile-País,” whose mission is improving the nation’s image internationally (2008-
2010). 
Carlos Portales joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1994 as Ambassador to 
Mexico (1994-1997) and later as Ambassador to the Organization of American States 
(1997-2000). Then, he led the Diplomatic Academy (2000-2001) and the Planning 
Division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Santiago (2001-2002). In 2002, as Director 
of Foreign Policy, he became the third most important advisor in the ministry (2002-
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2008). He was appointed Ambassador to Geneva (2008-2010) where he focused on 
developing an intensive human rights agenda.  
Finally, Alberto van Klaveren is a lawyer and political scientist who specializes in 
international relations (University of Denver and University of Leiden). Prior to the mid-
1990s he worked at the Institute of International Relations at the Universidad de Chile. 
Then, in 1996 he was appointed Director of Planning at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
and subsequently was appointed Ambassador to Belgium, Luxemburg, and the European 
Union (2001 through 2006), and Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs (2006-2009). He is 
the current coordinator of the Chilean team handling a territorial dispute with Peru before 
the International Court of Justice.  
The description of this group’s political careers and professional backgrounds 
attempts to underscore the relevance of key agents within the foreign policy-making 
process. Ambassadors Muñoz, Portales, van Klaveren, Insulza, and Valdés became 
principal actors in the definition of programmatic goals as well as in the development of 
specific policy initiatives within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Muñoz was a key actor 
within the U.N. system as well as within the ministry. He promoted Chile’s involvement 
in peacekeeping operations, the notion of the Responsibility to Protect, and preventative 
peace building, among others. Ambassador Portales became a key actor in defining the 
main guidelines for foreign policy during most of the Lagos and Bachelet presidencies, 
including the approval of several international treaties by the National Congress (Treaty 
of Rome, congressional guidelines for peacekeeping operations, and the ILO’s N° 169 
agreement, among others). As Head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1994-1999), José 
Miguel Insulza also took key foreign policy decisions to consolidate Chile’s 
85 
internationalization policies. Finally, Ambassador Valdés also played a vital role at the 
UN and became a key actor in promoting Chile’s proactive involvement in Haiti, as he 
led the UN mission in that Caribbean country.  
An additional dimension of their capacity to influence Chilean foreign policy 
relates to the particular characteristics of Chile’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as 
bureaucratic features played a role in allowing this group of leaders to effectively 
implement their ideas. Unlike similar bureaucracies, the Chilean Foreign Ministry is 
relatively small and therefore it was easier for the new leaders to take over during the 
transitional period. Even though many diplomats and members of the Foreign Service 
that worked during Pinochet’s year remained in their positions, the new group of 
policymakers could be inserted above them either formally or de facto. Within the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the key agencies in defining foreign policy decisions are: the 
Policy Division, which is in charge of coordinating all programmatic agencies within the 
ministry; the Multilateral Organizations Division, which is in charge of coordinating 
policy actions at different multilateral levels; and the Planning Division, which is in 
charge of establishing guidelines within different divisions. Other offices relevant to 
policy decisions are the Chilean Embassies at the UN in New York and Geneva, due to 
their role in dealing with multilateral topics. All of these divisions and units were 
effectively taken over by this new group of foreign-policy makers. 
In sum, each of these individuals held positions of power within the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs for almost twenty years, gaining important expertise in the field and 
access to multilateral organizations. What all of them have in common is not only a 
similar professional background but also a shared commitment to the promotion of 
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democracy at home and abroad and of human rights more generally. This commonality of 
interests and values was clearly reflected in a set of foreign policy priorities that for more 
than twenty years supported international initiatives for the promotion and protection of 
international human rights and democracy. 
Civil Society and Foreign Policy 
While the last section highlighted the relevance of certain key individual actors 
who have made key decisions within the state apparatus, this section will focus primarily 
on the role of non-state actors, in particular NGOs in the policymaking process. In 
particular it assess the idea the role of what has been called advocacy networks (local or 
transnational) in affecting foreign policies on human rights (Keck & Sikkink 1998).  
The democratization process during the 1990s did not increase civil society 
participation in Chile. On the contrary, many of highly organized human rights 
organizations during the military regime decided to terminate their advocacy activities 
when the democratic system was restored. Indeed, as several scholars have mentioned, 
civil society organizations had played a pivotal role during the cruelest period of the 
Pinochet regime. They were critical in documenting violations of human rights, 
articulating social disapproval of the regime, and providing important transnational 
networks to advance the democratic agenda of freedom, human rights, social rights, and 
gender equality. 
After the military coup and the subsequent banning of political parties, various 
NGOs were created with the aim of defending and advancing human rights. Many NGOs 
emerged during the 1970s and 1980s as the result of conscious efforts by activists with 
strong links to political parties. An extensive network of non-governmental organizations 
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was developed at the local as well as national level. These organizations devoted their 
attention to diverse issues, including, among other topics, women’s rights, the media and 
freedom of expression, rural studies, the environment, housing, education, and 
decentralization (Piña 1989; Oxhorn 1995).  
The transition to democracy proved a turning point for many individuals working 
in NGOs, with one of the immediate impacts being that many of these professionals went 
to work for the government. The newly-elected officials represented a broad coalition of 
Christian Democrats and Socialists, who had previously been part of the opposition to the 
military regime. This political climate presented social actors with a golden opportunity 
to influence public policy. The personal backgrounds of many of the newly-elected 
politicians made them sensitive to the demands of civil society. The story of activists 
within human rights organizations is particularly illustrative. The organizations that had 
close ties with the governing Concertación coalition saw their leaders assume 
government positions in the new administration. They entered those posts with the 
explicit intention of lobbying authorities from within. Activists from the Vicariate of 
Solidarity and the Chilean Committee for Human Rights (CHCHR) were politically 
connected to the Partido Demócrata Cristiano and the Partido Socialista. Several of 
them actively participated in the formation of government strategies, first in developing 
the new government’s electoral platform, then in implementing the platform once the 
transition to democracy took place.
30
 Particularly relevant was the Catholic Church’s 
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 To mention some of them, Alejandro González, Jorge Domínguez, Roberto Garretón, Carlos 
López, Felipe Portales, and José Zalaquett used to work in the Vicariate of Solidarity and in the 
CHCHR, and assumed new government positions related to human rights issues soon after the 
transition.  
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decision to dissolve the Vicariate of Solidarity, and the CHCHR’s decision to dissolve a 
network of more than five thousand volunteers nationwide. 
As the principal leaders of both organizations were assuming new positions 
within the state bureaucracy, it was impossible for them to maintain the same level of 
grassroots activity as before. The CHCHR transformed itself from a dense network of 
grassroots organizations into a bureaucratic entity with few staff members, fewer 
resources, and a lower level of interaction with social organizations. Another major shift 
in the non-governmental sector after the democratic transition was the significant decline 
of funding and sponsorship from international agencies. Thus, many of the NGOs 
working on issues concerning human and social rights disappeared after the transition. 
The reasons commonly provided by the literature include the dominance of political 
parties in the transitional political process, and the transition of leadership talent from 
NGOs to the new democratic government (Delamaza 2005; Fuentes 2005). Several 
organizations managed to maintain some of their influence, effectively monitoring the 
instatement of human rights clauses by the new Chilean government. However, such 
pressures were almost exclusively related to past human rights violations and specific 
human rights issues in the current agenda. Indeed, organizations linked to the indigenous 
movement, children’s rights, and the monitoring of violations of human rights committed 
during the military regime organized alternative reports to be submitted before the UN 
human rights system (Fuentes 2010). 
The Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not an exception. As said before, 
many of the key new foreign policy authorities had created important ties with human 
rights networks as part of the struggle against the military regime allowing them to bring 
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human rights ideas and values into their work. On the other hand, local NGO activists 
were also designated to occupy bureaucratic positions at different levels of the state 
apparatus and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This was particularly evident in the case of 
the newly formed Human Rights Unit at the Ministry. The designated Director from 
1990-1994 was Roberto Garreton—a human rights defender with an outstanding public 
trajectory as a human rights lawyer at the Vicariate of Solidarity. President Patricio 
Aylwin personally appointed Garreton to this position and they had a close relationship 
while in office. Indeed, Roberto Garreton previously worked at the Vicariate with Andres 
Aylwin—the president’s brother and also a prominent human rights lawyer— which 
made the human rights movement and its people even closer to the Presidency. During 
1990 an early 2000s, the directors and sub-directors of the Human Rights Unit had a clear 
human rights background
31
: Carmen Hertz, an active human rights lawyer for the 
Vicariate that lost his husband in the hands of the Caravan of the Death; Felipe Portales, 
sociologist, scholar and human rights activist; Alejandro Salinas, human rights lawyer 
trained in the United States who participated in the team of experts that was part of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1990 and consultant for international NGOS 
(Amnesty, Human Rights Watch). 
What is remarkable about this case is that the newly created unit at the Foreign 
Ministry was occupied not by the diplomatic service and its bureaucracy but by a small 
group of selected experts with a personal commitment with the human rights cause. The 
inclusion of human rights activists within this unit was pivotal for Chile’s international 
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 For this research it was possible to interview three of them: Roberto Garreton, Alejandro 
Salinas, and Felipe Portales. 
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human rights commitment. This group brought specific knowledge within the Foreign 
Ministry in an area where there was no previous expertise and where the predominant 
view was that human rights were not inherently part of the national interests. 
Paradoxically, the only previous training on this subject within the Ministry was how to 
respond to the criticism of international community in light of the abuses committed by 
the military regime. Garreton and the directors thereafter were able to bring human rights 
within the foreign policy decision-making procedures, a process that was reinforced by 
their ties with other recently appointed high-ranked governmental officials and in some 
circumstances with their close ties with the President itself. 
The newly created human rights unit was also critical to help training diplomats 
on human rights issues. Roberto Garreton and Alejandro Salinas recall that part of their 
work was to interact with the Chilean delegation in Geneva (base of UN Human Rights 
Commission/Council) and sometimes Washington (Inter-American Human Rights 
Commission) a process that prompted a common learning: Chilean diplomats learned 
about the human rights world through the expertise of these group and the human rights 
experts relied on the delegation specific knowledge regarding diplomatic procedures. The 
inclusion of human rights experts within the Ministry was also beneficial for enhancing 
the links between Chile’s diplomacy and international human rights groups. The expertise 
of the Directors of the Unit and their prestige as human rights lawyers made them closer 
to international NGOS and helped them to establish a working relationship during 
international meetings and United Nations settings. Garreton, for example indicates: “I 
felt part of the NGOs. Due to my background as a human rights defender I was much 
closer to the international advocacy groups rather than the diplomatic world” (R. 
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Garreton, personal communication, July 2013). The interaction between diplomats and 
international NGOS continued over time and is something that was very much set in 
motion due to the experience of the appointed directors of the human rights unit. 
In sum, NGOs did have a role in the way in which Chile responded to 
international human rights. However, its role has been slightly different than the one that 
is traditionally highlighted by the literature on the subject that portrays a group of 
transnational groups (domestic and international) pushing from the outside for 
governmental changes (Keck & Sikkink 1998). In Chile’s case the very same people that 
advocate for the overthrown of Pinochet was able to enter the government during the 
transition to democracy and from that position pushed for changes from within. 
What is worrisome for the future is that since the transition to democracy the field 
of foreign policy has been characterized by top-down action, with policymakers trying to 
address international human rights domestically but facing weak civic engagement on 
this matter. When dealing with civil society it is possible to observe a lack of human 
rights non-governmental organizations pushing for the implementation of foreign policy 
initiatives. This is an important weakness considering that these types of organizations 
are fundamental to ensuring that states abide by international norms, especially in the 
area of human rights. 
Of course, the involvement of civil society activism has varied greatly according 
to theme. Civil society activism is most likely found in issues concerning international 
commerce, international environmental standards, and the adoption of international 
standards concerning indigenous rights. But in issues concerning the protection of human 
rights abroad, civil society actors have not played a relevant role at all. Put in another 
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way, the protection of human rights internationally, humanitarian catastrophes or issues 
such as emergent debate on norm of the Responsibility to Protect have not been part of 
the agenda developed by Chile’s local civil society’s most influential actors.32 
Conclusions 
This chapter explains Chile’s foreign policy (1990-2010) as the product of the 
interplay between international and domestic conditions and pressures, actors’ 
preferences and values, and a set of institutional determinants that resulted in a strong 
commitment to human rights policies during the 1990s and in the following decade. The 
inclusion of human rights into Chile’s foreign policy can be interpreted as an expression 
of principled commitment to human rights values combined with and strategic use of 
foreign policy as a means for managing the transition to, and consolidation of, 
democracy. A key explanatory factor can be found in a small group of experts on 
international politics with extensive ties with human rights networks that took over the 
Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs since the return of democracy. Together, these 
individuals formed a leadership alliance that would have a profound impact on the 
nation’s foreign policy decisions for more than twenty years. Their influence in the 
promotion and implementation of foreign policy based on human rights and democratic 
principles has been characterized by remarkable longevity. 
This case also highlights the limits of international relations approaches to 
understand human rights foreign policy. Chile’s diplomacy illustrates that a country does 
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 Few nongovernmental organizations have addressed the topic. Among the exceptions are 
Amnesty International (Chilean Section), FLACSO-Chile, and Ignire.cl. The topic has not 
garnered media attention either.  
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not need to be coerced by a great power to adopt human rights policies. If anything, 
Chile’s human rights performance has been consistent with human rights values beyond 
economic or political pressures. The country has voted in favor of examining human 
rights situations in almost all the instances at the UN Human Rights Commission and 
later in the newly created Human Rights council. Chile’s decision at the Security Council 
in 2003 of not supporting the United States invasion of Iraq despite the pending signature 
of a Free Trade Agreement with the US reinforces this argument. 
The liberal explanations predicting that transitional democracies will ascribe to 
international human rights to protect unstable regimes played a role here. Government 
officials used the international community and international human rights groups as a 
source of power, thereby, counteracting the institutional legacy of the military regime and 
keeping the authoritarian sectors (particularly the armed forces) of the Chilean Society 
under control. Yet, the persistence of Chile’s active human rights diplomacy once 
democratic consolidation took place and once there were no clear motives for effective 
“lock in” policies cannot be explained by this approach. The evidence suggests that 
human rights were incorporated into foreign policy driven by a group of political leaders 
that has been exposed to human values and ideas and advocacy groups during the 
struggle against Pinochet and effectively introduced them not only for instrumental 
reasons but also as a matter of principle. They also created a specific human rights unit 
within the Ministry as a way of further institutionalizing these policies. 
Chile’s policy also illustrates that constructivism is right in highlighting the role 
of ideas and values in foreign policy. It demonstrates that a state democratic identity does 
make them immediately a human rights promoter and that those international ideas are 
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not easily diffused into domestic politics. The case shows that political elites are key 
drivers of the human rights values, that beliefs are also combined with strategic interests, 
and that favorable institutional settings especially at the Foreign Ministry are key. 
The final conclusions are dedicated to highlight some of the most recent trends in 
the government’s foreign policy decisions and their implications for Chile’s commitment 
to international human rights in the future. Domestically there were already significant 
changes as a new coalition came into office. At the beginning of 2010 the Coalition of 
Parties for Change, lead by Sebastian Piñera, won Chile’s presidential election. This was 
the first democratic election of a right-wing leader in fifty-two years, and serves as the 
perfect test for evaluating the endurance of foreign policy priorities established by 
previous governments. The question is, to what extent President Piñera’s administration 
will maintain the previous human rights approach to foreign policy and whether a policy 
shift is likely to occur. If Piñera is unsympathetic to the policies adopted by the previous 
coalition, then the degree of institutionalization of human rights ideals within the state 
apparatus will be crucial to their future sustenance. 
So far Piñera´s administration has maintained a similar foreign policy approach 
toward human rights. Chile was selected as a member of the Human Rights Council in 
2011 showing an active participation within this institution; the country has also 
increased its financial contributions to Inter-American Human Rights System indicating 
that is crucial to enhance and strengthened regional human rights mechanisms; and 
finally the government with congressional approval decided to keep Chilean troops from 
the continued UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Despite strong 
discussions between the Ministry of Defense, the armed forces, and the Ministry of 
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Foreign Affairs, and the disapproval of some of its political supporters, the government 
kept Chilean troops and civilian personnel in the Caribbean country. This decision speaks 
of the persistence of Chile’s policies on this subject and says much about the future of 
Chile’s performance on international human rights and humanitarian aid. 
On a less positive note, the Chilean foreign ministry´s showed lukewarm support 
of recent protests for democracy and the protection of human rights in the Arab World. In 
the case of the Egyptian protests for example, the Chilean government failed to release 
any sort of declaration calling for democratic elections or for the peaceful resolution of 
the conflict. Despite Chile’s experience with similar democratic struggles, the country 
opted to remain silent. Regarding Libya, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a timidly-
worded declaration, calling for the prevention of further civilian casualties caused by the 
Gaddafi-led government’s repressive action. The language of R2P was not used by the 
government, despite international evidence indicating the need to protect the Libyan 
population from the risk of mass atrocities. More recently, Chile condemned violence 
against civilians in Syria but, again, it did not use R2P language. These three crises reveal 
the new government’s timidity in addressing ongoing human rights struggles. 
Nevertheless, it is still too soon to evaluate the administration’s long-term approach to 
this matter. 
Despite Chile’s commitments, there is still much room for improvement when 
comes to international human rights promotion. Past experiences can illuminate some of 
the future challenges. Two topics are particularly relevant for the task of strengthening 
international human rights policies of the current government of Sebastian Piñera and the 
incoming administration in 2014. 
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First, this study shows the importance of political leadership to introduce 
important policy changes. Yet it also highlights that in many cases the prevalence of 
individuals over the construction of institutional capacities has prevented the 
consolidation of institutional rules and structures with the capacity to more permanently 
shape future foreign policy decisions. It is true that specific units were created within the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs for human rights and humanitarian affairs. However, when 
relevant decisions regarding human rights and international security are made, these units 
show very little capacity for generating responses. Rather than elaborating on the state’s 
human rights policies internationally, the main task of the human rights division is 
basically to respond to Chile’s monitoring requirements for international treaties. 
Responses to R2P is another good example of an international human rights norm, which 
has been strongly supported by Chilean representatives at the UN but has remained 
relatively absent from debates at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Santiago. There is no 
single official in charge of this topic within the Ministry. This situation poses the 
immediate question of whether there is enough institutional strength to sustain human 
rights policies when leaders that might be less sympathetic to the ideas and values of 
human rights come into power. Effective human rights promotion requires enhanced 
institutional capacities, a medium to long term agenda of action and strategies along with 
better diplomatic training (Fuentes, 2013). 
Second, non-governmental organizations remain weak, and their access to the 
decision-making process in foreign policy is limited. There is no evidence that the 
political opposition or other relevant groups are currently engaged in monitoring Chile’s 
international action. Furthermore, unlike in the late-1980s, there are very few national 
97 
academic institutions dedicated to the systematic study of Chile’s international policies 
and even less so specifically following up the government’s efforts to uphold human 
rights and democratic principles abroad. Thus, there is relatively little pressure on the 
government to keep its previous commitments to international human rights. The 
experience shows that adequate channels for NGOS engagement with the policy world 
enhance foreign policy activity.  
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CHAPTER 4: BRAZIL’S HUMAN RIGHTS DIPLOMACY 
Brazil’s Human Rights Policy-Shift: From Defense to Acceptance 
The return to civilian rule in 1985 opened the space for a gradual opening up of 
Brazilian diplomacy to the institutional and normative framework of the international 
human rights regime. In fact, scholars and local policymakers have compellingly argued 
that since the transition to democracy Brazil’s foreign policy has shifted from a defensive 
and almost exclusive focus on state sovereignty to broadly accepting and legitimating the 
role of human rights in international politics (Engstrom, 2010; Macaulay, 2010; Pinheiro, 
1999). Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, a Brazilian scholar and human rights expert, indicates that 
since the military dictatorship there has been a “sea of change when comes to Brazilian 
human rights policy … Democracy provoked decisive changes in Brazil’s foreign policy 
vis-à-vis human rights” (P. Pinheiro, personal communication, August 2013). 
Brazil’s position during the military regime (1964-1985) in relation to multilateral 
organizations and human rights institutions was “contradictory at the beginning and 
eventually it turned out to be increasingly defensive and isolationist, particularly during 
1976 to 1981” (Martin Solon, Clara 2011: 15). Brazilian delegations were part of the 
human rights system but they participated as a way of defending themselves from the 
increasing international criticism towards domestic abuses especially during the 1970s. In 
1977, Brazil was selected for the first time as a member of the UN Human Rights 
Commission, its main objective being to strengthen the position in which human rights 
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are seen as an exclusive responsibility of the state and, therefore, denying any legitimacy 
to international actions intended to promote and protect human rights beyond national 
borders (Lindgren Alves, 2009). Chancellor Azeredo da Silvera in his opening speech at 
the XXXII UN General Assembly, most clearly represents the Brazilian vision of the 
time: 
In the end, the solutions to issues pertaining the Rights of Man are responsibility 
of national governments. In a world that is unfortunately characterized by 
interventionist attitudes, either open or concealed, and by the distortion of certain 
issues, no state or group of states, can be attributed with the capacity to judge 
other countries in issues that are that serious and pertaining only to the intimacy 
of the national life of a state. (Azeredo da Silvera in Martin Solon, Clara 2011: 
15) 
 
Brazil’s human rights violations were analyzed and discussed between 1974 and 
1976 through a confidential procedure within the UN Human Rights Commission, a 
procedural alternative illustrating the skill of Brazilian diplomats in avoiding any 
possibility of public condemnation. During the military dictatorship, Itamaraty (the 
idiomatic short hand for Brazilian diplomatic service) was particularly careful in avoiding 
expressing any opinion regarding human rights situations abroad. When resolutions on 
country situations were voted, Brazil voted against them in a majority of the cases and 
abstained on the rest. (Martin Solon, 2011: 15).
33
 
The return to civilian rule had important effects on Brazil’s response to violations 
of human rights in other countries. The Sarney government (1985-1989) has been 
characterized by scholars and policy-makers as an “intermediate stage” between the 
defensive isolationism of the military regime and the more active multilateralism of its 
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 Exceptions were South Africa (Apartheid), Namibia, and Palestine and the Occupied 
Territories.  
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successors (Macaulay, 2010: 137). As Paulo Sergio Pinheiro has said, “we can note yet 
speak of a genuine new course because the legacy of continuity would prevail during the 
Sarney government, limiting bold initiatives” (Pinheiro,1999: 9). Sarney during his 
speech at the United Nations General Assembly, praised the International Declaration of 
Human Rights as the “most important document written by man in contemporary 
history”. This is not a minor change considering that between 1977 and 1984, Brazilian 
speeches, which traditionally open the UN General Assembly, “had never even 
mentioned human rights” (Pinheiro, 1999: 9). 
During this period the executive submitted to congress several human rights 
instruments including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
the Covenant on Economic and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the American Convention 
on Human Rights. Despite the hovering presence of the military institution, only recently 
returned to its barracks, Sarney’s government was also able to insert a number of very 
important human rights guarantees into the 1988 Constitution (Macaulay, 2010: 137). 
Yet, the transitional government remained abstentionist within the UN system, “only 
faintly acknowledging the legitimacy of multilateral initiatives to enforce human rights 
norms” (Pinheiro, 1999: 10). At the same time, some governmental officials used 
dismissive language when referring to human rights issues, in particular international 
assessment of national human rights practices and associated international assessment 
with “imperialist” attitudes.34 
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 Former Minister of justice and Senator, Paulo Brossard, attacked Amnesty on national 
television accusing it of being a subversive organization. 
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The Sarney Administration’s successor, the Collor de Mello (1990-1992) 
government, more broadly accepted the legitimacy of international human rights and 
actively pursued initiatives to open Brazil’s doors to international scrutiny. It hastened to 
ratify international human rights instruments--the ICCPR and the ICESCR in 1992--with 
the significant help of more progressive senators.
35
 In a psychologically-related move, the 
government also hosted important international conferences dealing with issues that had 
resonance in the human rights domain including the UN Conference on Environment and 
Development, held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Most notably, the government explicitly 
recognized that the UN Human Rights Commission “has the right to comment on the 
status of human rights on any part of the world” (Pinheiro, 1999: 10). Brazilian 
delegations abroad opened their doors to NGOS and external enquiries. In fact, the 
government issued a recommendation that missions should respond without resistance to 
complaints about the human rights situation and maintain contacts with NGOs. Collor the 
Mello was the first Brazilian President to receive representatives from Amnesty 
International investigating torture and the condition of street children. In meetings 
dealing with these issues, President Collor de Mello famously stated that “national 
sovereignty cannot be a protection against human rights violations” and in his speech at 
the XLIV UN General assembly he stressed that the world is marching “towards an 
advanced stage of democratic construction and of respects for human rights” (Pinheiro, 
1999: 13). 
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The then Senator Fernando Henrique Cardoso was particularly supportive of human rights 
initiatives.  
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After Collor’s resignation from the presidency due to an impeachment trial on 
charges of corruption, Itamar Franco (1992-1994) took over as an interim President. The 
highlight of this period was Brazil’s active participation at the UN Conference on Human 
Rights in Vienna where Ambassador Gilberto Saboia acted as the Chair of the drafting 
Committee. Brazil played an important role defending the universality principle in the 
face of other delegations from Asia and Africa that were strenuously insisting on the 
affirmation of culturally distinct approaches to human rights, that is cultural relativism 
(Lindgren & Alves, 2001; Belli, 2000). The Brazilian delegation strongly promoted the 
notion that “democracy, development and human rights” are intrinsically linked and 
interdependent. The Vienna Conference had important effects at the domestic level, 
fostering a series of meetings between governmental officials and local civil society 
groups, NGOS, and scholars to generate a common diagnosis about the most pressing 
human rights issues in Brazil. One of the indirect results of the Conference was that 
“Brazil started to be more aware of the demands and compromises required as a result of 
being part of the international human rights regimes, including presenting periodic 
reports to UN Treaty bodies on the subject” (Martin Solon 2011: 23). 
Foreign Relation Minister, Celso Amorim, clearly reflects the spirit of the time in 
his speech to the UN Assembly in 1993: 
Transparency in the decisions and actions of the government constitutes an 
important aspect of Brazilian policy. This transparency is also manifested in the 
fluid and constructive dialogue with the segmentary organizations of society 
dedicated to the fight for the observance of human rights in the country. (Amorim 
in Pinheiro, 1999: 18) 
Brazil took several steps under the presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
(1995-2002) to display its commitment to international human rights. As Fiona Macaulay 
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points out, it is during this government that “Brazil’s alignment with international human 
rights standards and active multilateralism intensified and became key foreign policy 
tenants” (Macaulay, Fiona 2010: 138). Eminent Brazilians diplomats, for instance 
Ambassador Lindgren Alves, signal the first year of Cardoso’s mandate as the time in 
which the country started a new phase of its human rights diplomacy, finally accepting 
the legitimacy of these principles as part of its foreign policy.
36
 Among Cardoso’s most 
notable achievements was to finally recognize the jurisdiction of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights (Brazil was the last Latin American to accept its jurisdiction). In 
addition it accepted international oversight carried out by UN bodies in execution of their 
mandates under the six human rights Conventions ratified by Brazil (Macaulay, 2010: 
140). In 2001, Brazil offered a standing invitation to all the mandate holders of Special 
Procedures of the Human Rights Council. As a result, Brazil became in the words of 
Macaulay, “the most inspected country in the hemisphere” (2010:40). Brazil has received 
visits by 17 such mandate holders since 1998 (Brazilian Mission at the UN, 2012). Along 
with the Special Rapporteurs
37
, the country has received the visits of three High 
Commissioner for Human Rights: Mary Robinson (2000), Louise Arbour (2007) and 
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Lingren Alves (1994) describes these phases as follows: 1978-1984: a conservative period, 
defensive positions; 1985-1989, Sarney’s transition government, characterized by the still 
relatively timid recognition of the legitimacy of the multilateral system when comes to human 
rights; 1990-1994, brazil experience a period of adhering, recognizing, and ratification of 
international human rights treaties. Finally, since 1995 the country entered a period in which the 
system is legitimized and therefore, they decided to play within the system and a more 
constructive role.  
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 These include, for example, Special Rapporteurs on: Torture (2000), Right to Food (2002, 
2009), On the Sale of Children, Prostitution, and Pornography (2003), Extra-judiciary Executions 
(2003, 2007), Adequate Housing (2004), Independence of the Judiciary (2004), Racism (2005), 
Indigenous Peoples (2008), New Forms of Slavery (2010). See: abstained (Martin Solon, Clara 
2011: 26) 
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Navanethen Pillay (2009). At the domestic level, and following the guiding of the Vienna 
Convention, the government launched in 1996 the National Human Rights Plan 
(PNDH)
38
 that included a national plan of action on the subject along with some 
guidelines referring to Brazil’s international policies on human rights (Brazilian Mission 
at the UN, 2012). The Foreign Ministry created a new Department for Human Rights and 
Social Issues to further institutionalize the inclusion of human rights as part of Brazil’s 
foreign policy and to be able to better fulfill treaty obligations including the 
implementation of reports. 
Under Lula da Silva administration (2003-2010) the country continued to 
manifest a conspicuous commitment to compliance with international human rights 
behavioral norms and procedures. Yet, unlike previous administrations and primarily due 
to the perception of Brazil as a rising power, Lula’s foreign policy was more closely 
monitored locally and internationally. While there was much positive continuity, there 
was, as well, what one could describe as “negative continuity”: Brazil continued 
abstaining when confronted with UN resolutions denouncing states for gross abuse of 
human rights. Even though abstentions at the United Nations was also a common feature 
of previous governments, during Lula’s government this situation led more than in the 
past to strong criticism by international NGOS as well as by newly created local 
organizations
39
 that were for the first time since the transition to democracy set up to 
follow up on Brazil’s foreign policy decisions. Indeed, one of the most important features 
                                                          
38
 PNDH is the acronym in Portuguese.  
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 Conectas, is a Brazilian NGO founded in 2001 with the mission of promoting human rights in 
the Global South. They have an specific program monitoring Brazilian foreign policy on human 
rights. 
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of this period is the strengthening of local NGOs and think tanks monitoring Brazil’s 
international actions. 
On the other hand, Brazil during this period acted as a global defender of 
economic, social and cultural rights. Lula’s government actively promoted international 
initiatives to elevate the issues of poverty and hunger on the international agenda and, in 
particular, initiated important diplomatic actions on the right to health and access to 
medicine. At the same time, Brazilian diplomacy was active on issues such as the 
protection of the rights of sexual minorities, the defense of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), and curbing the trade in small arms. Brazilian diplomats were also engaged 
on the reform of the UN Human Rights Commission and the creation of a new UN 
Human rights Council. 
Assessment: Is Brazil a Human Rights Promoter? 
Even though Brazilian diplomacy towards human rights has changed in important 
ways since the return to democracy, its performance in the arena of international human 
rights defense is less impressive than that of certain other Latin American countries in 
which democracy was restored after a period of harsh military rule. The country’s 
acceptance of international human rights as a legitimate issue in international politics did 
not go so far as make human rights a trump in relation to other foreign policy interests. 
On balance, I will propose, Brazil cannot reasonably be seen as a global human rights 
promoter or even a regional one. This conclusion reflects four dimensions of Brazilian 
behavior which I will sketch now and then develop in the following section.  
First, even though Brazil has ratified the most important human rights treaties, the 
country in comparison with other Latin American peers was relatively slow to accept 
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intrusive international scrutiny – reflected in longstanding refusal to sign up to UN treaty 
bodies – and individual complaint procedures. This was also at the Inter-American 
Human Rights system. For example, Brazil was one of the last OAS member states in 
Latin America to recognize the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(See table 10). Second, an unwillingness to openly criticize human-rights-abusive-
countries as has been evidenced by Brazil’s abstentionist record at the UN Human Rights 
Commission and later at the Council. At the same time, Brazil has very reluctantly 
entered the discussion on Responsibility to Protect and it has clearly pointed out its 
adherence to a softer concept “non-indifference”. Third, Brazil’s financial contribution to 
the international human rights system (UN and OAS) is comparatively lower than many 
western states or Latin American states in relation to their wealth and population. Fourth, 
despite enormous progress since the transition to democracy, Brazil still suffers from a 
poor domestic human rights record. It is true that different administrations have 
implemented successful social programs some of which have been exported to other 
developing countries (“Hunger Zero”, for example) but the government’s incapacity to 
ameliorate pressing human rights abuses—including unlawful police killings, the use of 
torture, prison overcrowding, and ongoing impunity for abuses committed during the 
country’s military rule—40 leaves Brazil in a difficult position to promote human rights 
internationally. 
As Brazil’s international profile has heightened, the country has been the target of 
more criticism of its behavior and calls to play a greater role in the promotion of 
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 For a description of the human rights situation in Brazil see the Country reports from HRW that 
are issued yearly. See also CONECTAS and the NGOS associated to it.  
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international human rights have augmented. The following section looks at Brazil’s 
human rights diplomatic performance in the same areas that were previously discussed in 
the Chilean case: a) Legal (ratification of International human rights treaties); b) 
International Human Rights Regimes (Participation in multilateral human rights 
institutions); c) Peace promotion and humanitarian protection (relevant UN peace 
keeping initiatives and responses to humanitarian crisis especially massive human rights 
violations); d) Financial assistance for human rights. In order to provide a better 
comparison, in each one of these four areas Brazil’s performance is contrasted with other 
countries in Latin America and middle powers such as India, Turkey or South Africa. 
Legal: International Human Rights Treaties 
Brazil has no ratified all the major international human rights treaties, including 
the regional ones such as the American Convention on Human Rights in 1992 (See table 
9). The process of entering the major conventions started during the transitional 
government of Sarney and the majority of the treaties were signed in the following 
governments, especially during Collor de Mello’s administration. President Sarney’ first 
speech at the UN, explains why his government decided to become part of these treaties:  
With Pride and trust, I bring to this Assembly the decision to be part of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and the Convention against Torture and 
other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment. With this decision, the Brazilian 
people give a step towards the democratic reaffirmation of its state, in front of 
themselves and the international community, a solemn commitment with the 
principles embodied in the UN Charter and with the promotion of human dignity. 
(Sarney at Martin Solon, Clara 2011: 18) 
 
It is also worth mentioning Brazilian efforts to maintain the integrity of the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Court became operational in 2002, with a 
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distinguished Brazilian jurist as one of its eighteen judges. In the face of this 
development the U.S. government engaged in a wide-ranging campaign to undermine the 
ICC, including an effort to bully states into signing “Bilateral Impunity Agreements” 
exempting U.S. nationals from the ICC’s jurisdiction. Brazil took a welcome stance at the 
time by not only refusing to sign such an agreement, but also by publicly stating that such 
an accord would “run counter to the letter and the spirit of the Rome Statute and 
constitutes a threat to the judicial equality of States” (HRW, 2004). 
On the downside, although major conventions were ratified it took more than a 
decade for Brazil to recognize the jurisdiction of the oversight bodies associated with 
these treaties (Macaulay, 2010: 138). At the international level, Brazil was reluctant to 
accept international scrutiny and no jurisdiction of the oversight bodies created by the 
UN treaties were recognized until years after ratification. Following the democratic 
transition Brazil was also initially hesitant to issue invitations to UN Special Rapporteurs. 
At a regional level, Brazil has been characterized a human rights “laggard” 
(Engstrom 2010). In fact, the country was one of the last Latin American states to 
recognize the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 1998 (See 
table 10). Furthermore, when Brazil ratified the American convention of Human Rights, 
it became the only country in the region to make a reservation on Articles 43 and 48, 
claiming that the Inter-American Commission had no automatic right to conduct “in 
loco” visits, which could only occur with the express permission of the host country 
(Macaulay, 2010: 139). This was a striking redundancy in that the Commission had never 
claimed that it could undertake an on-site inquiry without permission from the target 
state. 
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Following the democratic transition, Brazil has had comparatively few dealings 
with the Inter-American system (IAHRS). By 1994 only two of the hundreds of cases 
pending before the IACHR concerned Brazil (Macaulay 2010: 139). This is an anomaly 
in that NGOs have documented an abundance of human rights abuses in Brazil. The 
anomaly stems from a number of factors. One is the success of successive Brazilian 
governments in persuading the Commission not to process the complains received. A 
second is the lack of awareness within Brazil of the resources and opportunities provided 
by the Inter-America system and the international human rights system more broadly 
(Engstrom, 2010, 2013). That lack of awareness in in part a function of the concentration 
of abuses among the poor and poorly educated, in part a function of a certain 
introversion, a widespread sense that Brazil is today a global rather than a regional actor, 
that regionally it is almost a system unto itself. 
Recent studies indicate that when comes to Brazil this pattern of recourse to the 
Inter-American Human Rights System has continued throughout the 2000s. In terms of 
concrete engagement with the IAHRS on specific cases, “Brazilian state institutions have 
tended either to ignore judgments by the regional system or choose not to implement 
substantial measures” (Ensgtrom 2010). At the same time, unlike the case of Chile, 
Brazilian representatives acting as judges in the Court or as Commissioners at the 
IACHR
41
 have been relatively few in comparison to other countries in the region. 
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 Only Few Brazilians have been elected to the IACHR: Carlos A. Dunshee de Abranches, 1964-
1983: Gilda Maciel Correa Russomano, 1984-1991 and Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, 2004-2011. 
Cançado. Trindade is the only Brazilian who has served as Judge on the Inter-American Court.  
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During Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s term, however, there was an increasing 
engagement with the Inter-American human rights system and the Brazilian government 
reached a number of “friendly agreements” with the Commission most notably an 
agreement to demolish the infamous Carandiru prison. Years later in 2001, and in a in a 
landmark ruling, the Court of Human Rights criticized the Brazilian government for not 
taking effective measures to prosecute and convict perpetrators of domestic violence. 
This time the Brazilian government responded in 2006 enacting a law under the symbolic 
name “Maria da Penha Law on Domestic and Family Violence.” Despite these notable 
exceptions, the general picture of Brazil’s engagement with the Inter-American system 
has been more of neglect rather than active engagement. 
Table 8 
Brazil: Selected International Treaties 
Treaty Year of Ratification 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1992 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 1992 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women 
1984 
Convention on the Rights of the Child 1990 
Ottawa Convention 1999 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.  2008 
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance 
2010 
International Criminal Court/ Rome Statue 2002 
Source: Coalition for the International Criminal Court, 
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=country&iduct=35; Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights. http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en 
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Table 9 
Countries that Ratified the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) and 
Accepted the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
Country  Acceptance of the Court 
Argentina 1984 
Barbados 2000 
Bolivia 1993 
Brazil 1998 
Chile 1991 
Colombia 1985 
Costa Rica 1980 
Dominican Republic 1990 
Ecuador 1984 
El Salvador 1995 
Guatemala 1987 
Haiti 1998 
Honduras 1981 
Mexico 1998 
Nicaragua 1991 
Panama  1990 
Paraguay 1993 
Peru 1981 
Surinam 1987 
Trinidad y Tobago 1991 
Uruguay 1985 
Venezuela 1981 
Source: Sikkink (2004: 84) 
 
International Human Rights Regimes  
This section examines Brazil’s role in the UN human rights system by looking at 
its performance at the Human Rights Commission and the Human Rights Council 
(established in 2006) and when necessary it also highlights important landmarks at the 
United Nations General Assembly. It systematizes Brazil’s position (voting behavior) 
regarding resolutions condemning human rights abuses internationally and describes 
major initiatives and proposals submitted to the UN human rights system. 
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UN Human Rights Commission 
When it comes to initiatives within the Commission, Brazil has played a 
considerable role. Most notably, it took the lead in proposing a series of resolutions in the 
areas of development, health, and democracy. The Brazilian delegation in 2000 presented 
a proposal in the Commission that led to a resolution on “The Incompatibility between 
Democracy and Racism”. Later in 2005, Brazil presented a resolution at the Commission 
expressing concern at abuses against persons on the grounds of their sexual orientation 
and calling on states to “promote and protect the human rights of all persons regardless of 
their sexual orientation.” This was the first time that a resolution specifically focusing on 
sexual orientation had been brought before the Commission.
42
 
In the area of health, Brazil has shown important leadership starting during 
Cardoso’s administration and later on reinforced by Lula’s government. In relation to 
HIV/AIDS, it has been one of the principal players in the global struggle for access to 
affordable antiretroviral medicines and in promoting flexibility in the patent rules of 
international trade agreements. In 2001 the Brazilian National AIDS Program won the 
UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)’s Human Rights and 
Culture of Peace Award. Later in 2003, Brazil contributed to the appointment of a UN 
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health as well as to the Commission on Human 
Rights adopting resolutions recognizing that access to medication in the context of 
pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, is a fundamental right 
(Dauvergne, P. & Farias, D. 2012: 910-912). 
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In regard to voting behavior, records show that out of 59 resolutions that were 
considered by the Commission on Human Rights, 24 were adopted by consensus among 
the country members. Out of the ones that were voted (35 in total), Brazil voted in favor 
18 times, abstained 15, and voted against on two occasions (Martin Solon, 2011: 28). 
Table 10 summarizes Brazil’s voting pattern at the UN Human Rights 
Commission from 2001-2005. During this period, Brazil voted in favor of resolutions 
addressing abuses in North Korea, Iraq, the Israeli-Occupied Territories, and Sudan. Yet, 
Brazil’s delegation to the Commission in Geneva voted against or abstained in critical 
human rights situations such as the following (Martin & Solon, 2011). 
 
Voted against (twice) and abstained (twice) on resolutions criticizing abuses in 
Chechnya despite ongoing serious violations of human rights and international 
humanitarian law by both parties to the conflict. In 2004 the members of the Commission 
rejected a resolution introduced by the European Union condemning human rights abuses 
in Chechnya. In that opportunity, Brazil joined the majority of countries voting against 
the resolution with nations such as China, Congo, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, 
Indonesia, Nigeria, Russia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and 
Zimbabwe.
43
 
 Abstained on each one of the resolutions regarding Cuba (2001 to 2005), 
despite this country’s longstanding restrictions against political dissidents. In 
contrast, since 2001 Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador 
voted in favor of such resolutions. Mexico has voted in favor since 2002. 
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Argentina voted in favor in 2001/2002/2003 but abstained in 2004 and 2005.  
 Abstained twice (2001 and 2002) on resolutions on the human rights situation 
in Iran. Brazil maintained this pattern of avoiding condemnation of the Iranian 
regime in the following years but at the UN General Assembly.  
 Abstained three times on resolutions on Zimbabwe (2002/2003/2004). In the 
voting in 2004, among the countries blocking the resolution on Zimbabwe 
were India, South Africa, and Russia. The supporters included: Argentina, 
Chile, Costa Rica, Peru, Guatemala, Honduras, and several European 
countries.
44
  
 Abstained on a resolution criticizing abuses in Turkmenistan (2003), a country 
characterized by Human Rights Watch as “one of the most repressive states in 
the world.” At the time of voting, no independent human rights organizations 
could operate in Turkmenistan, and the media was subjected to strict pre-
publication censorship. However, a year later in 2004 Brazil voted in favor of 
the resolution on Turkmenistan. 
 Abstained in 2005 on a resolution criticizing abuses in Belarus, a regime that 
since 1994 continues to severely curtail freedoms of association, assembly, 
and expression, and the right to fair trial. In this opportunity among the list of 
countries that voted in favor were Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, France, 
Germany, Mexico, Paraguay, and UK. China, India, South Africa and Russia 
were among the countries opposing the resolution. In previous resolutions 
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 Mexico also abstained in this opportunity.  
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(2003/2004) Brazil had voted in favor.  
UN Human Rights Council 
Brazilian diplomats were actively engaged in the creation of the UN Human 
Rights Council (2006) and took on a leadership role in the creation of a new mechanism, 
the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) (Belli, 2008). In Brazil’s view, the UPR 
mechanism represents one of the pillars of the HRC, as it embodies the principles of 
universality, impartiality, and non-selectivity, essential to ensuring balanced and 
constructive treatment of countries under examination. Brazil played a constructive role 
in the interactive dialogue promoted with countries participating in the UPR First Cycle, 
contributing with questions and recommendations to the process. Brazil also supported 
capacity-building activities in countries undergoing evaluation under the mechanism, 
such as the exchange of experiences provided to foster the participation of Angola, Haiti, 
Panama, and São Tomé and Príncipe. 
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Table 10 
Brazilian Position and Status of the Resolution (UN Human Rights Commission) 
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Lebanese prisoners 
in Israel  
In favor 
(Adopted) 
In favor 
(Adopted) 
In favor 
(Adopted) 
No voting 
(Adjourned) 
- 
China (No action 
motion) 
Abstention 
(Adopted) 
- - In favor 
(Adopted) 
 
Afghanistan  Consensus Consensus - - - 
Iraq In favor 
(Adopted) 
In favor 
(Adopted) 
In favor 
(Adopted) 
- - 
Myanmar  Consensus - Consensus Consensus Consensus 
Cuba Abstention 
(Adopted) 
Abstention 
(Adopted) 
Abstention 
(Adopted) 
Abstention 
(Adopted) 
Abstention 
(Adopted) 
Iran Abstention 
(Adopted) 
Abstention 
(Adopted) 
- - - 
Russia Abstention 
(Adopted) 
Abstention 
(Adopted) 
Against 
(Rejected) 
Against 
(Rejected) 
- 
Sudan In favor 
(Adopted) 
In favor 
(Adopted) 
In favor 
(Adopted) 
Removed 
Project 
Removed  
Project 
DRC Consensus Consensus Consensus - - 
Sierra Leone Consensus Consensus - - - 
Burundi Consensus Consensus Consensus - - 
Equatorial Guinea Consensus In favor 
(Adopted) 
- - - 
Rwanda Abstention 
(Adopted) 
- - - - 
Cyprus  Consensus Consensus Consensus Consensus Consensus 
Zimbabwe  - Abstention 
(Adopted) 
Abstention 
(Adopted) 
Abstention 
(Adopted) 
- 
East Timor - Consensus - - - 
Turkmenistan  - - Abstention 
(Adopted) 
In favor 
(Adopted) 
- 
Belarus - - In favor 
(Adopted) 
In favor 
(Adopted) 
Abstention 
(Adopted) 
Chad 
(1503 Procedure) 
- - Consensus - - 
Liberia 
(1503 Procedure) 
- - Consensus - - 
Democratic 
Republic of Korea  
- - In favor 
(Adopted) 
In favor 
(Adopted) 
In favor 
(Adopted) 
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Table 11 
Brazilian Position and Status of the Resolution UN Human Rights Council 
Source: Based on (Martin Solon, Clara 2011) and Conectas yearbook (2008-2009, 2009-2010, 
2010-2011 http://www.conectas.org/en/. Note that these tables only include resolutions, 
and not amendments. Brazil has also abstained in certain amendments in some 
occasions, including the one regarding the DRC in 2008. 
 
In its first two terms at the HRC, Brazil led or co-sponsored a number of 
initiatives concentrated on economic and social rights and non-discrimination issues 
(Brazilian Mission at the UN, 2012).  These initiatives included convening the 10th 
Special Session of the HRC in 2009 to discuss the impact of the global economic and 
financial crisis on human rights. In Brazil’s view, the emerging effects of the crisis, 
which were then expected to manifest themselves through growing poverty and 
inequality, increasingly unstable and less secure working conditions, reduced social 
rights, and heightened discrimination and xenophobia, fully justified the organization of 
Item Country Year 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Item 
7 
Palestine 
and the 
Occupied 
Territories 
In favor  
(2 
resolutions 
Adopted) 
In favor  
(4 
resolutions 
Adopted) 
In favor  
(4 
resolutions 
Adopted) 
In favor  
(26 
resolutions 
Adopted) 
In favor  
(5 
resolutions 
Adopted) 
Item Belarus - - - - In favor 
(Adopted) 
Ivory 
Coast 
- - - - Consensus 
Myanmar  Consensus Consensus Consensus Consensus Consensus 
Libya  - - - - Consensus 
Honduras   Consensus - - 
Iran - - - - In favor 
(Adopted) 
Democrati
c Republic 
of Korea 
- In favor 
(Adopted) 
Abstention 
(Adopted) 
In favor 
(Adopted) 
In favor 
(Adopted) 
Sudan/ 
Darfur 
Consensus 
 
Consensus In favor 
(Adopted) 
In favor 
(Adopted) 
- 
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the session and updated discussions on the issue. The Brazilian delegation decided to call 
the 13th Special Session of the HRC in 2010 to discuss strategies for incorporating the 
human rights perspective in Haiti’s rebuilding efforts. 
Brazil also sponsored important resolutions tackling racism and racial 
discrimination. They supported the follow-up mechanisms of the Durban Declaration and 
Plan of Action. In 2008, Brazil hosted the Regional Preparatory Conference to the 
Durban Review Conference. Brazil has also proposed a series of resolutions that reflect 
its commitment to overcoming racism and racial discrimination from a variety of 
perspectives. Brazil and South Africa, in their capacity as host countries of the 2010 and 
2014 FIFA World Cups, proposed, in March 2010, the Resolution entitled “A world of 
sports free from racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance” 
(A/HRC/RES/13/27). Aware of the challenge posed to peaceful and democratic 
coexistence by political platforms with racist and xenophobic overtones, Brazil 
reintroduced in 2011 a resolution in the HRC reaffirming the “Incompatibility between 
democracy and racism” (A/HRC/RES/18/15). 
Brazil also strove to advance the promotion of children’s rights through fostering 
the presentation of a resolution on adopting the “Guidelines for the Alternative Care of 
Children” (A/HRC/RES/9/13 and A/HRC/RES/11/7), an essential measure to protect 
children deprived of proper parental care. Aware of the mobilizing potential of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Brazil secured, in September 2007, the approval 
of a resolution on the “Elaboration of human rights voluntary goals to be launched on the 
occasion of the celebration of the sixtieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights” (A/HRC/RES/6/26). The effort provided the bases for approval, the 
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following year, of the resolution “Human rights voluntary goals” (A/HRC/RES/9/12), 
which establishes a set of ten commitments capable of positively impacting the ability of 
countries to promote and protect the rights provided for in the Universal Declaration. 
In terms of voting behavior regarding country situations, Brazil’s performance at 
the HRC has tended to accompany the consensus at the Council. When resolutions have 
been voted, the majority of Brazilian votes have been in favor of addressing violation of 
human rights including Sudan, North Korea, Belarus and Iran (see Table 12). Yet, in 
2009, Brazil abstained on whether to continue human rights monitoring of North Korea 
where UN monitors were looking into reports of executions and detention camps. Brazil 
abstained along with South Africa, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Qatar, 
Philippines, Gabon, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Nicaragua, and Senegal.
45
 By comparison, 
Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay joined most European countries in supporting 
continuation of the UN monitoring mission. Brazil also abstained on an amendment to a 
resolution regarding Congo. 
When dealing with Special Sessions at the Human Rights Council
46
, the country 
has voted in favor of the majority of resolutions regarding urgent human rights concerns 
(2006-2011). This covers the following situations: Palestine occupied territories, Darfur, 
Myanmar, DRC, Ivory Coast, Libya and Syria. However, in 2009 Brazil abstained in a 
resolution aimed at stopping the council from monitoring human rights in Sri Lanka, 
where the UN High commissioner for Human Rights had denounced widespread war 
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 Voted against the resolution: China, Cuba, Egypt, Indonesia, Russia, and Nigeria. 
46
 Between 2006 and December 2011, the HRC held eighteen special sessions and six of them 
related to the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
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crimes. By comparison, Argentina, Chile, and Mexico voted for the continuation of the 
inquiry (Asano, Nader, & Vilhena, 2009). 
UN General Assembly (UNGA) 
The case of Iran is probably the most commented at international circles when 
comes to Brazil’s votes at the UNGA. Since 2001, with the exception of 2003, Brazil has 
abstained on all resolutions addressing Iran’s human rights situation at the UN General 
Assembly in New York (Asano, Nader, & Vilhena, 2009). The voting of the UN in 2008 
(document A/63/430/Add.3) is a good example of the general pattern of voting behavior 
of UN country members when comes to condemning human rights abuses in Iran. The 
majority of Latin American countries votes in favor of the resolution including : 
Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico, Netherlands, New Panama, Peru, 
Among the countries voting against were India, China, Russia, and South Africa.
47
 
President Lula da Silva expressed his support of the Iranian regime in other instances. For 
instance, Lula welcomed Iranian President Ahmadinejad to Brazil only a few months 
after the allegedly fraudulent June 2009 elections in Iran, and he refused to condemn 
Iran’s nuclear program or support a move toward UN sanctions (Brands, 2010). Between 
2007-2011, Brazil abstained on a number of other resolutions condemning human rights 
violations in country specific situations at the UNGA. As table 13 illustrates, apart from 
Iran, the abstentions included North Korea and Myanmar. 
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 Some the countries against the resolution were: Afghanistan, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, 
Bangladesh, Belarus, China, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, 
Eritrea, India, Indonesia, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi 
Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Venezuela, Zimbabwe. 
121 
Table 12 
Brazilian Abstentions to Country Human Rights Resolutions (UN General Assembly) 
Years  Country Human Rights Situation- Abstentions 
2008-2009 Iran  
North Korea 
2009-2010 Iran  
North Korea 
Myanmar  
2010-2011 Iran 
Myanmar 
Source: Based on Conectas yearbook (2008-2009, 2009-2010, 2010-2011), at 
http://www.conectas.org/en. 
 
Brazil’s human rights diplomacy—especially since President Lula took office in 
2003—has been criticized by media, international and domestic NGOS monitoring the 
country’s foreign policy at the UN human rights system. Already in 2004 Human Rights 
Watch wrote to President Lula indicating that they “were disappointed by Brazil’s failure 
to condemn certain abusive governments at the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, and 
by your unwillingness to speak about abuses in countries that you visited, such as Egypt, 
Libya, Syria, and Cuba” (HRW, 2004).  These organizations strategically used President 
Lula da Silva visit to the Council in June 2009 to explicitly condemn Brazil’s 
international policies on the subject. In a press release, titled “Brazil: Support Victims, 
not Abusers”, Julie de Rivero, Geneva Advocacy Director at Human Rights Watch, stated 
that: 
Brazil's support for abusive governments is undermining the Human Rights 
Council's performance. Rather than speaking up for victims, Brazil often argues 
that governments need to be given a chance and that the sovereignty of nations is 
more important than human rights. (HRW, 2009)  
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She concluded saying that "Brazil seems more concerned about not offending abusers 
than it is about implementing the council's mandate to address human rights violations.” 
Most notably, local NGOS such as Conectas and the Brazilian Human Rights and 
Foreign Policy Committee have criticized the country’s international human rights stands 
at the UNHRC. Since 2007, the Brazilian NGO Conectas issues a yearbook that monitors 
Brazil’s initiatives and voting behavior at the UN human rights system. In 2009, 
Conectas researchers published at “Politica Externa”— one of Brazil’s most influential 
international politics journal— an article reviewing Brazil’s human rights diplomacy. In 
the article they state the following:  
Brazil has been performing an increasingly relevant role in the international 
scene, including in forums that deal with human rights, such as UN Human Rights 
Council. Nevertheless, despite having become a strategic actor within the 
Council, Brazil has taken questionable positions in cases of rights violations in 
specific countries such as North Korea and Sri Lanka. Its stances in these cases 
distance themselves both from the international tradition in this field and the 
constitutional principles that rule our international relationships. In these cases, by 
resenting harsher resolutions by the Council against human rights violations, 
Brazil seems to act in a fashion that is ambiguous selective and non consistent and 
therefore does not contributes to the Council’s success. (Asano & Nader & 
Vilhena 2009: 77) 
When asked about the growing criticism of Brazil’s foreign policy on human 
rights, Lula’s Presidential advisor, Marco Aurelio Garcia, was quoted by Estado de Sao 
Paulo in June 2009 as saying: “Brazil doesn’t have to be handing out certificates of good 
conduct or bad conduct around the world”. And he added, “We think it is much more 
important to take positive actions that can move a country to improve its internal situation 
than actions of a restrictive nature” (Oppenheimer, 2009). In an article explaining 
Brazil’s foreign policy, Lula’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Celso Amorim, further asserts 
their position on this subject: 
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As I had the chance to observe during the 65
Th
 UN General Assembly, more often 
than not the exercise of human rights is more effectively ensured by dialogue and 
cooperation than by arrogant attitudes derived from self-declared moral 
superiority. A harsh condemnation of this or that country in Geneva or New York, 
based on self-ascribed position of higher moral ground does little to ameliorate 
the situation of those perishing in the field. (Amorim, 2010: 238) 
Peace Promotion and Humanitarian Protection 
Brazil’s participation in peacekeeping can be clearly divided into two stages: 
before and after the MINUSTAH operation in Haiti. Prior to MINUSTAH, Brazil 
adopted a strict policy of participation only in Chapter VI observation and monitoring 
missions (often not participating in more robust follow-on missions) in the Western 
Hemisphere and Portuguese-speaking nations. Overall, Brazil participated in 23 
peacekeeping operations from 1957 to 1999, as well as several Organization of American 
States (OAS) missions and operations under the auspices of the UN Department of 
Political Affairs (DPA). Throughout the 1990s, Brazil maintained a peacekeeping 
doctrine that was limited in scope and conditioned only to the pacific settlement of 
disputes (Kenkel, 2013). 
In 2004, Brazil took on its most important and sizeable peacekeeping commitment 
to date: providing MINUSTAH’s largest contingent (up to 2,200 troops) as well as an 
unbroken succession of generals serving as its Force Commander. Today Brazil is the 
largest contributor of peacekeepers in the Americas (Kenkel, 2013). Since Haiti, 
Brazilian troops have participated in the full range of activities under MINUSTAH’s 
Chapter VII mandate.
48
 This is an important change in Brazil’s peacekeeping doctrine 
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 Yet, Brazilian policymakers continue to be very skeptical of the possibility of use of force as 
stated on UN Charter under Chapter VII.  
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considering that local decision-makers traditionally refused to send troops to UN peace 
enforcement operations other than those conducted under Chapter VI of the United 
Nations Charter, which require the consent of the ruling authorities in the country 
concerned. In fact, with the exception of Rwanda, Brazil had always abstained from 
Security Council Chapter VII decisions about interventions. For example, when the 
debate on humanitarian crisis in Darfur took place and Brazil was an elected member of 
the council, the government chose to adhere to a non-interventionist posture and 
abstained from the instigation of a trial for the men listed by the International 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (Hertz, 2014). 
The decision to go to Haiti was unprecedented and Brazilian leaders were 
cautious in explaining the reasons for its involvement. As Brazilian scholar, Matias 
Spektor, explains: “Lula was careful not to couch this major transformation in terms of a 
new doctrine. Instead, his discourse emphasized continuity with Brazil’s traditional 
attachment to national sovereignty” (Spektor, 2012). Lula explained the country’s 
presence in Haiti due to a “growing approximation and consolidation of Brazil’s relations 
with its region” while insisting that it is “require that the situations of instability in these 
countries deserve a more attentive follow-up on the part of the Brazilian government, 
which is oriented by the principle of non-intervention, but also by an attitude of ‘non-
indifference’’ (Lula da Silva quoted by Spektor). 
Lula’s emphasis on “non-indifference” evidence and increasing acknowledgment 
within Brazil’s political elites that human rights abuses cannot be discarded as non-
consequential for international affairs. Starting in late 1990s and especially since the UN 
mission in Haiti, Brazilian diplomats ameliorated their anti-interventionist rhetoric and 
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started to contribute more consistently to UN peacekeeping missions. Yet, they remained 
very much skeptic to the idea of humanitarian intervention. Spektor (2012) explains, 
For Brazilian leaders the notion that the international community had an 
obligation to act in the face of mass atrocities in places like Rwanda, Somalia and 
Kosovo was deeply problematic. They feared that within this emerging consensus 
major powers would find a permissive environment to impose their will on far 
weaker countries. 
Indeed, Brazil’s position towards the notion of Responsibility to Protect introduced in the 
UN Summit in 2005 has been ambiguous. “Officially the government welcomed the 
initiative, but in practice it denounced R2P as a ploy of the strong to secure the legal right 
to intervene at will across the developing world. Under Lula, Foreign Minister Celso 
Amorim had spoken of R2P as “droit d’ingerénce [. . .] in new clothes.” (Spektor, 2012). 
In a lecture given at the London School of Economics in 2009, Amorim voiced Brazil’s 
position on the use of military force for humanitarian purposes even more clearly: “We 
reject the view of an international order which favors the use of force and regards 
multilateralism as just one among many options on the menu, to be selected when it suits 
the objectives of the powerful” (Amorim in Brands, 2010: 19). 
It is not until the crisis in Libya in early 2011 that Brazil was compelled as non- 
permanent member of the UNSC to address a Chapter VII resolution calling for a 
coercive response to a humanitarian emergency. Brazil voted in favor of imposing 
sanctions on Libya (Resolution 1970) but joined China, India, Russia and Germany in 
abstaining from the vote authorizing “all necessary measures” against Libya (Resolution 
1973). However, after NATO’s intervention in Libya, Brazil’s criticism to the military 
action hardened with Itamarity issuing statements condemning the loss of civilian lives 
and calling for a ceasefire. 
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Brazilian concerns regarding the potential abuse of R2P by western powers and 
what was considered the misuse of the principle during the NATO intervention in Libya 
crystallized in a new proposal “Responsibility while protecting” (RwP) that was 
presented by Brazil’s UN representative in late 2011. This proposal includes a set of 
criteria (including last resort, proportionality, and balance of consequences) to be taken 
into account before the Security Council mandates any use of military force, and a review 
mechanism to ensure that such mandates’ implementation is closely monitored. It also 
emphasizes that prevention is the “best policy” and that the use of force in particular must 
be monitored and assessed.
49
 Brazil’s position in this proposal highlighted prevention and 
monitoring but remains very cautious about the prospects of the use of force for 
humanitarian purposes. 
Financial Assistance  
Financial contribution to important UN or regional bodies provides an additional 
indicator of the degree of nation’s support for international human rights. Since 2006 the 
contribution of Brazil to the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights 
(OHCHR) has been very limited. According to the annual OHCHR reports, only in 2010 
and after not contributing for several years, Brazil gave US $1 million. In 2011 Brazil 
contributed only US $ 5,665, which leaves them according to OHCHR´s donor ranking 
per capita in place 69 out of 71 countries. In contrast, India contributes more than 
US$50,000 annually and Turkey around US$100,000 (OHCHR, 2011). 
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 This dissertation covers up to 2010 (Lulas’s Government). However, Brazil’s reaction to the 
crisis in Libya and its RwP proposal is critical to understand the country’s most current position 
when comes to respond massive human rights abuses. Yet, the discussion of RwP and its impact 
on Brazil’s foreign policy and international politics more broadly is still ongoing and its impact 
should be assessed in future research.  
127 
The United Nations Democratic FUND (UNDEF) that was created in 2005 is a 
UN institution providing grants to civil society groups for democracy promotion. It has 
received important contributions from countries such as India and United States as well 
less sizable but not insignificant contributions from Latin American countries including 
Mexico, Chile, and Peru. Brazil, by contrast, has never contributed funds for UNDEF. 
Brazil´s financial assistance to the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights has 
been very limited in comparison with its regional peers, with no contributions in 2007, 
2010, 2011 and 2012 (IACHR, 2012). 
Humanitarian assistance is one area in which the Brazilian government decided to 
participate more actively since Lula’s administration and the government defines50 it 
expressly as actions directly targeting the promotion and protection of international 
human rights.
51
 The humanitarian assistance provided by Brazil during the Lula 
administration consisted of donations in kind (food, medicine and general items), sending 
in Brazilian professionals to help, cash donations and participation in multilateral 
dialogues on humanitarian assistance. In 2010, the international humanitarian assistance 
budget was US$21million (Pimenta de Faria & Goulart Paradis 2013). 
The initiative that granted Brazil a worldwide reputation as a provider of technical 
assistance has been the internationalization of its national strategy to combat hunger 
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 The Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE) defines international humanitarian assistance: 
“Any action that contributes, in an immediate and effective way, to prevent, protect from, prepare 
for, reduce or alleviate suffering and to provide assistance to other countries or regions that are – 
temporarily or otherwise – in situations of emergency, public calamity, imminent or serious threat 
to life, to health, to the protection of human rights or the humanitarian rights of its population” 
(MRE at Pimenta de Faria & Goulart Paradis 2013). 
51
 Technical cooperation is a second area but it has not been defined as compromising human 
rights initiatives and therefore it has not been included in this section.  
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“Zero Hunger”. President Lula invested important diplomatic efforts on the “Action 
against Hunger and Poverty” that was launched by Brazil at the United Nations in 2004 
with the objective of identifying “innovative financing mechanisms” capable of scaling 
up resources for financing development in the poorest countries. Since the launch of this 
initiative, Brazil’s policies to combat hunger and poverty have become an international 
reference point and the focus of important international partnerships. During the last 
decade, the Ministry of Social Development and Fight Against Hunger (MSD) alone has 
had visits by delegations from 63 countries, 25 of them African, interested in learning 
more about the “Bolsa Família” Program. The demand for Brazil’s social technology has 
led the United Nations to open its only Center for Excellence against Hunger of the 
World Food Program (WFP) in Brazil (Instituto Lula, 2014) 
Conclusions 
Brazil´s diplomatic performance on human rights promotion. The country has 
indeed moved from a defensive position at the beginning of the transition to democracy 
in the late 1980s towards embracing human rights promotion and finally to accepting 
international scrutiny in the mid-1990s. Brazil is today signature of all major human 
rights treaties in sharp contrast to the United States, China, or India. The country was also 
an active participant in the process of reform creating the new UN Human Rights Council 
and has been at the forefront of important international initiatives at the United Nations 
on the right to health, development and non-discrimination. 
On the downside, Brazil took more than a decade (after treaties were ratified) to 
recognize the jurisdiction of its associated bodies. The country shows ambivalent support 
to resolutions addressing human rights abuses in foreign countries and presents and 
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important record of abstention votes at the UN system in the past two decades. This was 
particularly the case at UN Human Rights Commission but the country still abstained in 
important resolutions at the newly created UN Human Rights Council and continued to 
do so at the UN General Assembly. Discussions related the use of force for human 
protection and the principle of Responsibility to Protect remain highly contested among 
Brazilian elites and Itamaraty. The financial assistance for human rights has been limited. 
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CHAPTER 5: UNDERSTANDING BRAZIL’S HUMAN RIGHTS FOREIGN POLICY 
Contextualizing Brazil’s Foreign Policy 
Despite being a continental sized country and having borders with almost every 
country in South America, Brazil since the first decade of the last century has not dealt 
with external security threats nor it is dependent on any militarily stronger nation. Indeed, 
the configuration of Brazil’s national space and territorial demarcation followed a process 
led by the Brazilian diplomat Baron Rio Branco characterized mainly by international 
negotiations and arbitrations, rather than interstate conflict (Lafer, 2001) The early and 
peaceful establishment of borders had major consequences for the formation of the 
nation, its diplomatic practice and the future pattern of Brazilian foreign policy. It 
impacted at least in three ways. First, without military threats the country developed its 
international policies relatively independent of external forces. This sense of 
independence is captured more clearly on Brazil’s traditional foreign policy quest for 
“autonomy”, that is, “the condition allowing states to formulate and implement foreign 
policies independently of constrains imposed by powerful states”52 (Vigenani and 
Cepuluni 2009:6).  Second, economic interests rather than security became central in 
shaping its international policies and, as a consequence, Brazil’s foreign policy has 
always had a strongly developmentalist component. Foreign policy is perceived as a 
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 Note that autonomy is understood as a continuum whose extremities are alignment and full 
autonomy. Between these extreme there is a full gradation of foreign policies.  
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critical tool for national development. Third, the stellar performance of Rio Branco
53
 as a 
conflict mediator gave Brazilian diplomacy a special statue within the state apparatus. 
From the moment of its inception, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty) enjoyed a 
great deal of legitimacy among Brazilian elites and important levels of autonomy vis-à-
vis other state institutions (Lima 2000 and 2005; Lima and Hirst 2006).  
The centrality and the persistence to Brazil’s foreign policy of the factors 
mentioned above generated an uncommon degree of stability to the international policies 
of this colossus of the South. Maria Regina Soares de Lima and Monica Hirst (2006), for 
example, highlight that in the past century Brazilian foreign policy had only two major 
policy shifts: the first in the 1930s, with the crisis of the agro-exporting model and its 
replacement by an import substitution model (ISI); and the second in the 1990s, with the 
exhaustion of the “protected industrialization” regime and its replacement by a model of 
competitive integration into the global economy. Arguably, since early 2000s President 
Lula da Silva initiated a new foreign policy shift intended to develop a more assertive 
foreign policy to enhance Brazil’s role in the world. 
The first shift was driven by the rapid industrialization of Brazil in the fist half of 
the 20
th
 century. The country became one of the most successful examples of the ISI 
model. The major characteristic of this development model were a central role for the 
state in the provision of incentives and in production itself; discrimination against 
imports; and large-scale participation by the state in foreign direct investments on a wide 
range of industrial sectors (Lima and Hirst 2006: 23). 
                                                          
53
 Rio Branco was Minister of Foreign Relations from 1902-1912. 
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Foreign Policy was a key part of the ISI model and Itamaraty was instrumental “to 
the model’s domestic consolidation and international recognition”. Furthermore, “a close 
and virtuous link was seen to be established between the goal of ISI and the objective of 
developing an autonomous foreign policy” (Lima and Hirst 2006: 24). Vigevani and 
Cepaluni describe the foreign policy of the time
54
 as having a series of characteristics 
including: a policy of contesting the norms and principles of important international 
institutions; the belief in autarchic development, guided by the expansion of the domestic 
market and by economic protectionism, and resistance to international regimes 
interpreting as freezing world power, in favor of the status quo (Vigenani and Cepuluni 
2009:7). Lima and Hisrt (2006) add Brazil’s international role as a leader for differential 
treatment for development countries in the trade regime and the high value that the 
policymakers assigned to the expansion of economic cooperation with southern countries. 
The next policy foreign policy shift took place in the 1990s as a “result of both 
severe economic conditions and the systemic constraints produced by the fiscal crisis of 
the state” (Lima and Hirst 2006: 24). Brazil was experiencing a deep economic crisis 
originated in the exhaustion of a relatively autarchic economic model founded in the 
1930s based on import substitution. This process took place in the context of the 
transition to democracy in the mid-1980s that put to an end over two decades of military 
regimes that first took power as a result of the 1964 military coup. Jose Sarney assumed 
the Presidency in the midst of the collapse of the ISI model, an enormous foreign debt, 
rampant inflation, and the pressures of an incomplete transition. At the international 
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level, the world was witnessing the meltdown of Soviet power that led to the end of the 
Cold War and the emergence of new world order. 
An important consequence of these changes was the developing of a new foreign 
policy concept “autonomy through participation”, an idea that was incipient during 
Sarney government, gained more prominence during Collor de Mello, and was fully 
implementation during Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s Presidential term. In his brief 
period as Minister of Foreign Relations (1992-1993), Cardoso set the parameters of what 
he called a new foreign policy: 
Why a new foreign policy? Firstly, because Brazil has changed. In the political 
arena, we have made the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. In the 
economic arena, after a period of accelerated development, we entered a period of 
crisis that could lead to stagnation of growth. On the ideological side we have 
gone beyond authoritarian nationalism and autochthonous development to seek a 
competitive insertion in the world. Secondly, because the world has changed. In 
the political arena the end of the Cold War redrew the power structure. In the 
economic arena, globalization looks like becoming the dominant trend. In the 
ideological arena, democracy and the market economy are the general rules. 
(Cardoso in Vigenani and Cepuluni 2009:47) 
 
Cardoso puts it even more explicitly during his Presidency, “autonomy through distance 
pursued by the military dictatorships must be replaced by one of autonomy through 
participation, within a changing international reality” (FHC at Brands, Hal 
2012:8).According to Vigenani and Cepuluni (2009) the idea of “autonomy through 
participation” that was set forth during this period translates to a set of foreign policy 
priorities that include:  
the adherence to international regime, including those of liberal slant without 
losing the capacity to manage foreign policy. In this case the objective would be 
to influence the very formulation of the objectives and rules governing the 
international system. It is felt that national objectives would be more effectively 
achieved along these paths. (Lima and Hirst 2006: 24) 
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In sum, these new foreign policy priorities were crafted with the objective of retaining 
“the desire for autonomy” but at the same time, “sought to remove the legacy of 
authoritarianism and to respond to the international power of global liberalism” (Lima 
and Hirst 2006: 24). 
In the end of Cardoso’s term the pendulum leaned once again toward emphasizing 
the autonomous aspects of its foreign policy, a priority that was deepened during Lula’s 
government. The main reasons behind this emphasis were an increasing concern about 
the international consequences of increasing U.S. unilateralism during the first term of 
George W. Bush’s Presidency and, most importantly, Brazil’s stunning economic success 
at the beginning of the new century. Fueled by a commodity boom and a growing 
domestic market, economic growth picked up, averaging 4.5% between 2004 and 2010 
with relatively low inflation. The social implication of this new economic growth also 
became more evident by the middle of the decade when observers began to notice that 
Brazil was enjoying falling poverty rates and improving measures of income inequality 
(Montero, Alfred 2014: 2-3). Brazil was on the rise and President Lula was convinced 
that progress at home required more ambitious policies abroad. In his words, “This 
country has greatness… this country has everything to be the equal of any other country 
in the world. And we will not give up on this goal” (Lula at Hurrell, 2010:1). 
Although Lula’s government adopted macro-economic policies at home that were 
similar to his predecessor, during this period Brazilian elites were aiming for a more 
ambitious goal “a certain reconfiguration of the world’s commercial and diplomatic 
geography”—that is, according to Celso Amorim, to hasten the transition to a multipolar 
order in which international norms and institutions no longer favor the developed world 
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at Brazil’s expense (Amorim at Brands, 2012:8). The speech by President Lula to 
diplomats in 2003 captures the tenor of his foreign policy:  
We no longer accept participation in international politics as if we were Latin 
American wretches; a Third World country of no count; a worthless country with 
homeless children; a minor country whose people only know how to play soccer 
and dance the samba… There is no interlocutor anywhere in the world who 
respects another who bows his head and acts as an inferior. (Lula da Silva 2003) 
 
These foreign policy goals translated into an active diplomacy that included the opening 
of 33 new embassies, 5 new permanent missions to international organizations (including 
the IAEA and the Human Rights Council) and 19 new consulates (Hurrell 2010:1). 
Itamarity has played and important role promoting these new policies. Despite increasing 
pluralism of Brazil’s foreign policy and the rising importance of the Presidency in 
international affairs during Cardoso and Lula (Pinheiro, 2009; Faria, 2012; Cason & 
Power, 2009), the Ministry of Foreign Relations remained the most important institution 
in the designing and implementation of the country’s foreign policy, especially when 
comes to political decisions involving traditionally respected notions of sovereignty and 
non-intervention. The appointment of Celso Amorim
55
, a career diplomat rather than an 
eminent figure from outside the ranks of professional diplomacy as the head of the 
Ministry of foreign Affairs during Itamar Franco’s and in both of Lula’s terms further 
strengthened the power of the Ministry. 
In terms of concrete foreign policy strategy, Brazil’s international insertion during 
Lula has involved a strong focus on South America as key region for projecting Brazil’s 
global ambitions (Malamud & Andres, 2011); a heavy focus on building economic and 
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political ties with other emerging countries especially China, India and South Africa; and 
an increasing interest in partnerships with other regions such as Africa and the Middle 
East in search of areas to cooperate; and while Lula has maintained a good relationship 
with Washington this foreign policy strategy has inevitably resulted in “a relative 
distancing from the United States and the decline of traditional partners in Europe” 
(Hurrell, 2010:1). When comes to international institutions, Brazil has always relied on 
multilateralism as a source of power and during Lula’s term Brazilian diplomacy pushed 
much harder than previous administrations for a UN Security Council that better reflects 
the current distribution of world power, including a permanent seat for Brazil. 
Overall, Lula’s foreign policy has been characterized by a search for “autonomy 
through diversification” (Vigenani & Cepuluni 2009) and the core of its strategy was 
based on a renewed emphasis on development goals and the centrality of South-South 
cooperation (Dauvergne & Farias, 2012). Brazil’s ultimate goal is the reconfiguration of a 
new global order in which developing countries are at the center of the stage. As Celso 
Amorim (2010) puts it: 
The rise of developing countries is a structural transformation that is knocking 
down another wall: the North-South wall, albeit an invisible one. It is falling apart 
much more slowly than the Berlin Wall, but falling it is. In this more multipolar, 
more complex world in which developing countries are no longer passive 
bystanders, Brazil is willing to play a greater role. 
 
In sum, during the first decade of the 21
st
 century and following a pattern that can be 
traced back to Brazil’s state formation, the major determinants of Brazil’s foreign policy 
have been given by the pursuit of international autonomy and the primacy of domestic 
development. Itamaraty has been a key actor reinforcing the legitimacy of these ideas and 
has exerted great influence on the worldview of Brazilian decision-makers. What is 
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remarkable in the Brazilian case is that these foreign policy priorities have remained in 
place despite important domestic changes such as the installation of the military regime 
in 1964, the restoration of democracy in the late 1980s, and the liberation of the 
economy. After two successive and stable democratic administrations, Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso (1995- 2002) and Lula Da Silva (2002-2010), autonomy and 
development have remained, despite different degrees of emphasis, at the core of Brazil’s 
international strategies. 
The prevalence of these two principles (autonomy and development) and the 
traditional influence of the Foreign Ministry had an important impact on the ways in 
which human rights ideas are perceived and potentially incorporated into the foreign 
policy decision-process in Brazil. The next section analyses these issues further 
considering the international and domestic determinants of international human rights 
promotion. 
Human Rights Promotion: International Influence and Domestic Determinants 
The literature on human rights and international politics offers some insights on 
how human rights principles are included as part of a nation’s foreign policy. One 
perspective highlights the influence of international factors and especially the role of 
ideas and norms as standards for the appropriate behavior of states. This view predicts 
that countries will adopt new ideas such as human rights through a process of 
international socialization that is driven by a need to enhance international legitimation 
and credibility. It highlights the role of transnational advocacy networks as key actors 
enhancing the transmission of international norms (Finnmore & Sikkink1998; Barnett & 
Finnemore 1997; Clark, Ian 2007; Keck & Sikkink 1998). Other explanations emphasize 
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how domestic determinants are critical for the acceptance and inclusion of human rights 
into policy. For liberals, the inclusion of these principles is motivated by domestic 
calculations in times of democratic transition (Moravcsik, A. 2000) while for 
constructivist the process is driven by national identities especially democratic ones, local 
ideas and institutions (Risse-Kappen 1996; Brysk 2007; Acharya, 2004; Checkel 1998, 
Sikkink 2004). 
The following subsections test these theories against the Brazilian case and, in 
light of their apparent explanatory power or lack thereof, offer some explanations about 
this country’s human rights diplomacy starting with the transition to democracy up to the 
end of Lula’s second term in 2010. Brazil’s late adoption of international human rights 
treaties and its longstanding reluctance to become a more active human rights promoter is 
a good case to test these ideas. The literature on human rights has tended to look 
exclusively at the successful cases. That is, countries that are part of the selected group of 
the so-called “Global Good Samaritans” (Brysk 2007). Brazil is part of a group of 
countries accepting international human rights that at the same time has the capacities to 
act more strongly as a human rights promoter, yet the country remains a low key actor in 
this field. 
It is important to reiterate that the point of this chapter is not to minimize the 
changes in Brazil’s response to the international human rights movement since the 
transition to a democratic government. The previous chapter described Brazil’s path 
towards accepting human rights as part of its diplomacy along with the country’s 
increasing participation particularly in certain areas such as international development. It 
is rather to show the relative limits of those changes and the forces restraining Brazil 
139 
from becoming a leading promoter of a more effective international human rights regime. 
As I noted above, Brazil has remained a country reluctant to participate in the shaming of 
gross human rights delinquents much less to support coercive measures against even very 
grave abusers of rights. In short I am proposing answers to the question: Why does Brazil 
remains reluctant to become an international human rights promoter? 
International Influences 
Brazilian diplomats and foreign policy scholars have traditionally highlighted 
Brazil’s capacity to shape its international priorities relatively independently of external 
forces. This section argues that international influences since mid-1990s prompted Brazil 
to increase its international credibility through the promotion of international human 
rights. However, previously during the transition process and later in 2000s international 
influences were not a determinant driver of Brazil’s approach to international human 
rights. 
The low impact of international pressures promoting accountability for past 
human rights abuses and the relatively slow incorporation of these principles into foreign 
policy were particularly evident during the first decade after the transition to democracy 
that started in 1985. During the military regime and unlike Chile or Argentina, Brazil was 
not subject to formal condemnation at the UN Human Rights Commission; only private 
sessions were conducted between 1974 and 1976 to discuss the case. As human rights 
violations increased in other South American countries, the situation in Brazil was also 
seen as less urgent, and the international pressure upon the Brazilian government, such as 
it was, decreased. The transitional government of Sarney, as a consequence, started in a 
much better shape compared to other Latin American countries undergoing similar 
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circumstances: no formal international condemnation against Brazil was issued by and 
international institutions and external criticism due to human rights violations was 
relatively low. Brazilian elites perceived no apparent need to critically reformulate the 
country’s foreign policy for transitional times since, unlike countries like Argentina, 
Chile and Uruguay, it had never been classified as a kind of international felon. Hence its 
diplomats did not feel pressure to demonstrate national rehabilitation after a long period 
of notorious criminality. 
At the same time, while the Brazilian military engaged in widespread abuse-- 
institutionalizing torture and impunity, as well as violations of due process by special 
courts set up to try suspected insurgents, the number of victims was significantly less 
than in a substantial number of other Latin American dictatorships. The total number 
killed or disappeared for political reasons was much lower than in Argentina or Chile, for 
example, particularly in light of the size of Brazil. Argentina’s dirty war—in a period of 
seven years—killed at least twenty and possibly sixty times as many as in Brazil. Per 
capita, the Argentina security forces killed between fifty and two hundred times as many 
as their counterparts in Brazil. In Chile, security forces killed six times as many in 
absolute terms and sixty times as many in per capita terms (Carvallo, & Delgado, 2011: 
35). The relatively low number of victims partly explains the lack of engagement of 
transnational NGOs effectively pressuring the successive democratic governments to be 
more active in the search for transitional justice or in the monitoring Brazil’s 
international stands regarding democracy and human rights. 
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Brazil’s civil society organizations were at the same time much less 
internationally connected than some of their counterparts in other national contexts. 
Further, 
with the exception of the business and economic elite (which includes more 
inwards looking ISI beneficiaries as well as business interests linked with 
multinational and exporting interests, which are more outward looking) and the 
unions (repressed under military rule and linked to a sui generis Workers Party 
with no international affiliations), civil society organizations [in Brazil] were few 
and far between. (Barahona de Brito, A.: 18) 
This relative isolation of Brazil’s civil society groups was even more noticeable when 
compared to other human rights organizations throughout the region. In contrast with 
Chile, where human rights organizations emerged simultaneously with repression, in 
Brazil repression began in 1964 and the first organizations only appeared in 1972 
(Clearly, E. 1997). During the transition process this situation continued. A more recent 
study assessing the low impact of transitional justice in Brazil indicates that while 
networks between and among Spanish-speaking Latin American rights and solidarity 
groups have been strong for decades, it is only in the past decade with the advance of 
modern communications that Brazilian groups have engaged more fully (Carvallo & 
Delgado 2011: 36). 
Brazil’s comparative low involvement in the Inter-American system for the 
defense of human rights especially at the beginning of the 1990s is also a reflection of the 
lack of human rights advocacy groups. As an example, as recently as 1994, while 
activists were filing and litigating scores of cases against almost every other state in Latin 
America, only two cases were pending against Brazil (Carvallo, 2002). 
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In sum, the exchange of experiences and support among domestic, regional and 
international human rights advocacy networks was remarkably low during the struggle 
for democratization in Brazil and continued to be so at least a decade afterwards. 
Furthermore, the lack of ties among Brazilian opposition leaders and international 
advocacy groups during the dictatorship was also weak compared to other countries in 
Latin America.
56
 Unlike the case of Chile in which part of the political leaders entering 
the new democratic administration (including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) during the 
transition had been either part of these human rights transnational networks or had a 
substantive connection with these groups, Brazilian elites were not connected to these 
networks and the doors of the bureaucratic apparatus were largely closed to these groups. 
The low impact of international influences on Brazil’s foreign policy during the 
transition and the fragility of transnational advocacy networks in the country did not 
prevent completely further changes as a result of a fluctuating global scenario. The end of 
the Cold War and the effects of US economic, political and military prominence 
prompted Brazilian policy-makers to reformulate their international strategies and to 
review Brazil’s role in the world. President’s Collor de Mello’s (1991-1992) quest for the 
“modernization” and “creative adaptation” of Brazil’s international policies in 
accordance with new international rules and practices were further reinforced by the 
subsequent administration of President Cardoso. The aforementioned strategy of 
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“autonomy through diversification” was Cardoso’s attempt to accommodate Brazil’s 
national interests to US power and to liberal globalization. 
Greater emphasis was given during the Cardoso years to the idea that Brazil 
needed to re-established its credentials as a modern liberal democracy with an effective 
state and a coherent foreign economic policy. In this view, “Brazil’s status was very 
much seen as flowing from successful economic development and the successful 
navigation of the transformed world of liberal globalization” (Hurrell, 2010:6). Cardoso 
even stressed the correspondence between universally prevailing values and national 
identity: “The Brazil that enters the twenty-first century is a country whose primary 
objectives for international transformation and development are in harmony with values 
universally disseminated on the international level” (Cardoso in Vigenani and Cepuluni 
2009:57). In consequence the government moved towards increasing the acceptance of 
international norms and to actively adhere to international regimes in trade, security, 
environment, human rights and democracy. Human rights was a key area in which the 
government could easily signal its liberal credentials and Cardoso himself pushed for an 
international policy more in tune with these ideas. As the previous chapter illustrates, 
many of the most important reforms accepting and institutionalizing human rights as part 
of Brazil’s foreign policy were crafted during this period. 
By Cardoso’s second term in the end of the 1990s, the policy of “autonomy 
through participation” had come to face increasingly serious challenges (Hurrell, 2010). 
In addition to the country’s continued economic vulnerability to global economic forces 
and its difficulty in adapting to them, Brazilian decision-makers had also to respond to 
increasing unilateral policies from the new administration of George W. Bush, a situation 
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that was hugely aggravated in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in Washington and New York. 
When Lula came into power in 2003 the government sought to differentiate its own 
“assertive” foreign policy from that of its predecessor that was seen as “insufficiently 
resolute in the defense of Brazilian interests and too closely tied with the liberalizing 
agenda of the 1990s” (Hurrell, A 2010:8). As Par Engstrom (2010) puts it:  
The foreign policy of the Cardoso administration drew more actively on the other 
side of Brazilian national identity emphasizing Brazil’s convergence with the 
liberal norms of the 1990s. Whilst under Lula the emphasis has been on economic 
and political sovereignty and on seeking alliances within the Third World against 
the West. 
Lula’s renewed emphasis on an international strategy based on the prominence of 
the principles of autonomy and development had important consequences for Brazil’s 
human rights foreign policy. To be sure, Brazilian diplomats continued to stress the role 
of international institutions and the international human rights regime and its support for 
global liberal values. In fact, Brazil has been selected twice as a member of the Human 
Rights Council since 2006 and led a series of initiatives in this capacity. But international 
changes since 2000s and the rising status of Brazil and other emerging powers produced a 
renewal of what might be called “human rights skepticism” that tinted the rhetoric and 
practice of Brazilian international policies during Lula’s term. Three factors illustrate this 
tendency. 
First, U.S. dismissiveness of multilateral institutions combined with Bush’s 
discourse on the fight against terrorism and pre-emptive war augmented Brazil’s 
perception that human rights are selectively used by great powers when their national 
interest are stake. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 by a US-led coalition, acting without 
United Nations authorization, and faintly invoking human rights as a supplementary 
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justification, further damaged the appeal of humanitarian ideas among governing elites in 
the global south and Brazil in particular (Farer & Fuentes 2014). As a Brazilian diplomat 
has said, “there is a strong belief and also a historical international practice—Iraq is a 
good example— that shows that great powers intervene on selective basis and not with 
the primary objective of advancing universal human rights but their own strategic 
interests” (Anonymous, personal communication, September 2013). The described 
international environment gave Brazilian diplomats an extra justification to abstain more 
than a majority of Latin countries at the UN when faced with resolutions condemning 
human rights abuses in named foreign countries. 
Reinforcing Brazil’s traditionally reluctance to criticize the human rights record 
of other countries was Lula’s determination that Brazil play a leading role in the 
developing world and increase cooperation with other emerging powers. Enforcing 
international human rights had a lower priority. This is easy to illustrate. For example, 
when examining Brazil’s voting behavior at the UN Human Rights Council on the 
resolutions about Sri Lanka and North Korea in 2009, Brazil sided with countries such as 
China, India, Russia, and South Africa that either reject or abstain from condemning 
these countries. Brazil’s followed a similar pattern of behavior at the United Nations 
General Assembly, joining other emergent power refusal to condemn Iran, North Korea 
and Myanmar. Speaking of Brazil’s policies during the Lula Administration, a 
representative from an important NGO based in Washington interviewed for this 
dissertation underscored that “Brazil regards human rights as an obstacle to accomplish 
its political and strategic goals”. Moreover,  
146 
The rising Brazil designed a deliberate strategy to be recognized as the leader of 
the developing world, implementing a South-South agenda with a decisive anti-
colonial and anti-imperial discourse. Clearly this strategy took precedence over 
human rights considerations. (Anonymous, personal communication, September 
2013) 
Third, in tune with the objective of consolidating South-South relations, Lula’s 
administration decided to pursue an international policy of “solidarity”. This strategy was 
put into practice by increasing the international aid granted by Brazil, by transferring 
resources and technology and by the emphasis placed on conveying to partner countries 
some of the domestic social policies and programs developed successfully by the 
Brazilian government (Pimenta de Faria & Goulart Paradis 2013). This agenda very 
much emphasized economic and social rights that are critical for universal human rights 
and in this sense Brazil has enhanced its status as a “Global development power” 
(Dauvergne & Farias 2012). Yet, this strategy has downplayed the use of the human 
rights language choosing to highlight solidarity and cooperation instead. 
Domestic Determinants 
Domestic factors played an even greater role in constraining the possibilities of 
Brazil for adopting full-fledged human rights diplomacy. This subsection analyzes three 
factors that are critical to explain Brazil’s international behavior in the area of human 
rights: a) Transition to Democracy and the “Lock in” effect; b) The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (Itamaraty) and political leadership; c) Civil Society. 
Transition to democracy and the “lock in” effect. It is possible to say that 
Brazil’s transition to democracy started in 1973 with Military President Ernesto Geisel’s 
decision to initiate a “slow, gradual, and careful” liberation of the regime and ended in 
1989 with the first direct presidential elections in three decades. The length of the 
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transition is one of the most notable features of the Brazilian case considering that it took 
almost sixteen years, almost twice as long as the Portuguese transition. The length of the 
transition is even more dramatic when we consider that the Brazilian authoritarian regime 
only began on March 1964 (Linz & Stepan 1996). As indicated by Linz and Stepan,  
Both the extraordinary length of the Brazilian transition and the fact that the 
military ‘opening’ was six years longer than the military ‘closure’ seem to us 
directly related to the fact that the authoritarian regime, although never fully 
institutionalized, was hierarchically led by a military organization that had 
sufficient power to control the pace of the transition and strike a high price for 
extrication. (p. 68) 
Another feature of the Brazilian transition is key to mention: the military attempts 
to maintain control over the process. The result was a set of constraining conditions 
securing important degree of military power in the following administrations. For 
example, throughout the entire government of the first civilian President, Jose Sarney, 
there were six military ministers in the cabinet. The military also had important leverage 
on the writing of the new Brazilian Constitution that came into being in 1988: “the 
military, via a skillful combination of threats and lobbying, succeeded in eliminating, 
softening, or subverting most of the proposed constitutional clauses that would have 
curtailed military autonomy” (Linz & Stepan 1996: 169). 
A third element that is important to highlight relates to the unwillingness of key 
democratic political forces to precipitate a decisive rupture with the authoritarian regime 
(Keck, M. 1992) and the fact that the legacy of the military was perceived by Brazilian 
elites in a more favorable or at least ambivalent manner compared to other Latin 
American countries. Not only the number of human rights victims of human rights was 
significantly smaller compared to its regional counterparts, the strength of the military 
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was based on the significant economic growth that the country experienced especially 
from 1968 to 1973. Moreover, the gradual transition in Brazil contrasts with the collapse 
of the military regime in Argentina, where the armed forces were discredited by their 
military defeat in the 1982 Malvinas War (Hagopian, 1993: 468). Like most other 
military regimes in Latin America, the Argentinean regime imploded amid financial 
disaster, whereas Brazil’s regime achieved significant levels of economic growth during 
the so-called economic miracle (Hagopian, 1993: 468). 
Liberals perspectives explaining why states accept international human rights 
treaties, would predict Brazil’s adherence during the transition process. Yet, if anything, 
the Brazilian case highlights the lack of evidence indicating any inclination or willingness 
of the political elites to accept international human rights commitments either as a 
formula to lessen the political uncertainties of the new transitional government or as a 
strategy to consolidate domestic goals. Even though it was Sarney’s decision to ratify 
major international human rights Conventions, it took more than a decade for Brazil to 
recognize the jurisdiction of the oversight bodies associated with these treaties. Brazil 
recognized the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights only in 1998, 
ten years after President Sarney assumed office. Brazil’s case illustrates that not all 
governments transitioning to democracy are likely to adhere to international human rights 
treaties or to enhance their participation with international human rights institutions. Not 
at least as an immediate result of domestic calculations due to the uncertain 
circumstances of the political process. The type and the particular characteristics of the 
process largely shape the responses of the new civilian leaders.  
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As explained before, Brazil’s transition was gradual, the levels of uncertainty 
were lower than other similar cases due to its negotiated character, the legacy of the 
military evoked ambivalence, and there were markedly fewer pressures to address the 
legacy of human rights abuses. Under these circumstances, Brazilian governing elites did 
not perceive any immediate gain by adopting international human rights treaties that 
could lead to international scrutiny of domestic matters. Brazil’s case contrast most 
notably with Argentina, a country that adhered to international human rights regimes at 
the outset of its transition process. But unlike Brazil, Argentina’s elites were facing 
greater level of pressures to inflict domestic changes due its transition by rupture after the 
Malvinas war, the complete discrediting of the armed forces and the decisive society push 
for moving forward with transitional justice. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty) and political leadership. Appreciating 
the institutional and ideological authority of The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Itamaraty, 
is essential for a full understanding of foreign policy decision-making in Brazil. Scholars 
have been almost unanimous in their assessment that Itamaraty has historically 
centralized this process (Cheibub, 1985; Faria, 2012; Pinheiro, 2009). Cason and Power 
(2009) highlights three elements to explain Itamaraty’s preponderance in the foreign 
policy decision-making process. First, the ministry is admired both inside and outside 
Brazil for the high level of professionalization of its diplomats. Second, although 
embedded within a fragmented and penetrable state apparatus, Itamaraty maintained an 
impressive degree of bureaucratic autonomy and isolation. It benefits from the formal and 
informal boundaries separating it from other ministries and agencies. Third, until recently 
its policy responsibilities were monopolistic. Although there were minor variations across 
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time, it is fair to say that in postwar Brazil Itamaraty had virtually complete control over 
the design and execution of foreign policy, including trade policy. Finally, other authors 
have pointed out to the strong “esprit de corps” of the Ministry, which has been 
reinforced by an elitist diplomatic service along with a strong political culture that “forge 
among professional diplomats a sense of monopoly over what is understood as the 
national interest, which involves foreign policy formulation and implementation” 
(Burges: 2013; Pimienta & Belem & Casaroes 2013:468).  
Itamaraty was able to maintain its centrality along with important levels of 
bureaucratic autonomy throughout the process of democratic transition. This situation 
was maintained— not without modifications due to the increasing pluralism of actors 
involved and the importance of Presidential diplomacy—during the administration of 
Cardoso and Lula. The maintenance of the main tenants of foreign policy despite regime 
change is peculiar of the case of Brazil and it goes against foreign policy theories 
predicting changing policy behavior according to type of political regimes. A recent 
article by Pimienta & Belem & Casaroes (2013) explaining the persistence of Itamarity in 
Brazil’s foreign policy decision-making after the transition to democracy provides at least 
two reasons explaining this phenomenon. The first, and most obvious, concerns the lack 
of competition: the ministry maintained its central position as it found no external actors 
to systemically counterbalance its weight. Second, there is a set of institutional 
characteristics and historical developments of the Brazilian state, especially evident in the 
last couple of decades, which favours the centralisation of the process of foreign policy-
making. They are: (a) the country’s constitutional framework, which grants greater 
autonomy to the Executive in this matter, leaving the Legislative to a marginal position; 
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(b) the fact that the Brazilian Congress permanently delegates to the Executive 
responsibility in matters relating to foreign policy; (c) the ‘imperial’ character of 
Brazilian presidentialism; (d) the fact that the development model of import substitution 
has generated introversion and isolation of political and economic processes, thus 
allowing for a controlled opening to international trade (e) the largely adaptive and 
flexible character of Brazil’s diplomatic service; and, last but not least, (f) the substantial 
and early professionalization of Brazilian diplomats, associated with the prestige enjoyed 
by Itamaraty, both domestically and internationally. 
To be sure, during Cardoso and Lula ‘s governments there were foreign policy 
areas particularly in the economic and trade sector in which Itamaraity partly lost its 
decision making power over Presidential diplomacy (Cason & Power, 2009).  Yet, on 
political issues related to human rights and humanitarian intervention, the Ministry was 
able to continue its traditional policies of maintaining a “tight Westphalian focus on 
sovereignty and autonomy” without any significant force willing to counterbalance its 
power (Burges 2013). National autonomy and the defense of economic and political 
sovereignty that follows from it, is considered by Brazilian diplomats a key national 
interest and remained almost exclusively in the hands of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
The tight defense of sovereignty and non-intervention comes from set of foreign 
policy ideas and worldviews that have been historically transmitted and implemented in 
different policy decisions by several generations of diplomats serving at Itamaraty. Celso 
Lafer, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and prominent intellectual states that Brazil’s 
international identity and its foreign policy orientation has historical roots dating from the 
beginning of the 20
th
 century: 
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From the 1930s on, these reflections clearly oriented Brazilian foreign policy and 
diplomatic action by means of two principal guiding lines. One was to obtain and 
cultivate space for the exercise of autonomy-that is, in the words of then-minister 
of external relations Horacio Lafer in 1959, the zeal ‘to preserve the freedom to 
interpret the country's reality and to find Brazilian solutions to Brazilian 
problems.’ The second was to identify which external resources could be 
mobilized in different international situations in order to respond to the internal 
imperative represented by the challenge of development. (Lafer, Celso 2000)  
These two principals were reinforced even further with the rise of dependency theory and 
the import substitution industrialization model embraced by Brazil with the systematic 
support of the Foreign Ministry during the 1960s to early 1980s. As Soares de Lima and 
Hertz indicate, “Itamaraty acquired a powerful ‘institutional memory’ in which many of 
the characteristics and values associated with ISI retained their influence and 
attractiveness even after the decline of the particular development model” (1994: 24). 
Another principle that is historically rooted in Brazil’s diplomatic practice is the 
rejection to the use of force as a mechanism of conflict resolution. Rio Branco who drew 
the Brazilian map, first as representative and Brazilian counsel in international 
arbitrations, then, from 1902 to 1912, as minister of external relations, established 
Brazilian borders with little bloodshed during the ninetieth century. Celso Lafer, stresses 
the significance of this historical event for the construction of Brazil’s international 
identity: 
Not only did Rio Branco bequeath to Brazil a peacefully obtained map of 
continental proportions, he was also the great institution-builder of Itamaraty, the 
Brazilian Ministry of External Relations. He inspired the style of diplomatic 
behavior that, in my view, characterizes Brazil. Such a style is one of constructive 
moderation and expresses itself, in the words of Gelson Fonseca Jr., as the 
capacity to ‘de-dramatize the foreign policy agenda, that is, to reduce conflicts, 
crises and difficulties to their diplomatic bedrock.’ Such constructive moderation 
is influenced by a Grotian assessment of international reality-that is, by a 
concentration on the value of diplomacy and law in international intercourse as 
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appropriate ways to deal with conflict, foster cooperation, and reduce the impetus 
of power politics. (Lafer 2000)  
In sum, Brazil’s continuous emphasis on the peaceful settlement of disputes, its reticence 
to accept the concept and practice of humanitarian intervention when it entails the use of 
force and the preference for conflict prevention and mediation have historical origins 
back to more than a century of diplomatic practice. 
These set of ideas and principles guiding Brazil’s diplomacy continue to 
predominate after the return of democracy. Despite important foreign policy innovations 
due the economic opening of Brazil, the consolidation of the democratic system, and two 
different coalitions of government since 1995, Itamaraty has retained its historically 
acquired desire for implementing an autonomous foreign policy based on the defense of 
economic and political sovereignty. The fact that the Foreign Ministry after the 
democratization period retained its political and bureaucratic capacity to centralize the 
decision-making process allowed these principles to persist. The impact of these ideas on 
Brazil’s international policies can be traced directly to the human rights arena and easily 
recognized when examining the country’s unalterable behavior in this area: a long 
stressed resistance to coercive measures as a response for humanitarian emergencies and 
opposition to the idea of humanitarian intervention; an enduring resistance to criticize 
human rights violations occurring in foreign nations; and a permanent denouncing of 
what has been viewed as politically driven selectivity in relation to certain countries 
human rights records and on countries that are choses as target of humanitarian 
intervention. 
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The lack of new political leadership supporting human rights inside the Foreign 
Ministry also explains the prevalence of the former ideas. The bureaucratic insulation of 
Itamarity and its high levels of autonomy vis-à-vis other state institutions combined with 
the prestige of its diplomatic corps, prevented any institutional reform of the Foreign 
Ministry once new democratic government and the following ones came to power. There 
were no key appointments from outside the Foreign Service and therefore there was no 
renewal of people prompting a surge of new foreign policy ideas. It is true that Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso explicitly identify itself as a human rights person and as such he 
played an important leadership role as a Foreign Minister and after as President 
promoting human rights internationally and domestically among other measures through 
the creation of the National Human Rights Program and the Human Rights Department in 
Itamaraty. Furthermore, Cardoso himself decided to accept the jurisdiction of the Inter-
American Court and was able to get it approved despite the internal resistance of the 
Foreign Ministry (P. Pinheiro, personal communication, August 2013). Yet, political 
leadership on human rights in the area of foreign policy has been limited since the 
democratization process and the Ministry remained relatively unaffected on this issue. 
Considering the dimensions of the country, very few Brazilians have occupied 
important human rights positions internationally. This situation is clearly a reflection of 
the lack of engagement between Brazil’s diplomats and the international human rights 
institutions. At a regional level, only three Brazilians have been elected to the Inter-
American Commission for Human Rights: Carlos A. Dunshee de Abranches, 1964-1983; 
Gilda Maciel Correa Russomano, 1984-1991; and Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, 2004-2011. 
Cançado Trindade is the only Brazilian who has served as Judge on the Inter-American 
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Court. Internationally, the situation is no different. One of the most prominent figures in 
the global human rights machinery, Sergio Vieira de Mello, received practically no 
official or diplomatic support from his country of birth (Power, 2008) and 
the absence of any voluntary Brazilian financial support of the UN office that 
Vieira de Mello was heading at the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, is all the more glaring in light of modest, yet diplomatically significant, 
funding given by countries such as Mexico, Argentina and Chile. (Ergstrom 2010: 
14) 
Civil society. Brazilian civil society is seen today as vibrant, dense, active and 
able to mobilize against issues of importance. The transition to democracy brought a wide 
scope of political activism to the fore. Urban social, women’s and landless peasant 
movements joined Afro-Brazilians, workers’, environmental, and consumer movements. 
Overall, even though the focus of these movements was particular to their issue agenda, 
these groups have significantly contributed to expand citizenship through social 
mobilization around the “rights to have rights” (Montero 2014:95). Unfortunately, the 
strength and activism of Brazil’s civil society around foreign policy is much weaker than 
other issue-areas at least up to the beginning of the 2000s. Since civil society 
organizations are important drivers of ideas into domestic institutions (Sikkink 1993; 
Keck & Sikkink 1998), the lack of organizations monitoring foreign policy creates 
further constraints on more actively including human rights in Brazil’s international 
policies. 
The centrality and insulation of the Foreign Ministry and the perception of the 
majority of the Brazilian society that foreign policy is a question of “high politics” and 
not a public affair, played against the formation of a vibrant civil society on this subject. 
In an interview with Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, he recalls how the Ministry of Foreign 
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Relations during the transition to democracy was not receptive to the idea of exchanging 
information with NGOS particularly about human rights concerns. “Foreign policy was 
always a monopoly of Itamaraty and the federal government. An opening to other sectors 
of the Brazilian society was unprecedented and very much rejected especially by the 
‘soveranistas’ sector within the Ministry,” emphasizes Pinheiro. 
Yet, the 1990s brought some incipient changes. The incorporation and 
participation of local NGOs to forums and international events started in this decade. 
Civil society participation in the context of international conferences such as the Vienna 
Convention in 1993 and the increasing inclusion of some of these groups in ad-hoc 
consultation process with the Ministry on matters of interest are among the examples. At 
the same time and almost ten years after the transition to democracy, there has been 
increased interaction between local NGOs and transnational networks as evidenced in the 
creation of Justiça Global in 1999 by human rights professionals who previously worked 
at Human Rights Watch and CEJIL (Engstrom 2010). Yet, despite the importance of 
these developments, these changes have been insufficient to counterbalance societal 
perceptions on the subject. 
In 2001, as Cardoso government was coming to an end, local researchers 
surveyed 149 members of Brazil's “foreign policy community.” These included officials 
from the executive branch (the presidency, the key ministries, the diplomatic corps, the 
armed forces, and the Central Bank), the National Congress (deputies and senators 
involved in foreign relations and defense policy), business leaders, representatives of 
trade unions and NGOs, journalists, and many key academic specialists in international 
relations. When queried about how much attention the MRE gives to various actors from 
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political and civil society, the foreign policy community essentially endorsed the idea of 
an autonomous Itamaraty (Cason & Power 2009:120). 
It was only in the mid-2000s that significant changes took place regarding a more 
active and continuous civil society involvement on Brazil’s international affairs. The 
initiation of activities of the local NGO CONECTAS in 2001 and its acquired UN-
ECOSOC status as observer in 2006 with the objective of strengthening human rights 
defenders in the global south and monitoring and influencing Brazil’s human rights 
foreign policy is unprecedented in Brazilian politics. Some years later, the Brazilian 
Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Policy—a network of civil society 
organizations and state institutions—was also created with a similar aim of stimulating 
citizen participation and strengthen democratic control of Brazilian foreign policy as it 
relates to human rights. These organizations have sought to influence Brazil’s 
international policies on human rights. 
CONECTAS, for example, since 2007 issues a annual report monitoring Brazil’s 
positions regarding human rights matters at the UN system and denounces situations in 
which the country does not vote according to universal human rights standards such as 
the resolutions on Sri Lanka and North Korea in 2006. It has also been active lobbying 
the congressional committee on human rights and foreign policy and soliciting detailed 
information regarding foreign policy decisions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
CONECTAS has also been active networking with global human rights organizations 
especially from developing countries and in international debates at the UN Human 
Rights Council. Finally, CONECTAS has been able to fundraise important amount of 
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money from international donors to run their activities (L. Nader, personal 
communication, August 2013). 
The increasing activism of local NGOS with the aim of monitoring and 
influencing Brazil’s foreign policy decisions is too recent to permit a confident evaluation 
of its impact. The rise of these local NGOs coincides with the ascension of Lula to the 
Presidency and so far there is no concrete example of important policy changes on 
international human rights responding to civil society pressures. However, these 
organizations are asserting their presence by using advocacy strategies of agenda setting, 
“name and shaming”, and networking with international organizations in order to 
influence governmental decisions. These organizations might play an increasingly 
influential role in the future. However, for the majority of the time period covered in this 
study (1985-2010), civil society organizations were still marginal in foreign policy 
decisions and were unable to gain legitimacy among the most relevant foreign policy 
actors in Brazil. 
Conclusions 
This chapter attempts to understand why Brazil remains reluctant to become an 
international human rights promoter and looks at international and domestic factors as 
explanatory variables. It argues that on the impact of international influences on the 
adoption of international human rights this case illustrates how some countries are less 
permeable to external forces than others and how a foreign policy guided by the 
principles of autonomy and national development could be less receptive to the idea of 
international human rights. It is true that the need to obtain international credibility and 
legitimacy drove Brazil’s diplomacy to the adherence of international human rights and 
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to participate more actively on international human rights institutions during the 1990s. 
Yet, international conditions were not a powerful force to change traditional conceptions 
overstating the importance of sovereignty in international affairs and longstanding 
perceptions regarding the role of Brazil in the world.  
At the domestic level, it shows that democratic transitions not always generate 
local incentives for accepting international human rights norms. Most importantly, it 
highlights how history, institutional and bureaucratic practices, and the predominant 
ideology of decision-makers and political elites affect the ways in which international 
norms are perceived locally. Brazilian foreign policy has traditionally been dominated by 
a powerful Foreign Ministry that has been somewhat suspicious of international human 
rights and that had tended to disregard humanitarian interventions as a cover for great 
power involvement in the domestic affairs of other states. The lack of powerful 
transnational advocacy networks working on monitoring and influencing foreign policy 
decisions further constrained the prospections of a more active inclusion of human rights 
into Brazil’s international policies. 
Alternative explanations to the ones presented here come from two major 
perspectives. Realism will underscore that Brazil’s reluctance to become a human rights 
promoter is driven by its size, the economic strength of the country, and its growing 
international stature as a rising state. Brazil’s foreign policy, however, does not respond 
to the major tenants of power politics. The country has limited military capabilities and 
its international policies have historically been driven by international law, 
multilateralism and participation in international institutions. Furthermore, a realist 
perspective would predict that Brazil’s rising status since 2003 would increase the 
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nation’s reluctance toward international human rights. Yet despite some changes in the 
country’s foreign policy under Lula, this study shows that the country has been a slow 
and reluctant human rights promoter before Lula’s government and arguably since the 
transition to democracy in 1985. 
Another alternative explanation comes from liberalism and its assumption that 
economic opening prompts the search of liberal values internationally such as democracy 
promotion and human rights protection. This approach foresees that countries that decide 
to open their economies will almost automatically become part of a global liberal order of 
sorts. What this perspectives fail to capture is that countries like Brazil did develop 
important reforms to fully integrate itself to a market economy. Yet, these economic 
measures did not signify a complete alignment with liberal values internationally. To be 
sure, Brazil is clearly a Western society. However, as Andrew Hurrell puts its: “that 
identity [western] has only rarely been particularly significant in shaping either foreign 
policy ideas or foreign policy behavior” (Hurrell 2010). This chapter also demonstrates 
that a similar liberal argument stating that countries in transition to democracy are likely 
to adopt international human rights is also subject to criticism. Brazil’s case highlights 
that not all governments transitioning to democracy will adhere to international human 
rights treaties or decide to enhance its participation with international human rights 
institutions. Not at least as an immediate result of domestic calculations due to the 
uncertain circumstances of the political process. Furthermore, the case of Brazil 
underscores that those countries adopting political and economic liberal reforms at home 
are not necessarily destined to be “liberal internationalist” adopting straightforward 
strategies of democracy and human rights promotion abroad. The latter can shed some 
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light on the incipient debate about emerging democratic powers such as India and South 
Africa and their conception of and international liberal order along with their potential 
role shaping the future of the international human rights regime. 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS 
This research seeks to understand the ways and extent to which newly 
democratized states in Latin America support human rights beyond their borders. Using 
Chile and Brazil as case studies, it offers an explanation as to why Chile has been an 
active human rights promoter while Brazil has a more ambivalent policy towards 
international human rights. 
The main findings point out that states that commit to international human rights 
are the result of the intersection of domestic and international influences. At the 
international level, the search for international legitimacy and the desire for recognition 
and credibility affected the adoption of international human rights in both cases but with 
different degrees of impact. However, international values and pressures by themselves, 
while necessary, are an insufficient condition for human rights initiatives perceived to 
have not insubstantial political, economic or strategic costs. New democracies will be 
more or less likely to actively include human rights in their international policies 
depending on the following four domestic conditions: political leadership legitimizing the 
inclusion of human rights into a state’s policies, civil society groups connected to 
international human rights advocacy networks with a capacity to influencing the foreign 
policy decisions of their government, and the Foreign Ministry’s attitudes towards 
international human rights and the degree of influence it exercises over the outcome of 
the foreign policy process.
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The results of this research have important theoretical and policy implications to 
understand the means and circumstances in which states are likely to act to prevent or to 
terminate violations of human rights or to strengthen the normative and institutional 
framework for defending human rights. Important policy lessons can be extracted from 
the foreign policy experience of these two countries that can serve as guidelines for 
government officials, local and international norms entrepreneurs, NGOs, and scholars 
interested in the promotion of human rights internationally. 
Theoretical Contributions 
This study challenges the assumptions of the main approaches in international 
relations theory explaining why states incorporate human rights into their international 
policies and offers an account that particularly complements constructivist research on 
the subject. 
This research concurs with other studies indicating that realist theories have 
trouble accounting for the adoption and implementation of international human rights 
policies, except by dismissing them as insignificant (Sikkink 1993). There are few realist 
efforts to explain difference in human rights policies. The work of Egeland argues that 
“small and big nations are differently disposed to undertaking coherent-rights oriented 
foreign policies” (1988). According to this perspective, large states have multiple 
interests that preclude the pursuit of human rights objectives while at the same time these 
countries tend to base their policies on bilateral arrangements because they are more 
likely to have power to achieve their goals without multilateral support. Small states 
rarely have to choose between human rights and other foreign policy goals and their 
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foreign policy strategies are based on multilateral arrangements to increase their 
opportunities for influence. 
On the surface, the case of Chile and Brazil support realists accounts. Yet, there 
are several factors indicating that the differences in human rights foreign policies of these 
two countries are driven by other non-realist factors. First, despite its giant size Brazil has 
historically pursued an intense multilateral agenda and has permanently strived for 
occupying an active role within international institutions. The size of a country does not 
prevent the use and even the prioritization of multilateral strategies. In fact, Brazil has 
ratified all the major international treaties on human rights. Second, from a realist 
perspective Brazil’s emerging power since the beginning of the 21st century should be a 
powerful indicator that the country would be less inclined to participate in international 
human rights regimes. However, this study shows that Brazilian diplomacy was even 
more skeptic to include human rights at the beginning of the 1990s when the country was 
much more weaker economically and less influential internationally than it is today. 
Third, Chile is a small state pursuing human rights policies. But its size and its relatively 
low economic power do not explain the preponderant interest for human rights. Similar 
small countries in the region such as Ecuador or Peru have not assigned an important 
value to human rights into their foreign policy as Chilean diplomacy does. In sum, size 
and the relative power position of state cannot explain differences in human rights 
policies.  
Liberal accounts predict that new democracies are likely to commit to 
international human rights as a way of protecting regimes that are unstable during the 
transition process (Moravcsik 2000). This study tested this hypothesis and found that 
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only for the case of Chile this assumption holds. Chilean elites rapidly moved to sign 
international human rights treaties and to participate in international human rights 
institutions as way of protecting an unstable democracy and for containing the power of 
the military during the transition. Liberal explanations, however, cannot explain why 
Chile’s commitment to international human rights persisted once democratic 
consolidation took place. On the other hand, due to the character of Brazil’s transition, 
the new authorities had no incentives to subscribe to international human rights treaties. 
Not at least as an immediate result of domestic calculations due to the uncertain 
circumstances of the political process. 
Three general conclusions derive from these two cases when comes to the 
explanatory power of the liberal accounts. First, not all new democracies will 
instrumentally use international human rights to attain domestic goals. In some political 
transitions such as the case of Brazil, the political elites do not have sufficient incentives 
to pursue human rights policies or the perceived price of signing international treaties or 
accept international scrutiny is higher than the possible domestic gains. Second, in other 
cases such as in Chile, domestic incentives are crucial for triggering international human 
rights policies during the transitional period. However, the persistence of those policies 
after the transition depends the deep integration of human rights concerns as a standard of 
legitimized behavior domestically. Third, the case of Brazil underscores that countries 
undergoing democratic transitions are not necessarily destined to become “liberal 
internationalists” adopting straightforward strategies of democracy and human rights 
promotion abroad. The rise of new democracies does not necessarily imply the rise of 
new states supporting human rights standards worldwide. 
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Constructivist approaches investigate the role of ideas, norms, and identities as 
influences on state action. The national interest and foreign policies, they argue, are the 
product of the identities and values of a state. Therefore, it can be expected that 
democratic and right-protective states will seek to extend their domestic values abroad 
and recognize other states that do so (Risse-Kappen 1996; Brysk 2007). As for the 
domestic commitment to human rights in non-democratic states or in countries with low 
levels of human rights compliance, constructivist research has shown that states adopt 
human rights norms through a process of international socialization that is driven by the 
local regimes’ need for enhancing their international legitimacy and credibility and the 
persistent work of transnational advocacy networks in persuading governments to include 
normative concerns into their agendas (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Keck & Sikkink 
1998; Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999, 2013). 
The diplomatic experience of Chile and Brazil illustrates some of the 
shortcomings of the constructivist research on the subject and offers some clues as to how 
better understand the inclusion of human rights or lack of thereof in the foreign policies 
of new democracies. The comparison of the human rights diplomacy of these two 
countries shows that political transitions from authoritarian regimes in which the state 
itself is the perpetrator of human rights abuses into a democratic system respectful of 
citizen’s rights does not assure a state commitment to “protect strangers” internationally. 
The diplomatic trajectory of Chile and Brazil since their respective transitions to 
democracy is especially telling on this point. Despite the fact that both countries 
developed into democratic political systems respectful of human rights values, the foreign 
policy projection of those values differs significantly. Chile gives priority to the 
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promotion of human rights internationally while Brazil is still reluctant to become a more 
active participant within the international human rights regime. In other words, 
democratic and human rights values at home are not automatically translated into 
principled human rights foreign policies. 
This study shows that the adoption of human rights into a state foreign policy is 
conditioned by international as well as by domestic factors. Constructivist’s studies are 
right in pointing out the socializing effects of international norms and ideas into the 
behavior of states. In fact, this study shows that for Chile as well as for Brazil the search 
for international legitimacy and the desire for recognition and credibility is a necessary 
condition for new democracies to pursue human rights objectives. Yet, constructivists do 
not pay sufficient attention to the fact that in some cases the openness to international 
norms can vary and, as the case of Brazil demonstrates, a state can be less permeable to 
international influences due the predominance of local ideas that dot not readily 
harmonize with international human rights values. The predominant idea of an 
autonomous foreign policy and the priority given to sovereignty and non-intervention 
among Brazil’s foreign policy decision-makers underscores this fact. 
Domestic factors are critical to understand the degree of a state commitment to 
international human rights. Constructivist work provides important insights about the role 
of norms and ideas at the international level but they have overlooked the process and 
mechanisms by which those values and ideas translate into the domestic settings and, in 
particular, into the foreign policy process. This study fills this gap and suggests that the 
inclusion of human rights into their international policies of new democracies is 
dependent on three conditions: political leadership legitimizing the inclusion of human 
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rights into a state’s policies, civil society groups connected to international human rights 
advocacy networks with a capacity to influencing the foreign policy decisions of their 
government, and the Foreign Ministry’s attitudes towards international human rights and 
the degree of influence it exercises over the outcome of the foreign policy process. 
A brief summary of the analysis of the country cases help to illustrate how these 
variables work in practice. In the case of Chile, human rights diplomacy gained a 
prominent place because human rights values were mobilized, promoted, learned and 
legitimized by local actors (political elites and advocacy networks) and effectively 
channeled into the Ministry of Foreign affairs bureaucracy. Brazil’s case, on the other 
hand, illustrates how the lack of exposure to human rights ideas of foreign policy 
decision-makers, the institutional and bureaucratic practices at the Foreign Ministry that 
did not easily fit with international human rights values, and an inward looking civil 
society can negatively affect the inclusion of human rights into foreign policy. 
Policy Contributions 
There are several policy lessons that can be derived from the study of these two 
countries human rights foreign policies that are helpful for other governments, policy-
makers, and civil society activists willing to invest time, resources and political capital on 
the promotion and protection of people beyond their boundaries. This conclusions focus 
on four areas. 
Bureaucratic Barriers 
The main governmental agency implementing international human rights policies 
is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Yet, as the case of Brazil illustrates, bureaucracies can 
turn out to be fundamental barriers for introducing human rights into the foreign policy 
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process. The case of Chile illustrates a Ministry of Foreign affairs in which key positions 
are occupied by governmental officials that have signaled the importance of human rights 
as a main component of the country’s national interest. However, Chilean diplomacy still 
needs a stronger foreign policy machinery that is further institutionalized and that relies 
less on individual commitments. Chile and Brazil created human rights units within the 
Ministry but in both cases this topic is far away from being effectively integrated into the 
work of the different institutional compartments of the respective Ministries. There is an 
important degree of insulation of the human rights unit versus the other departments 
especially with ones dealings with political affairs. At the same time, the diplomatic 
corps as in any other country work on a rotational basis (two or three years) which in 
many cases decreases the development of acquiring human rights knowledge (if the 
person is assigned to the specific unit or Geneva) and civil society relationships that are 
particularly important for effective human rights interventions (Brysk 2007). 
The experience of countries such as Canada and Sweden when comes to 
“mainstreaming” human rights into the Ministry are particularly interesting. These 
countries not only brought a team of human rights experts to work into different units the 
Foreign Ministry but they also set up new thematic units and directly connected the 
country desks with related thematic units such as women, children, indigenous rights, etc. 
Some of these experiences could be brought into the Foreign Ministries of countries from 
the Global South. 
Training is another fundamental aspect to break bureaucratic barriers against 
human rights. The Diplomatic Academies of Chile and Brazil for the past five years have 
included new courses on human rights and some of their students have written original 
170 
thesis on diverse human rights issues. Yet there is a need in both countries to create new 
courses for diplomats in the middle of their careers that are willing to update their 
knowledge. Human rights could be included as a compulsory part in such training 
programs. Finally, it is important to create mechanisms of periodic consults between 
Ministry officials and local NGOS particularly on human rights issues. The work 
developed in the context of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) for the Human Rights 
Council has been very useful in both countries as a way of creating new channels for 
communications between governmental officials and NGOs and other national 
institutions. 
NGO Leadership 
This study shows that civil society groups systematically monitoring their 
government’s international policies are fundamental drivers for the effective inclusion of 
human rights into foreign policy. Here the recent experience of Brazil is particularly 
significant. Only in the last eight years, local Brazilian NGOS entered the foreign policy 
world. However, these organizations led by the work of CONECTAS are already 
showing important results. These includes an increasing visibility and public scrutiny on 
foreign policy on human rights, raising media coverage of the Brazilian foreign policy, 
improvements on the checks and balances in the foreign policy making process, and 
better coordination and higher presence of Latin American civil society in the UN. It is 
important to note that other transnational advocacy networks have contributed substantive 
resources and capacities to strengthen the work of Brazilian NGOs. 
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Diversity 
This study shows that there is a great diversity in the ways in which countries go 
about pursuing international human rights. Chile has focused on generating and 
supporting international initiatives especially at the UN Human Rights Council on civil 
and political rights with an emphasis on women’s rights and peace promotion. Brazil, on 
the other hand, focuses on economic and social rights. In fact, the country has been at the 
forefront of important international initiatives at the United Nations on the right to health, 
development and non-discrimination. Specialization on certain human rights areas 
considering the particular strengths of the countries involved could be a good way to get 
more countries especially from the Global South more involved. 
Coordinating Inter-institutional Policies 
Better coordinating and mainstreaming human rights inside the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs is as fundamental as harmonizing inter-state institutions that play a role 
in the international human rights policy. The case of Chile and Brazil shows the need for 
better coordinating the policies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of 
Defense specifically on issues such as peacekeeping, humanitarian de-mining, disaster 
relief, among other matters. The presentation of the UPR also underscored the necessity 
to create better coordination with the Ministry of Justice and other relevant state 
institutions. Most notably, in Chile and Brazil, domestic foreign aid agencies with an 
important budget for humanitarian initiatives develop their work semi-autonomously 
without coordination or even monitoring from other state institutions. 
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